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Foreword
In the last 16 months, we have all lived through a once-in-a-generation crisis. 
The pandemic will have a profound impact on the UK over the next decades. There is a 
huge risk that the gulf between the rich and the poor will continue to grow ever deeper 
and wider. The UK Government dug deep in its pockets to provide billions of pounds 
for people on furlough schemes and help for businesses and individuals hit by the 
pandemic. We applaud that commitment.
But as we emerge from the crisis and move towards recovery, it must dig deep again 
and take the same bold and decisive action to improve social mobility. Nearly one in 
three children in the UK now live in poverty, around 4.3 million. There could not be a 
more pressing time for the UK Government to make an action plan. Disadvantaged 
pupils in England are now as much as seven months behind their more privileged peers 
at school, including the gaps that grew in the last year. Young people have been more 
susceptible to job losses, with an 8.7% drop for working class men aged 16-24.
Now is the time to take action. We must not shy away from difficult decisions. We have 
drawn up a seven-point recovery plan which we believe will have the most impact 
on these groups. It will ensure that the disadvantaged are the first to get support to 
rebuild their lives and seize any opportunities, and to build a fairer United Kingdom, 
post-pandemic.
Now is not the time to cut public spending. We need to make the welfare system fairer 
and to use the tax system to pay for big recovery initiatives. Our proposals for education 
recovery, cutting child poverty by a third and creating opportunity for disadvantaged 
people will come with a hefty price tag, but they are critical to address the challenges 
we have identified – and they will benefit everyone in society. Small funding packages 
on the margins will have marginal impact. We urge government to ensure that any 
increases in taxation are levied on those most able to pay.
And that money should be targeted where it is needed most. We need to help close 
attainment gaps with a new student premium for 16-19-year-olds that will allow colleges 
and schools to invest in their students through tutoring, additional teachers or other 
evidence-backed interventions. We must invest in deprived communities by giving them 
the opportunities and skills to succeed. We should extend eligibility for 30 hours free 
childcare to all and give the early years workforce better pay and career structures.
But above all, we are urging the UK Government to put the poorest and youngest 
members of society centre stage of its recovery plan. Almost a third of the children 
in the UK now live in poverty and some regions have seen staggering growth. In the 
north-east of England, child poverty has risen by 11 percentage points in just five years. 
Children growing up in poverty will suffer worse health, education and life outcomes 
– and their chances for social mobility will be severely constrained. We know that 
targeting child poverty through welfare works – helping families out of poverty leads to 
better education outcomes, increased earnings for the child when they reach adulthood 
and even improved life expectancy. And ultimately, it benefits everyone in society when 
we are all better off.
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Now is the moment to level up opportunities for children across the country. Ending 
child poverty is one of the most impactful and influential things the UK Government 
can do to improve social mobility. We are recommending that the UK Government 
make a significant impact on social mobility by making welfare more generous 
through increasing Universal Credit payments, extending it to second earners and 
reducing taper rates. We also want to ensure that benefits policy once again reflects a 
household’s true size by removing the two-child limit. Our recommendations are only the 
first step of what must happen to end child poverty. We estimate they will lift 1.5 million 
children out of poverty, reducing the overall rate by 35%, and will help alleviate extreme 
poverty for millions more children.
COVID-19 has given many people their first real insight into how others live and how 
unequal the United Kingdom is. On our TV screens, we have witnessed cramped living 
in poor quality, high-rise accommodation where families sleep four to a room, with no 
outside space and no digital access. Some of the most pertinent debates about this 
pandemic were the reality of widespread food poverty driving thousands more to rely on 
foodbanks to feed their children.
But it’s not just about the poorest. Opportunities are still based on what your parents 
did. Today, you are still 60% more likely to be in a professional job if you were from a 
privileged background rather than a working class background.
As Commissioners, we believe the United Kingdom has a unique chance to use this 
moment as an impetus to create change. Over the last three years, we have worked 
hard as a Commission to draw up proposals aimed at ensuring that the UK has better 
social mobility outcomes. We want to make sure that potential and initiative matter 
more than your background or the place you grew up. To do this, we must remove 
the blockages, from birth to work, that hold back the most disadvantaged members of 
our society. All of our recommendations – whether on early years, education, place, 
apprenticeships or career progression – are now more relevant than ever and will lead 
to better social mobility.
As Commissioners drawn from very different professions, often with our own upward 
social mobility stories, we strongly believe that government, teachers, employers and 
local leaders each have a responsibility to act now. This report builds on three years of 
our in-depth research and strategic thinking to set out a programme of reform to drive 
social mobility forward.
Geography
The UK Government has committed to levelling up the country. It has signalled a strong 
desire to ensure where you grew up does not impact where you go in life. We support 
this goal.
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Our landmark report last year, the ‘Long shadow of deprivation’, showed in detail the 
scale of the challenge. We identified a true postcode lottery and showed how education 
alone cannot solve these complex issues. For example, we found that Bradford has 
some of the worst outcomes for disadvantaged young people in the country, with 
earnings of £9,500 per year and one of the largest pay gaps between young people 
from working class and better off backgrounds, even with the same levels of education. 
In comparison, disadvantaged people from neighbouring Harrogate earned £18,000 per 
year – almost twice as much – with a smaller pay gap.
Levelling up must take into account the varied outcomes people have, based on 
where they live. It should be about creating growth and opportunities, investment in 
infrastructure and transport, but it should also be about who benefits from available 
jobs, how people can move up the career ladder without moving to new areas, and how 
we create good lives for everyone, regardless of their postcode. Now is the time for an 
overhaul of existing policies and structures to tackle inequality within place.
But while our report showed education alone won’t solve this, it also showed how 
education still matters to social mobility – and how unequal outcomes are in different 
places. Much of the national debate about this has focused on outcomes for different 
ethnic groups, but this is a flawed way of approaching the problem.
Children in ‘coldspot’ communities are growing up in ex-industrial marginalised 
communities that have experienced decades of underinvestment. Most of these 
communities are predominantly White. Even for poor White boys, outcomes are not 
stable across the country and vary hugely by area. In metropolitan areas where schools 
and labour market outcomes are better, disadvantaged young people of all ethnicities 
are better able to thrive. Most disadvantaged, ethnic minority children are growing up 
in metropolitan areas many disadvantaged White children are not. As a Commission, 
we target our recommendations on the most effective interventions that will solve 
disadvantage across all ethnic groups.
The answer to these issues means thinking about investment in jobs, transport, 
housing, welfare and wider opportunities as well as in schools. We have often pressed 
the case for devolving more powers to the regions and city mayors in England and 
giving them more flexibility in how the money is spent. We believe this will be even more 
important now as we address the geographical impact of COVID-19.
Greater dialogue between schools, universities, colleges and local employers will help 
people stay and work nearer to local communities where they grew up – often offering 
them a better life. This work must help connect local partners to offer real solutions and 
pathways for people.
In our seven-point plan, we call on the UK Government to apply the lessons from 
Sure Start children’s centres as the new Family Hubs are rolled out in communities 
throughout the country. People need programmes that join up multiple agencies, that 
support parents to raise healthy children, and are flexible enough to work around 
complex work and family arrangements. Family Hub programmes require proper 
funding and must be targeted towards those who will benefit the most from them. As 
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Family Hubs are integrated into communities across the UK, we hope these important 
lessons from past initiatives are embedded into their design.
The impact of the virus may also have changed professional working patterns for good. 
Our recent research ‘Moving out to move on’ showed that privileged people tend to 
move to London or big cities to get a well-paid job, while those from poorer backgrounds 
lack the means or desire to uproot their lives. But the pandemic demonstrates this does 
not have to be the case. People no longer have to travel hundreds of miles or across 
the sea to improve their job prospects and become more socially mobile. In many 
cases, job opportunities are now just a couple of clicks away on a screen in a kitchen or 
bedroom, where living conditions, digital access and skills allow.
But there is no silver bullet. While homeworking can help, employers must also be 
incentivised to create more professional jobs in more deprived areas. We have called 
on employers, including the Civil Service, to move senior level jobs and high-level 
apprenticeships to these areas, to ensure there are greater opportunities for career 
progression for everyone. The UK Government has sought to lead the way on this 
with moves for many in Cabinet Office, the Treasury and other departments. The UK 
Government must consider how it can further incentivise employers to do the same to 
create opportunities and provide greater digital access and skills for everyone to thrive 
in a 21st century labour market.
We welcome the UK Government’s decision to publish a levelling up white paper 
and appoint an adviser to steer this through, but we need clarity about this agenda’s 
goals, funding and delivery. We intend to work with the UK Government in the coming 
months to ensure that this programme is as much about investing in people as it 
is infrastructure.
A dialogue between nations and regions
It is also time to recognise and learn from different approaches across all four nations – 
England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. Each nation reacted in its own way to 
the challenges of the pandemic. We must be prepared to learn more from each other.
The following four essays show how the different nations have sometimes drawn 
distinctions between tackling poverty and inequality and improving social mobility – 
but also that the three are inextricably linked. Child poverty has to be tackled to create 
opportunities for all. Equally, focusing on child poverty and inequality without an explicit 
effort on social mobility doesn’t work either.
Our insights into the four nations show that no nation has found this balance, but also 
that many of the most significant levers for change often lie with the UK Government. 
Despite strong and visible commitments to tackling poverty and inequality, we find that 
Scotland and Wales have not yet made progress on all of our key indicators. But both 
nations have led on a commitment to socio-economic equality by enacting the socio-
economic duty, a mandate for public bodies to consider the impact of their decisions on 
socio-economic disparities.
Social Mobility Commission | State of the nation 2021 | xi
Foreword
Each chapter explores in detail how the different nations have delivered against key 
social mobility indicators.
Early years, schools and further education
The lockdown from last March had an immediate impact on early years provision and 
experience. The closure of parks and playgrounds, for example, stopped children 
socialising and exercising.
Seven out of ten early years settings had to close due to financial pressures, with 
disadvantaged areas being hardest hit, and childcare workers either losing their jobs 
or put on furlough. Our report on the early years’ workforce last year highlighted the 
already high turnover in this profession due to poor career structures and low pay. Now, 
20% report they want to leave the sector after the strain of COVID-19. The attainment 
gap between poorer and more advantaged children by age 5 was already 4.5 months 
before the pandemic. We can no longer view the early years as ‘childcare.’ This is about 
a crucial component of our education system. Currently, the well-off are benefitting 
much more from early years entitlements then the poorest, who need the most support. 
This must change, starting with a better paid, qualified and stable early years workforce 
to deliver outcomes for children and with an expansion of the entitlement, so that more 
families can benefit from it.
Progress made in the last decade on closing the attainment gap in schools has been 
lost. Even before COVID-19, pupils who have spent 80% of their schooling in poverty 
were a shocking 22.7 months behind non-disadvantaged pupils on average. Education 
recovery will require an additional £10 billion in England alone, and will require 
evidence-backed interventions. We call on the UK Government to reform premiums, 
including introducing a 16-19 student premium. We also call for premiums to top up 
payments for students who are in persistent poverty and whose needs are greatest.
We praise each government for introducing flexibility into the education system in 
response to COVID-19. Indeed, many of the measures used during the pandemic are 
exactly the type of initiatives we have been calling on for years, albeit at a larger and 
more immediate scale. Post qualification applications to university, one-to-one tutoring 
and more teaching time during the school day for students who have fallen behind 
should all be on the table, long-term. We should be learning from initiatives like the 
T Level transition programme to help young people progress to Level 3, even before 
they complete their English and maths GCSE qualifications. These should not just be 
contingency measures but a much bigger effort to create permanent changes that will 
strengthen our education system for all learners.
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What now
Over the last 18 months we have produced a significant body of evidence which is 
relevant for this new phase of rebuilding the UK. Many of the recommendations in these 
are vital not just to any recovery programme but also to fix the pre-existing problems in 
our society that lead to poor social mobility.
In addition to these recommendations, the Commission will soon publish our plans for 
a new measurement framework to assess social mobility over the next 30 years. This 
framework will help the Commission and policymakers better monitor and take action 
when annual changes are risking people’s future social mobility prospects.
The country cannot rebuild itself after such an enormous shock without making sure 
that addressing social inequality is at the top of the agenda. Families and particularly 
children need to have the opportunity to thrive irrespective of their background or the 
place they grow up in.
Seven key pillars for recovery
• Geography and local power – A levelling up agenda that promotes equal 
outcomes for people living in under-invested places, and not just strategies that 
improve places generally.
• Poverty and living standards – The UK Government should make benefits more 
generous and account for different sized households in its calculations, starting by 
reducing child poverty by about a third.
• Early years – Higher pay and a better career structure for a workforce crucial to 
social mobility. Expansion of the 30 hours childcare offer regardless of education 
or training status.
• Education – A bigger focus on long-term deprivation, funding targeting, post 
qualification access to university and a student premium for those aged 16 to 19.
• Apprenticeships and adult skills – Increase the share of apprenticeships from 
disadvantaged backgrounds and make sure more get on to the higher levels.
• Digital access – Access to affordable broadband and digital devices for all 
households, as well as the skills to thrive in a 21st century world.
• Work and career progression – Ensure that all employers measure the social 
diversity of their workforce and focus on career progression for those from lower 
socio-economic background, including those in low paid jobs.
Executive 
summary
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Executive summary
Against the backdrop of COVID-19, the Social Mobility Commission (SMC) has taken a 
deeper look at the progress made in all four UK nations in tackling poverty, addressing 
inequality and improving social mobility. 
Our report reveals that each of the nations has struggled with the damaging impact of 
the pandemic from early years to training and employment, and that social mobility, 
already stagnant, could move backwards. 
The SMC’s remit is to monitor progress in social mobility across all the key nations, but 
only to advise on policy in England. Hence our recommendations in the next section 
provide the bedrock for a bold action plan for the UK Government, though many could 
be mirrored in the other nations. Most pressing is the need to end child poverty which is 
blocking progress across the whole of the UK.
England is the only nation solely legislated for by the UK Government. Scotland, Wales 
and Northern Ireland have separate parliaments or assemblies with different devolved 
policy responsibilities. Scotland and Wales have tax raising powers but use them to 
varying degrees.
Each has taken symbolic steps to try to address equality and social mobility. In April 
2018, Scotland became the first UK nation to have enacted the socio-economic duty of 
the 2010 Equality Act, requiring public authorities to consider socio-economic impact 
when making decisions. In 2020, Wales introduced the socio-economic duty, with a 
similar aim, which came into force in March this year. The UK government has set up 
a data hub for socio-economic and geographical data based in the Cabinet Office. The 
Commission has long pressed for legislation for a socio-economic duty in England but 
this is yet to be enacted. The Northern Ireland Executive have recently endorsed a 
report and action plan to address the links between educational underachievement and 
socio-economic background. 
The following section highlights the key areas of concern overall in the UK and in 
each nation.




Across the UK there are already signs that attainment gaps between advantaged 
and disadvantaged children are getting wider. Every critical measure of low social 
mobility – child poverty, income inequality, access to stable housing, unemployment 
for young people and gaps in school attainment – was poor in 2019. The impact of 
COVID-19 is threatening to make each of these factors worse.
Highlights
• Disadvantaged young people and children living in poverty have been hardest hit 
by COVID-19 and could face consequences that affect them for years. Around 
4.3 million children – almost one third of children in the UK – were living in poverty 
as of March 2020. This is an increase of around 700,000, or 3.7 percentage 
points, from March 2012.
• Furlough schemes have kept many people in jobs. Those from lower socio-
economic backgrounds are more likely to work in working class jobs, which have 
seen some of the most significant declines in paid work in the pandemic.
• When the pandemic hit in March 2020, only 51% of households earning between 
£6,000 to £10,000 had home internet access, compared with 99% of households 
with an income over £40,000.
• Between 2012 and 2020, all parts of the UK grew their share of professional 
jobs in the economy. In 2020, nearly half (49%) of all UK jobs were professional, 
while less than 30% of jobs were working class. But is social mobility improving? 
You are still 60% more likely to get a professional job if you come from a 
privileged rather than working class background.
• In 2019, people from working class backgrounds in professional jobs earned 
about £6,000 less than their more privileged counterparts in professional jobs.




The number of children in poverty in England has risen by around 500,000 since 
2012, yet England is the only nation in the UK without a strategy to address child 
poverty. When the current £20 uplift to Universal Credit expires this autumn, millions 
more will be worse off.
Highlights
• By autumn 2020, disadvantaged pupils in primary school were a total of seven 
months behind their more privileged peers. By this point, COVID-19 had already 
increased the attainment gap by 0.5-1 month on top of the existing gap. This is the 
equivalent of erasing between a third and two-thirds of the last decade’s progress 
on closing the educational attainment gap.
• 30% of all children in England live in poverty, a much higher rate than either 
Scotland or Northern Ireland, but roughly equal with Wales.
• In the north-east of England, child poverty rates have risen sharply by around 
11 percentage points in five years (from 25% to 37%). They are now close to the 
London rate of 38%.
• People from working class backgrounds are slowly becoming more upwardly 
mobile – 33% of people from working class backgrounds were in professional jobs 
in 2014 rising to 39% in 2020.
• But those from privileged backgrounds are also benefiting from the expansion 
in professional jobs. 62% of those in professional jobs are from privileged 
backgrounds, compared to 39% from working class backgrounds.




Northern Ireland’s unique post-conflict circumstances have exacerbated social 
deprivation. Both this and its decision to keep a high proportion of selective schools 
have impeded progress in tackling social equality and social mobility. The nation’s 
economy is heavily reliant on agri-food, retail and hospitality which have been hardest 
hit by COVID-19 and face an uncertain recovery.
Highlights
• Places at grammar schools have disproportionately gone to those from more 
advantaged backgrounds. 44% of children attend selective post-primary schools, 
but only 14% of pupils in selective schools are eligible for free school meals 
(FSM), (compared to 37% in non-selective schools).
• Almost one-quarter (24%) of children in Northern Ireland live in a household that, 
on income levels alone, struggles to provide the basics of heat, food and clothing 
or meet childcare costs.
• Significant gaps in school attainment between FSM and non-FSM students at 
Level 2 are larger for boys (30.6 percentage points) than girls (27.7 percentage 
points) and also larger for disadvantaged Protestant pupils (33.1 percentage 
points) than for disadvantaged Catholic pupils (27.1 percentage points).
• The proportion of professional jobs has increased creating more opportunity 
for social mobility, but still lower than UK-wide (42% against 49%). Those from 
professional backgrounds are still 80% more likely to be in those jobs than those 
from working class backgrounds.
• Qualification levels, wages, the proportion of high-paid jobs, the rate of job 
creation and new start-up growth are all lower in NI than the UK average. 25% of 
jobs pay less than the real living wage of £9.30.




Scotland is often perceived to be a place with good prospects for social mobility, 
but the reality does not match this. It was the first UK nation to introduce a socio-
economic duty, but it has no explicit social mobility strategy and social mobility 
outcomes have not yet shifted.
Highlights 
• Educational attainment gaps are narrowing but they are still substantial. Only 
about 83% of pupils from the most deprived areas reach the expected standard at 
secondary school, compared to 96% of pupils from the least deprived areas. The 
gap has been stuck at 14 percentage points for the last three years.
• Free tuition creates equality of opportunity to access higher education but by 
itself doesn’t necessarily close the attainment gap. There is concern that lack 
of fees inadvertently benefits students from wealthier backgrounds more and 
means that fewer funds are available to support disadvantaged students. The gap 
in progression to higher education between young people from most and least 
deprived areas is large (24.5% and 57.2% respectively in 2018-19) although it has 
narrowed in last decade from 38.1 to 32.8 percentage points.
• The proportion of professional jobs has increased, creating space for social 
mobility. However, 58% of those from professional backgrounds end up in these 
jobs, compared to 36% of those from working class backgrounds.
• Place matters in Scotland: deprived and post-industrial areas have the worst 
education and employment outcomes. Poverty is concentrated in the larger cities 
but also some areas surrounding Glasgow and rural areas.
• Unemployment among those from working class backgrounds and young people 
fell more in Scotland than in other UK nations before the pandemic (around one 
extra percentage point between 2016 and 2019).
• Scotland has consistently had low rates of child poverty compared to England 
and Wales, but 24.3%, or 240,000 children, remain in poverty. This is damaging 
to those children’s future social mobility prospects. Scotland has more generous 
child poverty benefits than the UK Government and strategically focuses on 
lowering rates, which we applaud.




Wales has with England the joint highest child poverty rate in the UK. Some 
progress made in recent years seems now to have fallen back despite valiant efforts to 
tackle inequality which have included laws on socio-economic duty and wellbeing. 
Highlights 
• The unemployment rate for those from working class backgrounds in Wales has 
generally been higher than the rest of the UK over the last few years, although 
this gap is now closing (from 1.2 to 0.1 percentage points).
• Wales has had the joint highest child poverty rates in UK, along with England with 
31% of children in poverty.
• The levels of in-work poverty in Wales are amongst the worst in the UK. 71% 
of children living in poverty live in working households, a figure which has been 
steadily increasing in recent years.
• The Welsh Government has prioritised raising standards in education and 
invested in early years, but there has been limited progress in closing the 
attainment gap between the most and least disadvantaged. The gap between the 
proportion of FSM and non-FSM pupils who achieve a good standard at GCSE 
has remained the same since 2007, at around 32 percentage points.
• 44% of people are now in professional jobs in Wales; an increase in the proportion 
of people in professional jobs represents an opportunity for social mobility – 
depending on who gets these jobs. 53.7% of those from professional backgrounds 
end up in professional jobs, compared to only 35.7% of those from working class 
backgrounds.
Recommendations 
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Recommendations 
Reversing the damaging effect COVID-19 has had will take investment and 
commitment. These plans will not be cheap. It is essential that the cost of the crisis 
does not disproportionately fall on the poorest or average earners. The UK Government 
should consider the recommendations of the Wealth Tax Commission. To support this, 
the Commission will initiate a cross-party working group to explore and present credible 
options for Treasury.
We are prescribing seven key pillars to build back better:
Geography and local power
The UK Government has committed to ‘levelling up’ the country but so far, plans seem 
focused on infrastructure and area-wide outcomes. Our work shows that this is likely 
to miss the mark. Men from working class backgrounds earn twice as much as similar 
working class men, depending solely on where they live. We must ensure that levelling 
up invests in people as much as it invests in places.
• Ensure that the UK Government’s levelling up strategy integrates social 
mobility objectives: The levelling up white paper should consider distributional 
inequalities within areas. Priorities should focus on greater powers for metro 
mayors, growth and access to professional jobs and the right measurements to 
track progress.
Poverty and living standards
Child poverty leads to worse health and educational outcomes, reduced development, 
and ultimately, worse social mobility. It is a preventable problem. Around 4.3 million 
children in the UK did not ask to be born into poverty, but their futures will be shaped 
by it nonetheless. With the will, the UK Government could immediately lift 1.5 million 
children out of poverty. This would raise life outcomes for millions of children, and make 
a significant, positive impact on social mobility at the same time. To do this, we must 
focus on both benefits and housing costs.
Child poverty
• Design and implement a poverty reduction strategy for England and its 
regions: Mirroring work that has already taken place in the other nations in the 
United Kingdom, the UK Government should measure progress using relative 
poverty after housing costs as the benchmark.
• Make benefits pay for children: Increase the rate for children in Universal Credit, 
legacy benefits, in child tax credit and for child benefits by at least £10 per week per 
child in the household; remove the two-child limit in Universal Credit, as children 
shouldn’t be penalised for being born to large households; reassess the benefit cap, 
to ensure households receive payment based on their needs, which could help the 
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poorest families get by better; reduce the taper rate so that for every £1 you earn in 
work, your benefits don’t decrease too sharply, to help second earners, particularly 
women, to get into work.
Housing
High housing costs have led to the private rental market doubling in size in the last 
20 years. This puts a strain on households’ finances, creates inequality, and impacts 
children’s education. Our recent work has shown how poorer children regularly 
moving schools contributes significantly to the educational attainment gap. Today, 
over 1.1 million people are on the social housing waiting list. To address this, the UK 
Government must build more social homes and create stability for private renters.
• Increase the number of social homes: Build three million social homes over the 
next 20 years.
• Give security to private renters: End Section 21 ‘no fault’ evictions, as part of 
the UK Government’s proposed ‘Renters’ Reform Bill’, which aims to ‘enhance the 
rights of those who rent.’
Early years
By the time children start school, poorer kids are already developmentally behind, 
and this ‘attainment gap’ grows throughout every stage of education. Quality early 
years education is not just about providing childcare or enabling parents to be in the 
workforce, it should deliver world-class education and development support to all 
children. Current early years entitlements are benefitting the better-off and are not 
reaching the families who most need high quality early years education.
• Make childcare more available and accessible: Expand eligibility for the 30 hour 
free childcare entitlement to all families, regardless of employment or training 
status; open universal childcare places for all two-year-olds; fund placements 
adequately, to ensure providers do not have to pass on basic costs to families.
• Expand Family Hubs: Expand Family Hubs (currently 150 hubs across the 
country), which aim to provide targeted early intervention support; target them 
in disadvantaged communities; embed lessons learned from similar initiatives, 
such as using hubs to connect families to multi-agency programmes and offers. 
Early years
Education
Children and young people have missed over six months of in-person education during 
the pandemic – almost 5% of their entire educational career. Disadvantaged students 
have been the most affected and will require significant and targeted support to catch-
up. We agree with analysis that education recovery will cost a total of £13-15 billion and 
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focus on evidence-based interventions that schools can deliver. In addition to those, we 
call on the UK Government to do the following for education recovery:
• Introduce a Student Premium for 16-19 disadvantaged students: Target funding 
at students who need it most, as they transition to a new phase of life. We already 
provide premiums from age 5-16. But disadvantage does not disappear at 16 and 
schools and colleges should be supported to close the attainment gap with targeted 
funds. As in schools, this premium should follow evidence-backed guidance but 
should be administered by school officials based on their needs (e.g. tutoring for 
disadvantaged students, hiring a new teacher, etc.). This should not replace the 
current bursary block funding pots, which serve different purposes.
• Fund additional teaching time in post-16: This will enable catch-up and can be 
built into the existing school day, with accountability through existing mechanisms.
• Factor in persistent disadvantage into the Early Years Premium, Pupil 
Premium, and the Student Premium (proposed above) and assess the Early 
Years Premium: Target additional funds to students who have been in poverty 
for 80% of their time in education; conduct an evaluation of the early years pupil 
premium by identifying how it is being used, whether there are any barriers to 
accessing it and what a fair value should be.
• Provide funding to schools for teaching and learning responsibility (TLR) 
for mid-career teachers: This will create an additional incentive for experienced 
teachers to go to or stay at disadvantaged schools.
• Replace SATs (in years 2 and 6) with an externally moderated digital portfolio 
of work: This must be shared with secondary schools to enable smoother 
transitions between key stages and assessed in order to continue monitoring 
attainment gaps. Primary schools should design these assessments in partnership 
with feeder secondary schools.
• Use the end-of-year time for catch-up: Young people taking GCSE’s and A levels 
should be required to stay in schools after exams for catch-up. In the future, 
this time should be used to teach employability and life skills (e.g. CV writing, 
budgeting etc.).
For universities
Access to universities is a crucial component for individuals’ social mobility prospects. 
To get in, universities rely on teachers’ predictions of their students’ grades. But 
predictive grades are wrong over 80% of the time, and they can harm disadvantaged 
students the most. Efficiency gains in our examination system should help us build 
a more effective system for students. Additionally, universities should assess what 
measurements they are using to target those from low socio-economic backgrounds, 
both as students and in their workforce. Currently, just 16% of academics are from 
working class backgrounds (compared to 39% of the general population).1, 2
1 Laurison, D., Friedman, S., The class ceiling: Why it pays to be privileged, 2019.
2 Social Mobility Commission, Simplifying how employers measure socio-economic background, 2021.
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• Implement post-qualification applications: Reduce exams to a three-week 
period (which was the original plan for 2021) and have them earlier in the school 
year to enable universities to get results earlier.
• Ask university applicants, students and the entire workforce for their 
socio-economic background: Universities should report on the socio-economic 
background of their populations. For applicants and students, this complements 
existing measures of disadvantage used in widening participation efforts and will 
allow employers to better target outreach efforts. For its workforce, it will help 
universities become more socio-economically diverse and inclusive.
Apprenticeships and adult skills
Apprenticeships can be a powerful tool for social mobility. But even before the 
pandemic, our work showed how they were failing on almost every measure to reach 
their social mobility potential. The pandemic has exacerbated what we found, cutting off 
opportunities for disadvantaged learners who could most benefit.
• Close the disadvantage gaps in apprenticeships: The UK Government should 
ensure that those from low socio-economic backgrounds get access to what should 
be one of the country’s premier routes to better social mobility. Use the levy and 
other mechanisms to incentivise employers to provide more Traineeships and Level 
2-4 apprenticeships, and to move higher level apprenticeships into social mobility 
coldspots. The levy should no longer be used as an alternative route for degree 
qualifications for more privileged staff.
Digital access
When the pandemic hit in March 2020, only 51% of households earning between 
£6,000 to £10,000 had home internet access, compared with 99% of households with 
an income over £40,000. Even when poorer households had access to equipment and 
internet, they were then less likely to have the skills to utilise it.
• Provide affordable access to devices and networks so everyone can engage 
in 21st century education and employment systems: Ring-fence a portion 
of the digital infrastructure budget so that skills and access provision increase 
proportionate to infrastructure spending.
• Ensure everyone is equipped with the essential digital skills for life (as 
defined by the Department for Education): Ensure every child leaves school 
with these skills; include training and assessment of these skills in relevant 
apprenticeship programmes; incentivise employers to ensure they equip people in 
their sphere of influence with skills (e.g. workforce, customers and supply chain).
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Work and career progression
Achieving better social mobility will take a coalition of partners. Here, we give 
recommendations to employers, who hold major levers to improve social mobility.
For employers
Over the past 18 months, we’ve helped employers to build more socio-economic 
diverse and inclusive workforces. These are the building blocks that employers from any 
sector can implement:
• Know your workforce: Ask the key question to determine the socio-economic 
diversity of your workforce - ‘What was the main occupation of your main household 
earner when you were aged about 14?’ – then benchmark your performance 
against national and industry figures.3
• Widen your talent pool: Target schools and further education colleges in 
social mobility coldspots for outreach activity; recruit for skills and potential 
over qualifications and ‘polish’; move senior, professional roles and high-level 
apprenticeships into coldspots.
• Support employees to ‘get on’: Our research consistently finds that those from 
lower socio-economic backgrounds face progression gaps. See page 18 for more 
actions you can take to support progression.
For a list of more comprehensive resources, employers can visit  
www.socialmobilityworks.org.
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Highlights
Furlough schemes 
have kept many 
people in jobs, but at 
a maximum of 80% of 
normal salary. Those 
in working class jobs 
have seen some of 
the most significant 
declines in paid work  
in the pandemic.
Disadvantaged young 
people and children 
living in poverty have 
been hardest hit by 
COVID-19 and could 
face consequences that 
affect them for years. 
Around 4.3 million children 
– almost one third of 
children in the UK – were 
living in poverty as  
of March 2020.
Between 2012 and 2020, 
all parts of the UK grew 
their share of professional 
jobs in the economy. In 
2020, nearly half (49%) 
of all UK jobs were 
professional, while less 
than 30% of jobs working 
class. But is social mobility 
improving? You are still 
60% more likely to get 
a professional job if you 
come from a privileged 
rather than working  
class background.
In 2019, people 
from working class 
backgrounds in 
professional jobs 
earned about £6,000 
less than their more 
privileged counterparts 
in professional jobs. 
When the pandemic 
hit in March 2020, only 
51% of households 
earning between £6,000 
to £10,000 had home 
internet access, compared 
with 99% of households 
with an income 
over £40,000.
The policy response 
from the UK Government 
was swift and broad: 
the Coronavirus Job 
Retention Scheme kept 
many in employment; 
eviction protection kept 
people in their homes; and 
the £20 weekly uplift to 
Universal Credit boosted 
incomes for those forced 
out of work. But many of 
these schemes missed 
the most disadvantaged 
communities. Recovery 
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Introduction
The United Kingdom has suffered a tremendous shock. The COVID-19 pandemic 
is a once-in-a-century event that is likely to have repercussions for decades. Every 
critical measure of low social mobility – child poverty, income inequality, access to stable 
housing, unemployment for young people and gaps in school attainment – was poor in 
2019. The impact of COVID-19 is threatening to make each of these factors worse.
In this chapter, we look at the overall picture of social mobility across the United 
Kingdom. We use data from September 2020 – just a few months into the COVID-19 
pandemic. This makes it our first snapshot of the damaging effect the pandemic has 
wrought on socio-economic disparities and social mobility. We assess the current 
national state of social mobility, look at the winners and losers from COVID-19, and 
review the policy response across the UK to this shock.
What is social mobility?
It’s the simple idea that where you start in life shouldn’t determine your future. It’s 
ensuring each generation does better than their parents. And it’s ensuring your 
potential, merit and choices determine your outcomes in life, not your background or 
the place you grew up in. To measure it, we look at what occupation or income your 
parents had, and what occupation or income you have.
But to get there, we have to look at what happens earlier in a person’s life. Socio-
economic gaps or disparities emerge right from birth and persist throughout life. 
When the pipeline of opportunity has holes in it, people with potential but not 
opportunity can leak out. When the Commission assesses government policy, we 
often look at these socio-economic disparities to see their impact on people’s future 
social mobility prospects and we make recommendations to government on how to 
ensure its policies are helping fix these leaks.
4 | Social Mobility Commission | State of the nation 2021
The United Kingdom
A note on our data
The Labour Force Survey (LFS) is carried out in four quarterly waves each year, 
and we have analysed data from the July-September (third) wave. This is our 
most reliable, workforce-wide dataset on social mobility trends and lets us look at 
trends since 2014, when the LFS started asking about participants’ socio-economic 
background (SEB).
Because the LFS only asks a person’s SEB in the third wave of each year, this is a 
first snapshot of COVID-19’s impact on social mobility – the full impact will emerge 
over time. Wherever possible, we report from this third wave. However, where we’ve 
marked it in a few places, we have had to pool data across multiple years to achieve 
sufficient sample sizes. We have also used the 3-digit Standard Occupational 
Classification (SOC) code version of the LFS, which can be accessed in public-use 
versions of the data. This version is widely used, but our recent analysis has shown 
it is up to 3 percentage points less accurate than the 4-digit SOC code version of the 
LFS, in more confidential versions of the data.4 For more, see Technical Annex.
The state of the United Kingdom: how COVID-19 has 
shaped trends
Where we started from
On the eve of the pandemic, the UK’s record on social mobility was poor. It ranked 21st 
for social mobility in the World Economic Forum’s index – better only than the USA and 
Italy among G7 nations.5 Driving this outcome was, in part, the country’s poor scores on 
measures of educational quality and equity (44th) as well as on fair wages (36th).6 But 
the picture wasn’t entirely bleak. Compared to other nations, the UK has greater access 
to work opportunities (9th), which can drive upwards mobility.
4 Social Mobility Commission, Simplifying how employers measure socio-economic background: An accompanying report to new guidance, 2021.
5 World Economic Forum, Social Mobility Index, 2020.
6 Ibid.
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Who sets policy for the UK?
The UK works under a system called ‘devolution.’ Most power is centrally held by 
the UK Government, and legislation and government policy set here affects all 
four countries in the United Kingdom. The UK Government is overseen from the 
Westminster Parliament, which has representatives from all parts of the UK.
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland have specific powers “devolved” or given 
to them by Parliament in Westminster. We cover specifically what these powers 
are in each of their respective chapters. These countries have their own, separate 
Parliaments or Assemblies, meaning, for example, that a citizen in Scotland will be 
represented both in Westminster and at Holyrood (the Scottish Parliament).
When it comes to social mobility policy, the UK Government holds the key levers 
to impact change, with the biggest exception being education policy (which is 
devolved). Despite this, England, Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales have taken 
their own approaches to tackling social mobility through policy, which we’ll look at in 
greater detail in later chapters.
The labour market continues to grow opportunities at the top
The opportunities available in our workforce have been shifting in recent years. Before 
we dive into who gets which jobs, we must first look at how the workforce is changing.
The biggest trend, dating back to post-World War 2, is the growth in professional and 
managerial jobs. 75% of the UK’s job growth since 2012 has been in professional jobs.7 
Today, nearly half of all jobs are professional, while less than 30% of jobs are working 
class. Since we last reported on this two years ago, there has been a strikingly rapid 
rise in professional jobs – from 45% of jobs in 2018 to 49% in 2020 (see figure 1.1). 
England has the highest share of professional jobs in the United Kingdom. 
7 From this point, professional jobs refer to the official classification ‘professional and managerial jobs’ and ‘routine and manual’ jobs are referred to as 
‘working class’.
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What is my socio-economic background?
Your socio-economic background is defined by your highest earning parent’s occupation, 
according to the National Statistics Socio-economic Classification (NS-SEC).8 We present it in 
three groups:
Professional and managerial occupations 
(NS-SEC 1 and 2). We call people whose 
parents were in this category ‘advantaged’, 
‘privileged’, ‘professional’ or ‘high socio-economic 
background’.
Examples include: CEOs, senior police officers, 
doctors, journalists, barristers, solicitors, teachers 
and nurses.
Intermediate occupations (NS-SEC 3 and 4). Examples include: shopkeepers, paramedics, 
small business owners and police officers.
Working class occupations (NS-SEC 5, 6 
and 7). We call people whose parents were in this 
category ‘working class’ or ‘low socio-economic 
background’.
Examples include: receptionists, electricians, 
plumbers, butchers and van drivers.9
More room at the ‘top’ of the workforce can be a good thing for absolute social mobility 
– it can help more people access higher-paying, higher-skilled jobs. But we are highly 
cautious about the recent increased rise, as it’s too early to know if it will be a long-
lasting trend. The last year has seen significant emigration of low-skilled migrant 
workers, post-Brexit and post-pandemic, meaning these figures could be anomalies or 
they could be the start of a new trend. It is unlikely we will know for some time whether 
this shift will hold.10
8 Office for National Statistics, SOC 2020 Volume 3: the National Statistics Socio-economic Classification (NS-SEC rebased on the SOC 2020), 2020.
9 We acknowledge the ambiguity around ‘long-term unemployed’ as a group that could include people of extreme wealth. However, we think it is 
important to code this group as lower socio-economic background to capture long-term scarring from stretches of unemployment, as a form of extreme 
(for more: Social Mobility Commission, Simplifying how employers measure socio-economic background: An accompanying report to new guidance 
2020).
10 This emigration of migrant workers is a real phenomenon, but the true extent is challenging to measure and, as a result, may be artificially 
accelerating the trends being seen in the labour market statistics here. This is due to the weighting of the survey which assumes the total population 
hasn’t fallen in this period, even when there is likely to have been emigration. See analysis produced by the Economic Statistics Centre Of Excellence 
(ESCOE), Estimating the UK population during the pandemic, 2021 and Office for National Statistics, Coronavirus and the impact on payroll 
employment: experimental analysis, 2021.
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Figure 1.1: Percentage of people in professional jobs across the labour market, in each 










Source: SMC Analysis of Labour Force Survey (ONS)
Note: Data refers to those in employment
40% of new professional jobs were in London and the south-east.
Looking deeper, we can see that the growth in new jobs isn’t distributed equally across 
geographic regions. Since 2012, 40% of new professional jobs were in London and 
the south-east (939,700 jobs), more than those created in Northern Ireland, Wales, 
Scotland, and the English regions of the north-east, the East Midlands, the south-
west, and Yorkshire and the Humber combined (818,800 jobs; figure 1.2). But the key 
question here is – who gets these jobs?
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Figure 1.2: Total number of new jobs and number of new professional jobs between 





































Source: SMC Analysis of Labour Force Survey (ONS)
Who gets these jobs?
For years, we have shown that your background makes a big difference in the type 
of job you end up in. Here, we look at who gets into working class and professional 
occupations.
Unsurprisingly, we again find that you are more likely to be in a working class job if you 
came from a working class background, and vice versa.
As figure 1.3 shows, in 2020 31% of people from working class backgrounds are in 
working class jobs (vs. just 14% of those from professional backgrounds in similar jobs). 
In other words, those from poorer backgrounds are still twice as likely to end up in 
working class jobs than those from more privileged backgrounds.
Those from poorer backgrounds are still twice as likely to end up in working class 
jobs than those from more privileged backgrounds.
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Figure 1.3: How likely are people from different backgrounds to be in a working class 



















Source: SMC Analysis of Labour Force Survey (ONS)
Note: Margin of error varies from 0.7% to 1.3% for individual statistics. See Appendix Table B1 for sample sizes and 95% 
confidence intervals
11 These trends are likely more lasting than year-on-year changes, which should be treated with caution. In 2021, the Commission will release an 
updated measurement framework for assessing social mobility, which will take into consideration appropriate amounts of time for change to occur 
between measurement points to account for year-to-year fluxes in the data.
There has been some small progress. Between 2014 and 2020, people from working 
class backgrounds have become more likely to be in professional jobs – from 32% in 
2014 to 38% in 2020 (see figure 1.4).11 There have been especially significant increases 
in Northern Ireland and Wales, although both started from a low base. This upwards 
social mobility across the UK is probably driven by the growth of professional jobs in all 
nations. England has the highest percentage of people from working class backgrounds 
who get professional jobs and has also seen the highest growth of professional 
jobs in the UK.
So opportunities are much better than they have ever been. But they are still not equal. 
A person from a professional background is over 60% more likely to be in a professional 
job than someone from a working class background. In other words, those from 
privileged backgrounds are better able to hold on to their position, resulting in fewer 
opportunities for those at the bottom to move up. Only Wales has experienced a decline 
in people from professional jobs in professional roles, while Scotland has held its rate 
steady since 2014.
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Figure 1.4: How likely are people from working class and professional backgrounds to 























Source: SMC Analysis of Labour Force Survey (ONS)
Note: UK: Margin of error varies from 0.8% to 1.5% for individual statistics. See Appendix Table B2 for sample sizes and 95% 
confidence intervals
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Who isn’t working – unemployment
The story of COVID-19’s economic upheaval has been about jobs. When lockdowns 
hit, whole sectors were thrown into chaos. COVID-19 disrupted the five-year gain in 
unemployment drops the country had previously been enjoying. Here, we look at who 
was affected, as of September 2020, as an early analysis of the pandemic’s effect on 
different social groups’ employment.
Surprisingly, those from professional backgrounds had the largest jump in 
unemployment, from about 4% to about 6% (see figure 1.5). While this seems 
counterintuitive, there are three main reasons this could be happening. First, those from 
professional backgrounds are younger on average and we know that unemployment 
has risen faster amongst young people (this will be covered later in more detail). 
Second, it could be driven by self-employed or owner-manager professionals needing 
to claim universal credit as unemployment support during the pandemic, as the Self-
Employment Income Support Scheme did not protect the incomes of the self-employed 
nearly as effectively as the employed.12 Finally, it is likely a reflection of how the 
Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme was targeted. Industries with high proportions of 
working class jobs took up the scheme at greater rates (such as hospitality, leisure 
and retail) and since people from working class backgrounds are more likely than 
other people to be in working class jobs, it is possible they were more protected from 
unemployment.13 Without the Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme, we likely would have 
seen significantly higher rates of unemployment.14
12 Institute for Fiscal Studies, Support for the self-employed during the coronavirus pandemic, 2020.
13 HM Revenue & Customs, Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme Statistics, 2021.
14 Office for National Statistics, Labour market overview, UK: October 2020, Accessed June 2021.
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Source: SMC Analysis of Labour Force Survey (ONS)
Note: People aged 16-64. Margin of error varies from 0.3% to 0.5% for individual statistics. See Appendix Table B3 for sample sizes 
and 95% confidence intervals
15 This chart does not show those who were on furlough.
Until 2020, the data has shown that those from working class backgrounds have had 
higher rates of unemployment. Looking across the UK, Wales has almost always had 
the highest levels of unemployment for those from working class backgrounds and 
England the lowest. England, Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales have all seen 
an overall decline in unemployment levels until shortly before COVID-19, where they 
were levelling off. And all but Scotland have seen a small rise in unemployment for 
working class people since COVID-19. Scotland appears to be bucking the trend with 
a continued decline of unemployment for those from working class backgrounds (see 
figure 1.6).
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Figure 1.6: Unemployment of those from working class backgrounds in England, 












Source: SMC Analysis of Labour Force Survey (ONS)
Note: People age 16-64. UK: Margin of error varies from 0.3% to 0.5% for individual statistics. England: Margin of error varies from 
0.2% to 0.3% for individual statistics. Northern Ireland: Margin of error varies from 0.6% to 1.1% for individual statistics, so changes 
across individual years should be treated with caution. Scotland: Margin of error varies from 0.6% to 0.9% for individual statistics, 
so changes across individual years should be treated with caution. Wales: Margin of error varies from 0.8% to 1.2% for individual 
statistics, so changes across individual years should be treated with caution. See Appendix Table B3 for sample sizes and 95% 
confidence intervals
16 Ellwood, D., Teenage unemployment: permanent scars or temporary blemishes? In the youth labor market problem: Its nature, causes and 
consequences, 1982.
17 Bell, D. N. F., and Blanchflower, D. G., Young people and the Great Recession, 2011.
18 Joseph Rowntree Foundation, Low paid workers who lose their jobs likely to face intense competition for new roles, 2021.
Scarring effects associated with unemployment, particularly when experienced by 
young people or those with fewer qualifications, are likely to lead to longer-term 
negative impacts on people’s employment prospects (lower pay and higher risks of 
unemployment).16, 17, 18 Although being on furlough is likely to have less severe scarring 
effects than unemployment, workers on furlough have lost out on work experience, seen 
their skills deteriorate and missed out on opportunities for promotion. The fact is that the 
labour market shock associated with the pandemic will impact people for a long time. 
There is an increased risk that for the unemployed and for workers on furlough they will 
experience poorer labour market outcomes in the future.
Unemployment hasn’t been the only issue. Many throughout the pandemic have lost 
hours or work altogether. Figure 1.7 broadly shows that the type of job you are in has 
been the biggest predictor of your change in paid work. While the Coronavirus Job 
Retention Scheme has helped, those on furlough and not working will lose at least 
20% of their earned income unless their employer tops up with discretionary payments. 
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Unsurprisingly, there has been a decline across all socio-economic backgrounds in 
paid work between September 2019 and September 2020 with working class jobs 
having been hardest hit, (declines of about 7%-10%).19 As we’ve shown below, the 
occupation you are in is influenced strongly by one’s socio-economic background. In 
other words, those from lower socio-economic backgrounds, who are more likely to 
work in working class jobs, have seen some of the most significant declines in paid work 
in the pandemic.
19 While it appears at first glance that those from professional backgrounds in working class jobs have been hit hardest, the sample size for this group 
is small and so there is no statistically significant difference in the size of this drop compared with that seen for those from other backgrounds.
Figure 1.7: Change in the share of individuals in paid work between September 2019 
and September 2020 by own occupation and socio-economic background












Working classIntermediateProfessional / managerial
Source: SMC Analysis of Labour Force Survey (ONS)
Note: Margin of error for changes over time varies from 1.6% to 3.6% for individual statistics and groups. See Appendix Table B4 
for sample sizes and confidence intervals. Note: Those defined as in paid work are those who worked at least one hour in the week 
before the respondent was interviewed. People who are employed but on furlough, and who did not work at least one hour, may not 
appear in these figures
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Who got to work from home?
Overnight, professional work shifted. Zoom meetings, background displays and 
delivery service dominated popular culture – but this was a profoundly privileged 
experience. Here are the experiences people had for each type of job.
Overwhelmingly, professional jobs (such as accountants, engineers, even 
teachers) pivoted to remote working, providing stability for employees and even 
some new opportunities. Professionals had homeworking rates more than 40 
percentage points higher than any working class occupation.20 This also holds 
when we look at homeworking by income; 55% of workers in households with 
annual income greater than £20,000 worked from home vs 19% below £20,000.21 
As we have shown in this chapter, those from privileged backgrounds are more 
likely to be in professional jobs and have been able to benefit from continued 
employment, physical shielding from the virus, and, because they were less likely 
to be on furlough, they benefitted from greater stability. A notable exception to this 
is the creative industries, which are over-represented by those from professional 
backgrounds and faced significant periods on furlough.22, 23
Many intermediate jobs do not lend themselves to home working (e.g. shop 
owners, taxi owners, call centre agents). In April 2020, 15% of caring, leisure and 
service occupations did some work at home, compared to over two thirds (70%) of 
professional occupations.24, 25 Small business owners and contractors likely utilised 
both Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme and unemployment schemes. Additionally, 
these jobs were more likely to have self-employed individuals. While the Self-
employment Income Support Scheme (SEISS) was made available, many were still 
left without support.
But those in working class jobs faced the biggest variation, which exposed them 
to greater risks, instability and strain. Some industries were more likely to be 
put on furlough and were less stable (e.g. waiter/waitresses, bar staff, catering 
assistants) while others saw increased and unprecedented demand, supporting 
those working from home (e.g. grocery store workers, postal workers, HGV and 
van drivers). Generally, working class jobs were the least likely to be done from 
home, meaning the daily health risks they had to take to put food on the table were 
extremely different.
20 Office for National Statistics, Coronavirus and homeworking in the UK: April 2020, 2020. Data is in reference to April 2020, which coincides with 
potentially the height of people working from home. These are the latest figures currently available.
21 Ibid.
22 Creative Industries Policy and Evidence Centre, Getting in and Getting on: Class, participation and job quality in the UK Creative Industries, 2020.
23 Office for National Statistics, Business Insights and impact on the UK economy: 22 April 2021, 2021.
24 Office for National Statistics, Coronavirus and homeworking in the UK: April 2020, 2020.
25 Resolution foundation, Results by Free School Meal entitlement and gender, 2020.
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Key workers have been an essential group in this crisis who cut across all socio-
economic backgrounds (doctors, nurses, grocery workers, and more). They have 
predominantly not been able to work from home and have carried the burden of this 
crisis, while also being exposed to the most health risks.
26 Office for National statistics, Internet access – households and individuals, Great Britain: 2020, 2020.
27 National Endowment for Science, Technology and the Arts, Data poverty in Scotland and Wales, 2021.
28 Lloyds Banking Group, Lloyds Bank UK Consumer Digital Index, 2020.
29 Cambridge Centre for Housing & Planning Research, The Digital Divide: What does the research tell us?, Accessed June 2021.
30 For example, see Social Mobility Commission, Learning ladders: Adult training and progression out of low pay, 2020.
31 Bridge Group, Who gets ahead and how?, 2020.
32 Friedman S. and Laurison D., The Class Ceiling: Why it Pays to be Privileged, 2020.
The role of digital exclusion
Working from home requires people to have devices, internet access and the skills 
to effectively engage with online working environments. By February 2020, 96% of 
households had internet access26. However, having an internet connection is not the 
same thing as having enough internet access. Many low-income households cannot 
afford the data allowance they need due to high costs or poor local infrastructure.27 
22% of the population do not have basic digital skills to use the internet effectively.28 
People in lower income groups, without a job, with fewer educational qualifications 
and with disabilities are more likely not to have internet access and/or the skills 
which are required for the workplace. It is estimated that when the COVID-19 
pandemic hit in March 2020, only 51% of households earning between £6,000-
£10,000 had home internet access, compared with 99% of households with an 
income of over £40,000.29
The class pay gap: it pays to be privileged
Jobs are only one side of the equation – the other is pay. Once in a job, those from 
lower socio-economic backgrounds tend to progress upwards at slower rates than their 
more privileged peers, even when controlling for performance, resulting in class pay 
gaps.30, 31, 32
Across the whole workforce, people from a privileged background earn, on average, 
30% more than those from a working class background. Part of this can be explained 
by the type of occupation they end up in – they are much more likely to end up in a 
professional job. But even after we take this into account, there is still a class pay gap 
within every occupational group (figure 1.8).
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In 2019, even when people from working class backgrounds successfully entered 
professional occupations, their more privileged counterparts in those professional jobs 
still earned 18% (£6,000) more.33 In other words, it quite literally pays to be privileged.
33 For this section, we use 2019 data because 2020 data was impacted heavily by the UK Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme.
The pay gap in professional jobs: people from working class backgrounds earn 
£6,000 less on average than those from professional backgrounds.







Source: SMC Analysis of Labour Force Survey (ONS)
Note: These figures are based on 2019 earnings due to 2020 earnings being affected by pay on furlough. The difference for those 
from professional backgrounds is statistically significant at the 5% level. The differences for those from intermediate and working 
class backgrounds are not statistically significant. Further details, 95% confidence intervals and unweighted sample sizes can be 
found in Appendix Table B5
This gap shows a significant progression gap across the labour market, which is critical 
for employers to solve. Access isn’t enough – all employers must do their part. Their 
focus should be on not only who gets in but also who gets on.
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Employers: from getting in to getting on
Our work consistently finds that in all types of jobs, those from lower socio-economic 
backgrounds progress at a slower rate than their more privileged peers. This is true 
even when we control for job performance, gender and a range of other factors. This 
is important not only to help create fair systems in ‘top’ jobs, but also to help those 
stuck in low paid jobs to progress their career.
Government has the power to set up effective regulatory frameworks which establish 
workplace standards if it so chooses. That said, we do not think this is the work of 
government alone. That’s why we work with hundreds of employers in England to 
help improve socio-economic diversity and inclusion in the workplace. In 2020, we 
published best practice advice and case studies for employers who want to progress 
their low-skilled, low paid workforces (such as in retail, manufacturing and food 
services).34 We then went on to look at progression in professional settings, including 
the Civil Service.35
Here are the main lessons for employers:
• There are no silver bullets; this work takes a multi-pronged approach.
• Build a culture of progression – employers who do best for progression have 
strong, visible commitment from senior leadership and view their workforce 
as a valuable asset. They ensure managers at all levels are offering training 
and holding regular career conversations.
• Reduce informal ways to be promoted – sponsorships, high-profile roles 
and informal networks can give those from privileged backgrounds an 
unintended leg up.
• Have a defined list of skills required for each promotion – those from lower 
socio-economic backgrounds tend to be overlooked in jobs that require subjective 
measures of skills and tend to apply to jobs they perceive to be based as 
meritocratic.
• Focus on inclusion and start a conversation about class – many job 
environments, particularly professional settings, favour those from privileged 
backgrounds and can inadvertently exclude others (our work in the Civil 
Service showed especially negative effects on women from low socio-economic 
backgrounds and Black employees).
• Ensure there are intermediate steppingstones of progression built into your 
structure – instead of a huge jump from shop floor to manager of 50+ people, 
why not introduced shift safety leaders or specific specialisms that come with 
smaller levels of responsibility (and a commensurate pay bump).
For more, visit www.socialmobilityworks.org.
34 Social Mobility Commission, Increasing in-work training and progression for frontline workers, 2020.
35 Social Mobility Commission, Navigating the labyrinth: Socio-economic background and career progression within the Civil Service, 2021.
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Cumulative barriers: how characteristics intersect
People do not experience their characteristics as separate and, with that in mind, 
we strive to show (where data allows) the interplay between gender, ethnicity and 
disability. No characteristic can solve for another – these are complex experiences 
that policymakers must consider in the round. Since we last reported on social mobility 
by gender and disability in 2018-19, there have been no significant changes.36 In this 
section, we look at early impacts the pandemic has had on these intersections.
Gender and age
The pandemic has caused a similar reduction in paid work for both men and women 
(4%-5%, a statistically insignificant difference, see figure 1.9).
However, when we dive deeper, we see age, gender and background come together 
to create big effects. Young people aged 16-24 have generally seen the biggest 
decreases in paid employment, with young men being the most affected (about 3%-12% 
for men vs. 4%-7% for women, depending on socio-economic background). Similar 
patterns exist across the overall workforce, showing that those from more privileged 
backgrounds have suffered the greatest loss in paid work for those aged 16-34. For 
young people, this is partly due to higher rates of privileged people spending more 
time in education, whereas for the 25-34 age bracket, they were more likely to be on 
furlough.37 We will discuss the impact on young people more in the next section.
Amongst older individuals, there is a more complex picture, with men and women from 
working class and intermediate backgrounds generally seeing the biggest reductions in 
paid employment.
36 Social Mobility Commission, State of the nation 2018-19, 2019.
37 HM Revenue & Customs, Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme statistics: November 2020, 2020.
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Figure 1.9: Percentage change in the share of individuals in paid work between 
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Age 50-64Age 35-49Age 25-34Age 16-24All
Source: SMC Analysis of Labour Force Survey (ONS)
Note: Those defined as in paid work are those who worked at least one hour in the week before the respondent was interviewed. 
The change in paid work for men from intermediate backgrounds is not statistically significant, due to small sample sizes. Margin of 
error for changes over time varies from 2.5% to 7.5% for individual statistics and groups. See Appendix Table B7 for sample sizes 
and confidence intervals
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Experiences of the pandemic have not been felt equally. Women from lower socio-
economic backgrounds were already several steps behind on upwards mobility. In 2020, 
just 36% of women from lower socio-economic backgrounds were in professional jobs, 
(compared to 40% of men from low SEB, 58% of women from high SEB and 65% of 
men from high SEB).
The burden of being on furlough and redundancy has fallen differently across the 
genders. While redundancy has been higher for men, women were more likely to have 
been put on furlough, mainly because women from lower socio-economic backgrounds 
make up large swaths of the low-paid workforce, who were particularly vulnerable to 
being on furlough.38, 39, 40 The experience of being on furlough has been unequal as well, 
as those in insecure work have received less additional support from their employers.
Women on furlough were 10 percentage points less likely than men to get a top-up 
from their employers.
Women are more likely to be in insecure work, which has meant that women on furlough 
are 10 percentage points less likely than men to receive a discretionary 
top-up from their employers.41
Additionally, the experience of the pandemic has been different for women depending 
on socio-economic status: low-income families with kids were almost 10 percentage 
points more likely to lose paid working hours than those with high incomes.42
46% of mothers who have been made redundant during the pandemic cite lack of 
adequate childcare provision as the cause.
38 Office for National Statistics, LFS: ILO redundancy level (thousands): UK: Men: SA, 2021.
39 Social Mobility Commission, Learning ladders: Adult training and progression out of low pay, 2020.
40 UK Parliament, COVID-19: Empowering women in the recovery from the impact of the pandemic, 2021.
41 House of Commons: Women and Equalities Committee, Unequal impact? Coronavirus and the gendered economic impact, 2021.
42 Women’s Budget Group, Women and employment during COVID-19, 2021.
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Additionally, at the beginning of the pandemic, when nurseries and schools were closed, 
women with children faced the overwhelming burden of being employee, mum, teacher 
and sometimes cleaner, cook and partner. In September and October 2020, women 
spent 99% more time on unpaid childcare than men, and 64% spent more time on 
unpaid household work.43 This regression of gender norms has had real impacts on 
women, who reported significantly higher rates of anxiety, depression and loneliness 
than men.44 For mums who could not work from home, the pandemic has created 
additional and profound challenges. Poor families are also less likely to have access 
to the internet at home, further compounding some of the difficulties for mothers trying 
to teach their kids from home.45 This has been pivotal for some, as 46% of mothers 
who have been made redundant during the pandemic cite lack of adequate childcare 
provision as the cause.46 This will be damaging to working class women’s social mobility 
and it may also have an impact on the gender wage gap and career progression 
in the future.
It is clear that working class women were already starting behind compared to all 
other groups, and the pandemic has hit this group hard. As recovery continues, it 
will be crucial to see how women reconnect to the labour market and restore their 
mental health.
43 Office for National Statistics, COVID-19 and the different effects on men and women in the UK, March 2020 to February 2021, 2021.
44 Ibid.
45 Cambridge Centre for Housing and Planning Research, “Pay for the Wi-fi or feed the children”: Coronavirus has intensified the UK’s digital divide, 
2021.
46 Women’s Budget Group, Women and employment during COVID-19, 2021.
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Ethnicity
Ethnic minority individuals from privileged backgrounds are more likely to experience 
downward social mobility than their White counterparts.
In general, ethnic minorities are less likely to be upwardly mobile, regardless of their 
background. Our 2020 work on downward social mobility clearly showed that overall, 
ethnic minority individuals from privileged backgrounds are more likely to experience 
downward social mobility than their White counterparts.47 They are less likely to end up 
in professional roles (55% vs. 61% for White individuals from professional backgrounds) 
and they are more likely to be in working class jobs (19% vs. 15%).
But grouping all ethnicities into one set hides massive variation, which inhibits 
policymakers’ ability to identify specific problems and solutions. To dive deeper, our 
analysis here pools data for 2014-2020 to give us sufficient sample sizes.
Those from Chinese and Indian backgrounds outperform other ethnic groups both on 
their upward mobility and on maintaining privileged positions in society. Amongst all 
people from working class backgrounds, those from Chinese and Indian backgrounds 
are the most likely to be upwardly mobile, outperforming White working class people by 
14 and 10 percentage points respectively (see figure 1.10). Concurrently, Chinese and 
Indian individuals who come from professional backgrounds have a 61-65% chance of 
being in professional occupations themselves.
Just 24-25% of working class people from 
Bangladeshi and Pakistani backgrounds 
make it into professional jobs vs. 48% of 
working class Chinese people.
24% to 
25%
The worst outcomes are for those from Bangladeshi and Pakistani backgrounds, 
who have shockingly low rates of upwards mobility. Just 24%-25% of working class 
individuals from these groups make it into professional occupations, compared to 48% 
of working class Chinese individuals.
47 Social Mobility Commission, Changing gears: Understanding downward social mobility, 2020.
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These groups also have the worst rates of holding onto privilege. Just 33% of 
Bangladeshi and 36% of Pakistani individuals from privileged backgrounds themselves 
end up in professional jobs. The most concentrated pockets of deprivation in the country 
are found among Pakistani, Bangladeshi and Black groups.48 People from the Pakistani 
and Bangladeshi ethnic group are over three times more likely as White UK people to 
live in the most overall deprived 10% of neighbourhoods, which may partially explain 
these poor rates of upwards social mobility.49 These patterns match similar analysis 
carried out on data from the past 50 years.50
48 Office for National Statistics, Ethnicity Facts and Figures, 2020.
49 Ibid.
50 Commission on Race and Ethnic Disparities, The social mobility of ethnic minorities in Britain in the last 50 years (1972-2019), 2021.
Figure 1.10 : Percentage of people from professional and working class backgrounds in 



































































Source: SMC Analysis of Labour Force Survey (ONS)
Note: Margin of error varies from 0.4% to 6.2% for individual statistics and groups. The largest margins of error are seen for the 
Chinese, Black Caribbean and Bangladeshi groups. See Appendix Table B9 for sample sizes and 95% confidence intervals
Social Mobility Commission | State of the nation 2021 | 25
The United Kingdom
What drives social mobility?
To help inform policy and understand social mobility, it is important to look at what 
drives it in the UK. Soon, we will release a refreshed and improved edition of our 
2016-17 social mobility index. This index will chart the outcomes that will impact and 
drive social mobility over the next 30 years. As part of that work, we have identified 
the key drivers of social mobility from the evidence base:
• Conditions of childhood – such as poverty, overcrowding and inequality. Lower 
rates of these contribute to a socially mobile society, while higher rates can limit it.
• Education access – quality and equity, such as the ability to get to good quality 
schooling and post-school education, exclusion rates and equality of learning 
when you’re at school.
• Lifelong learning – such as changes to re-train or seek further education.
• Work opportunities and transition to work – which is particularly important for 
young people entering the labour market.
• Fair wages and working conditions – including how many people are stuck in 
low paid, insecure and ‘dead end’ jobs.
We are still considering other drivers, such as access to housing, success of new 
enterprise and wider economic drivers of absolute mobility, and will publish the 
complete index later this year, along with the evidence base that sits behind it. We 
will use this refreshed index to improve our statutory monitoring function.
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Who has been most affected by COVID-19?
There is one thing we can say confidently about the COVID-19 pandemic; it has not 
affected everyone equally. This section looks at those hardest hit by COVID-19 and the 
implications that it has on future social mobility prospects.
Young people
Young people are often the most impacted from recessions, and COVID-19 has held 
true to that trend. Young people were twice as likely to be working in sectors that were 
shut down than the rest of the workforce.51
Youth unemployment increased faster between Spring and Autumn 2020 than at any 
point since the financial crisis.
Across the entire workforce we showed above (figure 1.7) that there has been a 
reduction in paid work of between 4%-4.5% with roughly equal distribution across those 
from all backgrounds. But for young people aged 16-24 that jumps to 6.6%-9% decline 
in paid employment (see figure 1.11). For those who were employed in 2020, a large 
share was likely to have been put on furlough.52 Youth unemployment increased faster 
between spring and autumn 2020 than at any point since the financial crisis, and young 
workers make up a disproportionate share of the fall in employment over the last year.53 
There is also evidence that ethnic disparities in unemployment risks widened.54
Young men of all backgrounds have been particularly affected, as have young women 
from professional backgrounds (see figure 1.9).
51 Resolution Foundation, Risky business Economic impacts of the coronavirus crisis on different groups of workers, 2020.
52 Unfortunately, the Labour Force Survey does not ask if someone was put on furlough and so we cannot accurately see the effect, but the trends 
in figure 1.11 are in line with official statistics, showing a higher share of younger workers on the Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme than for older 
workers.
53 Resolution Foundation: Uneven steps: Changes in youth unemployment and studies since the onset of COVID-19, 2021.
54 Ibid.
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Figure 1.11: Percentage point change in the share of 16 to 24 year olds in different 
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Source: SMC Analysis of Labour Force Survey (ONS)
Note: Margin of error for changes over time varies from 1.7% to 5.2% for individual statistics and groups. See Appendix Table B10 
for sample sizes and confidence intervals. Those defined as in paid work are those who worked at least one hour in the week before 
the respondent was interviewed. The change for those from intermediate backgrounds is not statistically significant, due to small 
sample sizes
55 Sutton Trust, COVID-19 and social mobility impact brief #5: Graduate recruitment and access to the workplace, 2020.
There are several worrying impacts of these trends:
• Young people on furlough are potentially vulnerable if the employers they work for 
continue to struggle over the next year.
• Young people are likely to be missing out on valuable work experience. This holds 
both for those who are on furlough as well as for those in education who are 
seeking experience as part of a course. Around 60% of graduate employers have 
had to cancel some or all of their work experience and internship placements due 
to COVID-19.55 This creates questions about who is getting the work experience 
that is available. If ‘sharp-elbowed’ young people from privileged backgrounds are 
securing limited work experience opportunities, it could lead to fewer opportunities 
for poorer young people to get a foot on the ladder.
• Those from privileged backgrounds have disproportionately taken up or stayed in 
education, and we will discuss the impacts of this more in the next section.
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How do recessions impact social mobility?
Experience from previous recessions can be indicative of what to expect coming out 
of the pandemic. In all the previous recessions covered by recent analysis, those 
with the lowest level of qualifications (who are more likely to be from lower socio-
economic backgrounds) and ethnic minorities were disproportionately affected by the 
economic downturns.56, 57
Graduates who left education after the 2008 financial crisis had employment scarring 
effects reduce after one year and end after four. But non-graduates had scarring 
persist far longer.58
These findings emphasise the importance of sustained investment towards recovery 
for the most disadvantaged in society.
Children in poverty
Exposure to child poverty is extremely damaging to life outcomes.59 It can lead to worse 
health, worse educational outcomes, and reduced development.60, 61, 62, 63, 64 The poorest 
children often start school behind and then see the gaps between them and all other 
children widen throughout the education system.65 This then translates into the labour 
market, resulting in poorer pay and instability. In other words, child poverty plays a 
significant role in limiting social mobility. Reducing it would be one of the most influential 
and cost effective policy actions government could take to improve social mobility 
across society.66, 67
Staggeringly, around 4.3 million children, almost one third, were living in poverty as of 
March 2020, right at the beginning of the pandemic.68 Since 2011-12, child poverty has 
risen by 3.7 percentage points, the most sustained rise since the 1990s, and well above 
1960s era levels which hovered around 10% (figure 1.12).69 Over the last decade, 
56 Centre for Economic Performance, What can previous recessions tell us about the COVID-19 downturn?, 2020.
57 Department for Education, Level 2 and 3 attainment by young people aged 19, 2021.
58 Resolution Foundation, Class of 2020 – Education leavers in the current crisis, 2020.
59 Cooper, K., and Stewart, K., Does household income affect children’s outcomes? A systematic review of the evidence, 2020.
60 Duncan, G.J. et al., Economic deprivation and early childhood development, 1994.
61 Bradshaw J., Poverty: The outcomes for children, 2000.
62 Bradshaw J., Child poverty and child outcomes, Children and Society, 2002.
63 Griggs J. and Walker, R., The costs of child poverty for individuals and society, A literature review, 2008.
64 The organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, A broken social elevator? how to promote social mobility, 2018.
65 Masten, A., and Cicchetti, D., Developmental cascades. Development and Psychopathology, 2010.
66 The London School of Economics and Political Science, Understanding the relationship between poverty and inequality: overview report, 2019.
67 The EIF estimates £17 billion per year could be saved in England and Wales if early intervention was utilised Early Intervention Foundation, Why is it 
good for society and the economy?, Accessed June 2021.
68 Institute for Fiscal Studies, Living standards, poverty and inequality in the UK, 2020.
69 Ibid.
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these increases have been largely driven by cuts to the welfare system, where working-
age benefits were frozen and slow pay growth has left families – many of whom are 
employed – worse off.70 The two-child limit on social security benefits leaves children 
in larger families particularly vulnerable: the Children’s Commissioners for Northern 
Ireland, Scotland and Wales have argued this is a breach of children’s rights to an 
adequate standard of living.71
70 Ibid.
71 Sally H. et al., Letter to Therese Coffey MP, 2021.

















































































































Source: Department for Work and Pensions, Households below average income, 2021
Note: This is based on a poverty line defined as 60% of the contemporary median after deducting housing costs
Despite how dire this situation is, government continues to argue over the definition 
of poverty. Additionally, it has avoided setting a meaningful strategy to address these 
damaging rates.
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How should we measure poverty?
There are two ways to measure poverty – absolute and relative.
72 Institute for Public Policy Research, No longer ‘managing’: The rise of working poverty and fixing Britain’s broken social settlement, 2021.
73 Institute for Fiscal Studies, Living standards, poverty and inequality in the UK, 2020.
74 Social Market Foundation, Measuring and mitigating child hunger in the UK, 2020.
• Absolute poverty is 60% of the average (median) net household income in 
2010-11. This threshold stays the same over time – it does not adjust for changes.
• Relative poverty is 60% of the average (median) net household income in the 
same year in question. In other words, the poverty line changes each year based 
on the latest income distribution in the country.
Most experts, including us, prefer the relative poverty measure, because it shows 
the number of households significantly below today’s normal living standards. 
In contrast, the UK’s absolute poverty measure becomes increasingly out of 
date over time.
Within relative poverty, there are two ways to look at it: before and after housing 
costs. We look at poverty after housing costs to see how much households have 
in disposable income. Ignoring the cost of housing means you only have half of 
the picture of financial pressures on struggling households. Since housing costs 
have spiralled over the past 25 years (increasing by almost half in real terms for 
private tenants), and because housing costs differ dramatically across the country, 
it makes a real difference on families’ purses.72 This figure for disposable income is 
then adjusted for the number of people who live in the house and how old they are 
(‘equivalised’) and then compared to the median equivalised household income.
In summary, relative poverty after housing costs gives a better assessment of how 
families are faring to meet their basic needs.
We don’t yet know how the pandemic has impacted child poverty, but those who were 
most at risk of working in ‘shut-down’ sectors were also the most likely to already be 
living in poverty, such as hairdressers and cleaners. These groups already had high 
rates of in-work poverty, are over-represented by women, and were unlikely to be able 
to work from home during COVID-19.73
There are signs of the strain COVID-19 has put on an already fragile situation. Between 
March-September 2020, about 1.7 million children faced low food security.74 The £20 
weekly uplift to Universal Credit (covered more in the next section) is a big step in the 
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right direction, but government announced plans to end it in September.75 Some groups 
have estimated that 6.2 million families could face an overnight loss if, as planned, this 
uplift expires in September.76
75 BBC, Universal credit: how long will the £20 increase last?, 2021.
76 Joseph Rowntree Foundation, Keep the lifeline: why the Government should keep the £20 uplift to Universal Credit, Accessed June 2021.
77 Institute for Fiscal Studies, Living standards, poverty and inequality in the UK, 2020.
78 The London School of Economics and Political Science, The Conservative Governments’ Record on Social Policy from May 2015 to pre-COVID 
2020: Policies, Spending and Outcomes, 2021.
79 Institute for Fiscal Studies, Living standards, poverty and inequality in the UK, 2020.
80 The London School of Economics and Political Science, The Conservative Governments’ Record on Social Policy from May 2015 to pre-COVID 
2020: Policies, Spending and Outcomes, 2021.
What has driven increases in child and in-work poverty?
A basket of policy changes across the UK have contributed to rising rates of child 
poverty and in-work poverty, including:77, 78, 79
• 4-year freeze on working-age benefits (2016-2020)
• Introduction and implementation of Universal Credit
• Reductions of benefits within the Universal Credit system
• two-child limit on Child Tax Credit, Universal Credit
• Housing Benefit and Council Tax Reduction for children born after 6th April 2017
• the Benefit cap, introduced in 2013 (£500 per week) and lowered in 2016 (£350 
per week) limiting the amount of state benefits an individual household can claim
• Local Housing Allowance cap (restricting Housing Benefit to the 30th percentile of 
local rents from 2011 in England)
• the move to Consumer Price Index method to uprate benefits due to inflation (a 
change from using the Retail Price Index, which was more generous)
Children in large families, workless households and lone parent families have 
suffered the most from these reforms.80 Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales have 
had the ability to introduce policies to mitigate the impact of UK Government cuts, 
for example the introduction of the Scottish Child Payment which gets around the 
benefit cap and the two-child limit rules. These will be discussed in the nation-
specific chapters of this report.
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Who is building capital?
All recessions have winners and losers. While it is still too early to look holistically at the 
COVID-19 recession’s impact, there are clear and early indications of two groups who 
are building capital and gaining skills, with significant impact to future social mobility.
Riding out the storm in education
When a recession hits, a logical way to ride out the storm is to turn to education to 
build human capital. This keeps people active and gaining skills, and, crucially, out of 
the labour market while jobs are scarce. There is nothing inherently wrong with this 
approach, but the policy challenge comes when some groups dominate.
Our analysis (shown in the previous section, figure 1.11) shows those from privileged 
and intermediate backgrounds are disproportionately turning to education. This 
is worrying, as those from privileged backgrounds especially were already over-
represented in higher education compared to those from poorer backgrounds; the 
most advantaged pupils were more than twice as likely to go to HE than the most 
disadvantaged pupils.81 If more privileged pupils turn to HE during the pandemic, it could 
significantly damage efforts to widen participation and could set the country back years.
As the economy recovers, these young people will have higher rates of qualifications 
and skills than their working class peers, which could result in them taking up 
professional jobs at even higher rates than before. This could have lasting knock-on 
effects on job prospects for young people from disadvantaged backgrounds.
And for poorer young people who do not have the option to spend more money to stay 
in school, the ‘scarring’ effects of leaving education in the midst of a recession will 
persist for several years.82
Wealth and Housing
The typical gap in wealth per adult between the top and the middle of the distribution 
is now 55 times the typical household income (measured after housing costs). The 
Resolution Foundation has estimated that, unusually during a recession, total household 
wealth has actually increased by almost £900 billion, or 6%, on pre-pandemic levels. Yet 
despite this significant increase in total wealth, low-income households were more likely 
to have run down their savings, and were less likely to pay off debt, than those higher 
up the income distribution. All of this further widens the wealth gap.83
81 Department for Education, Widening participation in higher education, 2020.
82 Intergenerational Centre: Resolution Foundation Briefing, Uneven steps: Changes in youth unemployment and study since the onset of COVID-19, 
2021.
83 Resolution Foundation, (Wealth) Gap Year, 2021.
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Quality, secure housing in a convenient location is key to good living standards 
and opportunities. It also matters because inequalities in home ownership have an 
impact on inequalities in inheritance, which will impact future generations’ social 
mobility prospects.
Prior to the pandemic, poor housing supply, particularly for affordable and social homes, 
was one of the biggest drivers of intergenerational inequality and a key challenge 
for absolute social mobility – the ability for each generation to do better than the 
last.84, 85, 86, 87
Recent trends have shown wealthier families increasing levels of second home 
ownership and an apparent increase in intergenerational wealth transmission.88 As 
inheritance of these houses comes into play, we will see stark rises in inequalities, 
which affect ‘relative’ social mobility; the comparison between peers within a generation. 
56% of first time buyers under 
35 are receiving financial  
support from the ‘bank of  
mum and dad’
56%
Young people are increasingly relying on support from their families to get on the 
housing ladder. 56% of first time buyers under 35 are receiving financial support from 
the ‘bank of mum and dad’.89 Those who don’t have access to such funds end up stuck: 
young people whose parents were not homeowners and those whose parents were in 
lower-skilled occupations have, since the early 2000s, been increasingly less likely to be 
homeowners.90, 91
Lack of social housing has pushed many low-income people out of the social rented 
sector and into less secure housing, leaving over 1.1 million people on the waiting list 
for social housing.92 From 2007 to 2017, the share of UK households that live in private 
rented accommodation increased by 63% to an estimated 11 million people.93, 94 Not 
only are these households paying a higher share of their income on housing costs, they 
are also missing out on the opportunity to accumulate housing assets.
84 UCL Institute of Education, The crisis for young people: why housing is the key to social mobility, 2017.
85 Resolution Foundation, Living standards 2016: The experiences of low to middle income households in downturn and recovery, 2016.
86 UCL Institute of Education, The crisis for young people: Why housing is the key to social mobility, 2017.
87 Office for National Statistics, Living longer: Changes in housing tenure over time, 2020.
88 Centre for Economic Performance, Trends in intergenerational home ownership and wealth transmission, 2021.
89 Legal and General, Bank of Mum and Dad Report, 2020.
90 London School of Economics and Political Science, Home ownership and social mobility, 2017.
91 The University of Sheffield, The social mobility of home ownership: To what extent have the millennials fared worse?, 2019.
92 Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, Table 600: numbers of households on local authorities’ housing waiting lists, by district, 
England, from 1997, 2021.
93 Office for National Statistics, UK private rented sector: 2018, 2019.
94 Institute for Fiscal Studies, Living standards, poverty and inequality in the UK: 2014, 2014.
34 | Social Mobility Commission | State of the nation 2021
The United Kingdom
There are now more than one and a half million families raising children  
in private rentals, more than double the number 15 years ago.
The type of people living in the private rented sector has changed too – it used to 
be a temporary place for young professionals beginning their careers. Today, many 
disadvantaged families have needed to rent for longer periods at rising costs. There are 
now more than one and a half million families raising children in private rentals, more 
than double the number 15 years ago.95
High housing costs are driving insecurity. In the last three years, over half of state 
school teachers in Britain have worked at a school with children who were homeless or 
became homeless.96 Rising housing costs also mean that families may have to put up 
with poor conditions like damp and overcrowding, which can have a significant impact 
on childhood health and educational outcomes.97, 98
Insecure housing tenure of any kind increases the probability of frequent moves, making 
it more difficult to sustain education, employment and training.99, 100 UK Government 
research found that frequent movers are significantly less likely to obtain five A*-C 
GCSEs, or to be registered with a GP.101 Living in an insecure home also has an impact 
on mental health. Children who moved once in the past year were almost 50% more 
likely to have lower wellbeing than those who hadn’t.102
The pandemic has seen a spike in house prices in many parts of the county, making 
it even harder for many disadvantaged households to get on the housing ladder.103 
Depending on how the housing market continues to fare, this could exacerbate the pre-
existing trends, worsening social mobility outcomes.
The UK Government responded to the crisis with a wide array of measures to protect 
mortgage-holders, builders and lenders. But these policies are regressive. First time 
buyers are already largely exempt from stamp duty (unless they are buying high value 
properties), and so the stamp duty holiday (in England and Northern Ireland, and 
changes to transaction tax thresholds in Scotland and Wales) benefits home buyers 
95 Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, English housing survey 2019 to 2020: Headline report, 2020.
96 Shelter, Homeless at school: 56% of teachers have worked with homeless children, 2020.
97 Shelter, Chance of a lifetime – the impact of bad housing on children’s lives, 2006.
98 Shelter, Homeless at school: 56% of teachers have worked with homeless children, 2020.
99 The Health Foundation, Frequency of residential moves by housing tenure, 2021.
100 The Children’s Society, Moving always moving, 2020.
101 Department for Communities and Local Government, Moving on: Reconnecting frequent movers, 2006.
102 The Children’s Society, Moving always moving: The normalisation of housing insecurity among children in low income households in England, 2020.
103 Office for National Statistics, UK house price index, 2021.
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who are moving up the property ladder and accumulating housing wealth, or who are 
buying multiple houses. Additionally, coronavirus mortgage payment holidays benefited 
homeowners.104
But there were positive policies for lower income households. For tenants, evictions 
were banned across the UK at the start of the first lockdown (with an end of 31 May 
2021).105 Financial support was made available through Local Housing Allowance uplift 
to cover the lowest 30% of market rents in each area and increases to Discretionary 
Housing Payment funds of £180 million were made in 2020-21.106
Nonetheless, in December 2020, citizens Advice estimated that half a million private 
renters in the UK were behind on their rent, and the UK Government estimate that 
around one in ten of all renters in England are in arrears.107, 108 45% of private renters 
now rely on benefits to pay their rent, and housing support now fails to cover the cost of 
a modest two bedroom home in 67% of local areas in England.109
The gaps in living standards
Pre-pandemic, we were already facing entrenched divides in living standards between 
the richest and the rest. 110, 111, 112, 113 Households at the 95th percentile of earnings have 
seen their incomes rise 2.5 times higher than they were 40 years ago. This compares 
to almost no growth for the households at the 5th percentile (see figure 1.13). This level 
of inequality is reaching unsustainable heights and is contributing to lower levels of 
wellbeing and life satisfaction for the poorest.
104 UK Parliament, Mortgage arrears and repossessions (England), 2021.
105 Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, COVID-19 and renting: Guidance for landlords, tenants and local authorities, 2020.
106 House of Commons Library, Coronavirus: Support for landlords and tenants, 2021.
107 Citizens Advice, Half a million renters in arrears as evictions set to resume, 2021.
108 Ministry of Housing Communities and Local Government, Household resilience study: Wave 2, 2020.
109 Shelter, 45% of all private renters now receive benefits to pay rent, 2021.
110 Department for Work and Pensions, Households below average income: an analysis of the income distribution FYE 1995 to FYE 2020, 2021.
111 Institute for Fiscal Studies, Living standards, poverty and inequality in the UK: 2020, 2020.
112 Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Flat-lining or seething beneath the surface? Two decades of changing economic inequality in the UK, 2019.
113 Resolution Foundation, Charting the UK’s lost decade of income growth, 2020.
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These divides are felt by adults across the UK. In our 2021 opinion poll, 79% of adults in 
the UK said there was a fairly large or very large gap between different social classes.114 
It is easy to understand why large proportions of the population – including those in the 
middle – feel left behind. In very real ways, they have been.
Young adults in particular are facing the squeeze. They have experienced much lower 
and sometimes even negative growth in their average income and earnings compared 
to older age groups.115 If we are striving to ensure each generation is financially better 
off than the last – achieving absolute social mobility – we are sadly failing younger 
generations.
There are several drivers of this stagnation. The economy had barely recovered from 
the 2008 financial crisis when inflation hit in 2016. Following the Brexit referendum, 
sterling depreciated, driving up inflation rates. Put together, incomes have stalled for 
those at the bottom and in the middle in an unprecedented way, with average income 
growing less than any other 10-year period since records began in the 1960s.116 These 
trends have been compounded with significant cuts to the welfare system (discussed in 
the child poverty section above).
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17% of working households  
lived in poverty in early 2020
17%
Together with spiralling housing costs, stagnating incomes and welfare cuts, the result is 
high rates of in-work poverty: levels hit a new high of 17% of working households living 
in poverty in early 2020, before the pandemic took hold.117 Rises to the National Living 
Wage helped increase earnings equality for those at the bottom end of the spectrum, 
but it failed to counteract in-work poverty. The result is a large and growing gap between 
the top and bottom of the ladder.
But income is only one part of the picture. The COVID-19 recession is unlike any before, 
in that it literally forced many to increase savings. With no restaurants or travelling 
options available, 28% of high- and middle-income households began accumulating 
additional savings.118 But while some households have saved, others have had to 
take on debt in response to falling income. The ONS estimate that, by December 
2020, nearly 9 million people had to borrow more due to the pandemic.119 Increases 
in borrowing were most common among lower income groups, the self-employed and 
people living in rented accommodation.120
These trends will likely map onto overall wealth. The Economics Observatory expect 
that households with relatively lower wealth at the beginning of the crisis are unlikely to 
have grown wealth, while poorer households are falling behind due to rising debts.121, 122
This all matters, particularly as inheritances come into play.123 According to the Institute 
for Fiscal Studies (IFS), for those born in the 1960s, inheritances are projected to 
account for around a quarter of inequality in living standards between those from 
different socio-economic backgrounds.124 But for those born in the 1980s, this is 
projected to rise to a third.
This has knock-on effects for home ownership, retirement income and even 
consumption and living standards. Higher-earning households who expect to receive 
significant inheritance can save less for retirement and therefore have greater 
consumption and living standards. In other words, lower savings means more spending 
– and potentially better living standards – in the years before inheriting.
117 Institute for Public Policy Research, No longer ‘managing’: The rise of working poverty and fixing Britain’s broken social settlement, 2021.
118 Bank of England, How has COVID-19 affected household savings?, 2020.
119 Office for National Statistics, Personal and economic well-being in Great Britain: January 2021, 2021.
120 Ibid.
121 Economics Observatory, Have government measures been protecting the UK’s most vulnerable?, 2021.
122 Economics Observatory, What are the implications of COVID-19 for wealth inequality?, 2021.
123 Econ Papers: Trends in Intergenerational Home Ownership and Wealth Transmission, Accessed June 2021.
124 Institute for Fiscal Studies, Inheritances and inequality over the life cycle: what will they mean for younger generations?, 2021.
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Even pre-pandemic, there were gaps between those at the very top versus the rest. 
It will be some time before a definitive picture of income, savings, debt and wealth 
inequalities emerge, but it is highly likely that the pandemic has made these obstacles 
to social mobility in the UK even worse. Social mobility and inequality are intrinsically 
linked – these divides are critical to solve.
Strong redistributive, educational and employment policy responses are crucial to 
ensure the qualifications and capital accumulated under COVID-19 do not lead to long-
term impacts to social mobility.
How has UK policy addressed this?
Three lockdowns since March 2020 have meant that many people have lost their jobs 
or have been unable to work for a lot of the time. Faced with incredible challenges, the 
UK Government has responded in ways few could have predicted. The same party 
that oversaw austerity after the last recession has responded to COVID-19 with over 
£271 billion of committed spending in the UK, which will continue to increase.125, 126
Approximately half of this has gone towards support measures such as payments to 
those on furlough, grants and higher benefits. In a matter of weeks, government rewrote 
entire policy areas across almost every department. The speed of response was 
unprecedented in recent memory. Without a doubt, many more would be suffering had 
these measures not gone into place.
But despite this response, COVID-19’s impact has still been felt unevenly across 
groups, often affecting the most disadvantaged in society and creating socio-economic 
disparities. In this section, we will briefly analyse the most relevant UK-wide policy 
response for COVID-19’s impact on socio-economic disparities. Relevant devolved 
policy areas will be addressed in more detail in country-specific chapters.
Jobs
The UK introduced the Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme (CJRS) and the Self-
Employment Income Support Scheme (SEISS) as the primary ways of propping up 
employees and keeping them tied to their employers (which would enable faster 
recovery). At the end of September 2020, 2.8 million people were on the Coronavirus 
Job Retention Scheme, and as at May 2021, there have been 11.5 million unique 
jobs supported by the scheme since its inception; take-up rates have been highest in 
accommodation and food services, arts, entertainment and recreation, and other service 
125 National Audit Office, COVID-19 cost tracker, 2021.
126 To contrast how remarkable this spending approach has been, in the 2008 financial crash, the NAO put the total government spending to stabilise 
the banks at £133bn, of which most was paid back and only around £25bn remains outstanding. In 2008, the Government also provided financial 
guarantees to the banks of over £1 trillion but this primarily provided confidence to the sector and does not cost the Treasury anything if all goes well.
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activities.127, 128 These policies and additional help for businesses in the form of grants, 
preferential loans and tax breaks have helped to keep many employers afloat as their 
markets dried up.
While we do not know definitively how well the scheme supported those from different 
backgrounds, the analysis we have laid out throughout this chapter has suggested 
that those in working class occupations may have seen the most protection as a 
result of being on furlough. Without it, we would have expected to see higher rates of 
unemployment for those in working class jobs. It is still too early to tell whether these 
groups will see significant increases in unemployment once the Coronavirus Job 
Retention Scheme comes to an end.
Youth unemployment – Kickstart
The UK-wide Kickstart Scheme, launched in autumn 2020, is one of the UK 
Government’s preventative measures against long-term youth unemployment among 
16-24 year olds claiming Universal Credit.129, 130 The scheme provides funding to 
employers for creating new jobs for this group. Funding pays the minimum wage for the 
new employee (for 25 hours a week for 6 months), as well as National Insurance and 
pension contributions. Over 219,000 jobs have been created.131
It is too early to draw firm conclusions on the impact of the Kickstart Scheme, but the 
targeted design of the scheme is welcome. The UK Government must closely monitor 
the participation rate for both employers and young people on a regional basis, with a 
particular focus on the availability of placements near areas of deprivation.
We do, however, have concerns over the scheme’s delivery and ultimately its impact. 
Initially, a threshold requirement was in place, with employers having to create at least 
30 placements to be able to apply directly for participation in the scheme, impacting 
on the ability of small businesses to benefit from it. Although this limit has now been 
removed, risks still remain regarding the ability of employers to fulfil their plans and offer 
more young people the opportunity of employment – all before December 2021, when 
the scheme ends.132 Employers have noted that they have had to delay placements due 
to lockdown conditions.133 Data is not yet available for a full evaluation of the scheme.
In addition to Kickstart, the UK Government has a youth employment programme, 
including youth hubs and employability coaches, and an expansion of traineeships, 
among other initiatives, all operating in England, Scotland and Wales.134
127 HM Revenue and Customs, Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme statistics: 6 May 2021, 2021.
128 HM Revenue and Customs, Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme statistics, 2020.
129 HM Treasury, Landmark Kickstart scheme opens, 2020.
130 Institute for Employment Studies, Labour Market Statistics, 2020.
131 Youth Futures Foundation, Five reasons to extend Kickstart, 2021.
132 Youth Futures Foundation, Five reasons to extend Kickstart, 2021.
133 UK Parliament. Kickstart scheme: Question for Department for Work and Pensions, 2021.
134 Department for Work and Pensions, Guidance: help to find work for Universal Credit claimants aged 18 to 24, 2021.
40 | Social Mobility Commission | State of the nation 2021
The United Kingdom
Digital access and skills
The UK Government has taken important action to build the UK’s digital infrastructure. 
The National Infrastructure Strategy, which was announced in December 2020, outlines 
how the UK Government aims to work with the private sector to provide fast and reliable 
internet connection across the UK by 2025.135 While this initiative is welcome, this does 
not mean everyone will be able to benefit from the UK’s renewed digital infrastructure. It 
is estimated that one in every seven adults in Wales and Scotland is currently not able 
to afford private, sufficient and reliable internet to meet their essential needs.136
17.1 million do not have digital workplace skills.
Furthermore, providing internet connection alone is not enough: nine million adults 
lack the foundation skills (such as turning on a computer), 11.7 million adults lack the 
essential digital skills for life (such as buying something online) and 17.1 million do not 
have digital workplace skills.137 Many among those 17.1 million do not know how to use 
the internet to search for a job, write a CV or attend a virtual job interview. The lack of 
essential digital skills needed for work negatively impacts these disadvantaged people’s 
employability by trapping them in low-paid jobs.
13% of the population in Wales are still offline compared to 5% in England.
While the UK Digital Strategy (2017) covers the entire UK, digital skills and inclusion 
policy is a devolved matter.138 The COVID-19 pandemic has revealed the extent to 
which the UK policy has failed to make a substantial impact on the digital skills level 
of the population, particularly when it comes to addressing regional disparities. 17% of 
the population in the east of England say that they are not confident with using digital 
technology compared to only 10% in London.139 13% of the population in Wales are still 
135 Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, Project gigabit phase one Delivery Plan, 2021.
136 National Endowment for Science, Technology and the Arts, Data Poverty in Scotland and Wales, 2021.
137 Lloyds Banking Group, Lloyds Bank UK Consumer Digital Index, 2020.
138 Department for Digital, Culture Media and Sport, Digital skills and inclusion - Giving everyone access to the digital skills they need, 2017.
139 Lloyds Banking Group, UK consumer digital index 2021, 2021.
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offline compared to 5% in England.140 A new digital strategy is due in autumn 2021. The 
pandemic has demonstrated the need for increased funding and organisational support 
for adults’ digital skills provision.141
For students across the country, lockdown changed the way education had to be 
delivered. But not all students could switch easily to remote working. Ofcom estimates 
that 20% percent of pupils did not have constant access to a laptop, computer or tablet 
at home during school closures.142 England, Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales all 
made significant efforts to provide internet access and digital devices to disadvantaged 
pupils. Wales responded quickest, thanks to its existing digital inclusion policy initiatives 
and infrastructure.143 By May 2021, approximately 1.5 million digital devices were 
delivered to disadvantaged pupils in total across the United Kingdom.144, 145, 146, 147
The Department for Education (DfE) grants the ownership of devices to local authorities, 
academy trusts, schools, colleges and further education institutions which then lend the 
devices to pupils and children. This means that not all pupils will be able to keep their 
devices unless the local authorities or school decide to give them permanently.148
Having a parent around to help younger pupils to navigate their virtual lessons is also 
crucial. Unfortunately, this too was stratified by socio-economic background; 44% of 
middle-class parents spent four or more hours helping with home learning compared to 
33% from disadvantaged backgrounds.149
140 Ibid.
141 House of Lords, Beyond digital: Planning for a hybrid world, 2021.
142 Ofcom, Digital divide narrowed by the pandemic, but around 1.5m homes remain offline, 2021.
143 Education Policy Institute and Nuffield Foundation, Education policy responses across the UK to the pandemic, 2020.
144 Department for Education, Laptops and tablets data, week 19 2021, 2021.
145 Scottish Government, Helping families get online, 2021.
146 Northern Ireland Government, IT equipment: 19 Oct 2020: Northern Ireland Assembly debates, 2020.
147 Welsh Government, Device and connectivity update for digitally excluded learners during coronavirus (COVID-19), 2021.
148 Department for Education, Who owns the devices, and how to distribute them to children and young people, Accessed June 2021.
149 Education Policy Institute, Education policy responses across the UK to the pandemic, 2020.




While schools were closed, 
Ofcom estimated that 
1.5 million children in the 
UK did not have access to a 
laptop device. 
 
Recognising that access to appropriate tech could have a lasting impact on the 
educational outcomes of young people and their life chances, the Department for 
Opportunities, the advocacy and campaign arm of the Social Mobility Foundation, 
began campaigning to #EndLaptopPoverty, encouraging employers they work with to 
donate devices.
They also ran a consumer-facing campaign to collect old devices from individuals. 
Donated laptops and tablets had to meet quality control standards, with a minimal dual 
core processor and at least 2GB of RAM. Any devices that were previously owned were 
securely wiped. Donation partner charities, based across the UK, ensured that the 
laptops reached those students most in need by working with social services and local 
community groups.
The device came just in time for Olivia from Durham, “The timing is 
amazing, with my assessments coming up I’m really grateful that 
I’m now able to revise easier online and be more prepared if we 
go back to online learning. It will help me keep on track with my 
revision timetable as I’ll now be able to access online resources that 
I was only able to access at sixth form.”
So far, 2,214 laptops have been donated. The award-winning campaign is still running 
and whilst it is recognised that students from lower socio-economic backgrounds do still 
face challenges around access to wifi or digital skills training, it shows how individuals, 
employers and charities worked together to support those in need during the pandemic.
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Unemployment and benefits
For the unemployed or underemployed, the universal credit £20 weekly uplift policy was, 
and is, a vital intervention. It was created at impressive speed and against a sudden 
and huge increase in demand, with 3.4 million individuals making a universal credit 
declaration from 1 March to the end of June 2020 – a testament to DWP’s preparation 
and delivery.150 This particularly benefited families on lower incomes, those with children 
(particularly single parents), ethnic minority families, and families where someone is 
disabled. This policy was a lifeline for many, but its impact wasn’t evenly spread; the 
same amount was paid irrespective of household size or needs. If reversed, as planned 
in September 2021, some estimate it could impact 6.2 million families.151
6.2 million families could be  
impacted when the £20 uplift  
to universal credit is removed
6.2m
Despite these and other support measures it is likely that the number of households 
facing hardship has still increased according to the Equalities and Human Rights 
Commission.152 The number of households unable to pay essential bills has increased, 
even after receiving support such as universal credit or the Coronavirus Job Retention 
Scheme, and there has been unprecedented growth in demand for emergency food 
parcels.153, 154 England, Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales all offered Free School 
Meal (FSM) provisions, whether in the form of vouchers or payments, to all eligible 
children.155 In England, a public campaign by footballer Marcus Rashford helped sway 
public opinion and put pressure on the UK Government to respond.156 Scotland and 
Wales had already committed to free summer meals at the time of Rashford’s campaign 
and Northern Ireland followed suit soon after.157
150 Department for Work and Pensions, Universal Credit declarations (claims) and advances: Management information, 2020.
151 Joseph Rowntree Foundation, Keep the lifeline: Why the Government should keep the £20 uplift to Universal Credit, 2020.
152 Equality and Human Rights Commission, How coronavirus has affected equality and human rights, 2020.
153 Step Change Debt Charity, COVID-19 Client Data Report, 2021.
154 Institute for Fiscal Studies, Income protection policy during COVID-19: Evidence from bank account data, 2020.
155 BBC, Free school meals: Meals to be funded during holidays until 2022, 2020.
156 BBC, Marcus Rashford: Food voucher U-turn after footballer’s campaign, 2020.
157 Ibid.
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Whilst the UK Government’s response has undoubtedly provided important protection 
to society as a whole, people from disadvantaged backgrounds have still faced multiple 
burdens from the COVID-19 pandemic, including disproportionate mortality and 
morbidity rates, disproportionate impact from lockdown measures and greater suffering 
from the subsequent economic fallout.158
As we have said throughout the pandemic, the poor and the young will suffer most from 
an economic downturn – they need to be put at the heart of every policy and financial 
decision the UK Government makes in the coronavirus recovery plan.
Tax
When the UK emerges from the COVID-19 crisis, managing debt will be on the top of 
Treasury’s agenda. That must be considered alongside a need to spend significant 
funds on the bold recommendations we have set out to ensure that recovery prioritises 
social mobility. It is critical that the UK Government outlines a non-regressive plan or 
that does not ask more from those who have the least to give. These decisions will 
require trade-offs and will not be easy.
The role of the tax and social security system to transform social mobility outcomes 
is often understated. This is despite evidence that redistributive and income support 
policies are associated with greater intergenerational social mobility.159 Cross-
country analysis tells us that austerity measures tend to make poverty and income 
inequality worse.160, 161, 162
The UK system is characterised by an inconsistent and inequitable treatment of wealth 
and savings, with different principles applied in each area and sharp differences in 
treatment between areas.163, 164 Plans to pay for the pandemic should focus on wealth 
and assets, rather than income or National Insurance, and should create a more 
progressive and consistent tax system. In particular, the UK Government should 
address council tax policy in England, which is outdated and regressive, alongside 
stamp duty. Inheritance tax should also be considered, but crucially, it should include a 
broad base of housing and pensions rather than income alone. In this chapter, we have 
shown how assets have accumulated for some during this pandemic and how these 
assets will shape future income mobility when they are inherited by the next generation. 
It is important tax policy addresses this, to create a more socially mobile UK.
158 The BMJ, Using socio-economics to counter health disparities arising from the COVID-19 pandemic, 2020.
159 OECD Journal: Economic Studies, Reconciling fiscal consolidation with growth and equity, 2014.
160 OECD Economics Department Working Papers, The Equity Implications of Fiscal Consolidation, 2013.
161 OECD Economics Department Working Papers, How to achieve growth- and equity-friendly fiscal consolidation?: A proposed methodology for 
instrument choice with an illustrative application to OECD countries, 2013.
162 IMF Working Paper, The Distributional effects of fiscal consolidation, 2013.
163 Nuffield Foundation, Economic & Social Research Council, Tax by design, 2011.
164 Centre for Analysis of Social Exclusion, Wealth distribution, accumulation and policy, 2013.
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Looking forward
The United Kingdom has faced significant shocks throughout its lifetime – recessions, 
pandemics, even global wars. It is how we have responded to these shocks that has 
defined our country and shaped the society we live in today.
Prior to COVID-19, the Commission was already worried about rising levels of child 
poverty, gaps in educational attainment, growing gaps between those who can access 
opportunity and those who can’t, declines in living standards, geographic inequality and 
a great divide opening up between the richest and the rest. COVID-19 has accelerated 
all of these trends. Great crises require great solutions. As we move into recovery, the 
UK Government must put fairness at the heart of its tax policy.
In the following essays, we look separately at England, Northern Ireland, Scotland and 
Wales. We monitor each one’s key social mobility indicators, before looking at what 
trends we were concerned about pre-COVID-19, and the differing policy responses that 
came out of the pandemic. We analyse policy and set out what each can learn from the 
other in their differing approaches. 

England
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in primary schools are 
now a total of seven 
months behind their 
more privileged peers 
by autumn alone. So far, 
COVID-19 has increased 
the attainment gap by 
0.5-1 month on top of 
the existing gap. This is 
the equivalent of erasing 
between a third and 
two-thirds of the last 
decade’s progress on 
closing the educational 
attainment gap. 
People from working 
class backgrounds are 
slowly becoming more 
upwardly mobile – 33% 
of people from working 
class backgrounds were in 
professional jobs in 2014, 
rising to 39% in 2020.
Since 2014, England has 
had the highest rates 
of child poverty of any 
country in the United 
Kingdom, though it is now 
roughly equal with Wales. 
Over 30% of children are 
living in poverty. 
In the north-east of 
England, child poverty 
rates have risen 
sharply by around 11 
percentage points in 
five years (from 25% 
to 37%). They are now 
close to the London 
rate of 38%.
England is the only 
nation in the UK without a 
strategy to address child 
poverty – this is one of 
its greatest blockages to 
improving social mobility. 
To recover from 
educational learning 
loss, close to £15 billion 
may be needed, far more 




Those from privileged 
backgrounds are 
benefitting from 
an expansion of 
professional jobs in 
the labour market, 
increasing their hold 
at the top of the labour 
market. In 2020, 62% of 





compared to 39% of 
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Introduction
Successive governments have pledged to reduce the socio-economic inequalities 
that lead to poor social mobility. Whether that’s focusing on the ‘distribution of 
opportunity,’ ‘opportunity for all,’ the ‘left behind,’ ‘building back better’ or ‘levelling up,’ 
each successive government has pledged to create a more fair and equal society 
that allows talent and merit – and not what family you are born into – to be your 
defining feature.
Despite this, there has never been an overarching strategy for social mobility or a 
desire to make socio-economic background a protected characteristic, which would 
unlock legal protections and reporting on public sector bodies and employers. Instead, 
England’s major policy initiatives have focused on using education to reduce socio-
economic inequalities, including the Opportunity Areas pilot.165 
We know education alone cannot solve social mobility. Improving access and 
progression through functioning labour markets is the second critical piece.166 The third 
and perhaps most significant is tackling poverty.167 England is the only nation in the 
United Kingdom that lacks a poverty reduction strategy.
The levelling up agenda offers an opportunity to address geographic inequalities 
that can lead to a postcode lottery for social mobility. In December 2020, the Women 
and Equalities Minister announced the creation of a new Equality Data programme 
in Cabinet Office’s Equality Hub. This has the potential to improve data on the socio-
economic inequalities that lead to poor social mobility. However, the programme was 
started without a significant focus on policy, which is likely to reduce its effectiveness in 
coordinating across government. Data teams have been exploring linkages with the new 
levelling up unit; the effectiveness of this join up and the impact of low levels of policy 
capacity will determine how well Cabinet Office can lead a cross-government response 
to the social mobility agenda. 
This chapter assesses the state of social mobility in England and early impacts of 
the COVID-19 pandemic. It will address key policy areas of early years, education, 
employment, poverty and living standards to unpick how England’s policy 
response is faring.
165 Department for Education, improving social mobility through education: unlocking talent, fulfilling potential, 2017.
166 Social Mobility Commission, The long shadow of deprivation, 2020.
167 For a complete assessment of UK policy response to social mobility, see Social Mobility Commission, Monitoring social mobility 2013 to 2020, 2020.
50 | Social Mobility Commission | State of the nation 2021
England
How does England compare with the rest of the UK?
England makes up 84% of the UK’s population and so England-specific trends often 
align closely to UK-wide trends in social mobility, employment, living standards, 
poverty and inequality. In this chapter, we sometimes draw on UK statistics to 
represent this situation in England where England statistics are not readily available. 
Social policy in England is largely set by the UK Government with some local 
devolution to combined authorities. This chapter primarily focuses on England-
specific policy areas.
Trends in social mobility in England: Overview
Around half (49%) of all jobs in England’s labour market are managerial and 
professional occupations (See Annex A for definition) (see figure 2.1). Like the rest of 
the UK, this has been growing over time, and is good news for social mobility – more 
professional jobs mean more room at the ‘top’ and can help absolute mobility. England 
has the highest proportion of professional jobs compared to other nations, with large 
concentrations of these jobs in London and the south-east. The growth in professional 
jobs is offset by a decline in working class jobs – since 2005 the percent of working 
class jobs in the labour market has fallen from 34% to 29% in 2020.
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Figure 2.1: Percentage of people in professional jobs across the labour market, in each 










Source: SMC Analysis of Labour Force Survey (ONS)
Note: Data refers to those in employment
More room at the ‘top’ of the workforce can be a good thing for absolute social mobility 
– it can help more people access higher-paying, higher-skilled jobs. But as we noted 
in Chapter 1, we are highly cautious about the recent increased rise, as it’s too early to 
know if it will be a long-lasting trend.
It doesn’t only matter how many jobs there are, it also matters who gets into them. Like 
in the rest of the UK, the type of job your parents did continues to be a determining 
factor in the type of job you end up in. People in England from lower socio-economic 
backgrounds (see Technical Annex for definition) are under-represented in professional 
and managerial jobs and those from professional jobs are under-represented in working 
class jobs. 62% of those from privileged backgrounds are themselves in professional 
backgrounds (figure 2.2).
There are some small signs that upward mobility is slowly rising. Since 2014, the 
chance of someone from a working class background entering a professional 
occupation rose from 33% in 2014 to 39% in 2020. While this sign is encouraging, 
there is a big caveat. Over the same period, those from privileged backgrounds also 
increased their access to professional jobs (from 58% to 62%), as did those from 
intermediate backgrounds (from 41% to 47%). The same pattern is happening in 
Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales, as discussed in Chapter 1.
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So how do we explain this? A greater share of professional jobs in the labour market 
might be helping those from working class backgrounds to be upwardly mobile, but it is 
also helping those from professional backgrounds to increase their hold on these jobs. 
The lesson – an increased number of professional jobs doesn’t automatically create 
more relative upwards mobility across society.
Figure 2.2: How likely are people from different backgrounds to be in a professional 

















Source: SMC Analysis of Labour Force Survey (ONS)
Notes: People aged 25-60. Margin of error varies from 0.9% to 1.7% for individual statistics. See Appendix Table B2 for sample 
sizes and 95% confidence intervals
In England, there is very little downward mobility. Those from working class 
backgrounds are twice as likely as those from privileged backgrounds to be in working 
class jobs in England (30% and 14% respectively). The drop in 2020 for people from all 
backgrounds in working class jobs is likely due to working class job losses during the 
pandemic (see figure 2.3).
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Source: SMC Analysis of Labour Force Survey, (ONS)
Note: Margin of error varies from 0.9% to 1.4% for individual statistics. See Appendix Table B2 for sample sizes and 95% 
confidence intervals
168 Department for Education, Improving social mobility through education, 2017.
Education
Education has been the single most important policy lever England has deployed to 
address social mobility, but with patchy success.
The most explicit effort to target social mobility through education was the 2017 
strategy: Unlocking Talent, Fulfilling Potential.168 Disappointingly, the plan was not 
fully implemented or monitored in any meaningful way. There is currently no strategic 
leadership or drive within the department ensuring that socio-economic disparities 
are effectively addressed across the span of its work and responsibilities. We think 
this needs to change. In this context of this absence of strategic focus, the most 
disadvantaged in our education system continue to leave school with lower levels of 
qualifications and with worse results on average.
Prior to COVID-19, there had been some encouraging progress in closing the 
attainment gap between poorer students and their more advantaged peers, particularly 
in primary school. But that progress has stalled in recent years.
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The Education Policy Institute (EPI) estimates that disadvantaged students, prior to the 
pandemic, were 18 months behind their more advantaged peers by age 16.169
The last time we could officially measure the gap was in 2019, before COVID-19 
disrupted the testing system. In this section we use two different measures: attainment 
and qualifications gaps. Both point in the same direction; disadvantaged students are 
consistently behind their more affluent peers.
Starting with the youngest pupils, at age 7 (end of Key Stage 1), disadvantaged pupils, 
those eligible for free school meals (FSM), had a 17% and 18% gap in reading and 
writing, respectively.170 At GCSEs, just 45% of poorer students achieved a grade 4 
or above in English and maths GCSEs compared to 72% of all others.171 The more 
comprehensive measure at age 16, Attainment 8, confirms this gap; FSM students were 
13.6 points behind other pupils (36.7 vs 50.3, respectively).172 By the end of compulsory 
schooling, this gap manifests in lower levels of qualifications for poorer students. In 
2020, almost half (49%) of disadvantaged young people left school without a Level 
2 qualification (GCSE equivalent) in English and maths compared with just 22% of 
their peers.173
When COVID-19 hit, the attainment gap between poorer and more affluent students 
began to widen. By the end of the pandemic, most children in the UK will have missed 
over six months of in-person schooling – the equivalent of 5% of their entire time in 
school.174 Despite the often-heroic efforts of teachers and parents, for many students it 
was a poor substitute for in-class learning.
The UK Government has to date announced £3.1 billion for catch-up in England, with 
targeted support for early years, schools and 16-19 settings.175, 176 Funded initiatives 
include tutoring, summer schools, early language support and additional funding for 
schools. But this sum is far off what some estimates are calling for (between £13.5-15 
billion).177, 178 The UK Government’s own Education Recovery Commissioner resigned 
in protest after the June 2021 investment of £1.4 billion, saying the spending package 
“betrays an undervaluation of the importance of education”.179 The UK Government 
has said that the next stage of investment will include a review of time spent in school 
and college and the impact this could have on helping children and young people 
to catch up. The findings of the review will be set out later in the year to inform the 
spending review.180
169 Education Policy Institute, Measuring the disadvantage gap in 16-19 education, 2021.
170 Department for Education, Phonics screening check and key stage 1 assessments in England, 2019.
171 Department for Education, ‘KS4 national characteristics data’ from ‘Key stage 4 performance’, Permanent data table – Explore education statistics, 
2021.
172 Ibid.
173 Department for Education, Level 2 and 3 attainment by young people aged 19, 2021.
174 Institute for Fiscal Studies, The crisis in lost learning calls for a massive national policy response, 2021.
175 Department for Education, Prime Minister’s Office, Billion pound COVID-19 catch-up plan to tackle impact of lost teaching time, 2020.
176 Department for Education, Huge expansion of tutoring in next step of education recovery, 2021.
177 Education Policy Institute, Education recovery and resilience in England, 2021.
178 Education Policy Institute, Analysis paper: Preliminary research findings on education recovery, 2021.
179 Guardian, Education recovery chief quits in English schools catch-up row, 2021.
180 Hansard (UK Parliament), Education Recovery, 2021.
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This section looks at the pre-existing socio-economic gaps in England’s education offer, 
and the COVID-19 policy response.
Early years (0-5)
The wealthier a child’s family is, the more likely that child will start school at a 
good level of development (81% for the wealthiest vs. 64% for the poorest)
Early child development and education is a crucial time, and impacts on future life 
outcomes.181 But there are clear and persistent trends – the wealthier a child’s family 
is, the more likely that child will start school at a good level of development (81% for 
the wealthiest vs. 64% for the poorest – see figure 2.4). Gaps that exist at age 5 persist 
throughout the education system and result in worse outcomes for people from poorer 
backgrounds when they try to get jobs later in life. The poorest children start school 
4.5 months behind all others and leave school at age 18 a staggering 18.1 months 
behind.182 High quality and accessible early years provision is essential to ensure this 
development gap is closed. 
181 Centre for Educational Neuroscience, Most learning happens within the first 3 years, 2020.
182 Education Policy Institute, Education in England: Annual report 2020, 2020.
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Figure 2.4: Percentage of children achieving a good level of development at age 5 by 


















Source: Department for Education, Early years foundation stage profile results, 2018-19
183 Education Policy Institute, The COVID-19 pandemic and early years workforce, 2021. 
184 Ibid. 
185 Full Fact, Are parents paying for free nursery places?, 2018.
186 Sutton Trust, COVID-19 and social mobility impact brief #4, 2020.
Across both national and local lockdowns, early years settings have been serving both 
children of essential workers and the wider population at different points. But the sector 
has come under huge financial pressure. 
Between November 2020 and February 2021, overall attendance of children at early 
years settings dropped by 28% of what it was in the year before.183 This meant that 
72% of early years settings across England and Wales were forced into full or partial 
closures.184 This drop in attendance was on top of an already challenging financial 
model. As we noted in our 2018-19 State of the Nation, government funding does 
not adequately cover the cost to providers, meaning settings often pass along ‘extra’ 
costs to parents.185 This most impacts settings with lower income parents who cannot 
subsidise extra costs. Significantly, at the peak of the pandemic, financial woes 
experienced by early years settings disproportionately affected disadvantaged children 
and families. 34% of early years providers in the most disadvantaged areas in England 
were unsure of their future compared with 24% of the least deprived areas in more 
affluent areas.186
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Some early years settings qualified for support the UK Government provided to 
businesses, but even this approach was fundamentally flawed. Early years settings 
are not any other business. They provide critical services to children and should be 
protected against market failings during economic downturns. 
Prior to COVID-19, we have prominently spoken out about the poor pay, conditions and 
lack of recognition of the early years workforce.187, 188 Too often, this workforce – which 
is fundamental to ensuring we build a well-educated, equal society – is viewed as 
‘women’s work,’ ‘childminders’ and not considered as the educators they are. Our work 
found that low pay, instability and a lack of an early years strategy was leading people 
to leave the sector and jeopardising England’s ability to deliver high quality education 
equally across the country. From 2014-2020, there appeared little evidence that recent 
government policies aimed at improving the early years workforce had garnered much 
improvement for the profession.189 
The sweeping effects that COVID-19 has had on early years provision in England has 
put further strain on an already creaking, unstable sector. One in five workers (20%) 
say they are considering leaving due to COVID-19-related stress or mental health 
concerns.190 If true, this will make the sector more fragile and less attractive as a career 
destination.
There has seldom been a more important time to ensure the stability of early years 
provision.191 
Family hubs and children’s centres
The quality of a child’s home-learning environment continues to be recognised as the 
most significant factor in predicting a child’s educational development at age 5. Family 
Hubs serve as locations for integrated support services for families, with a goal of 
‘overcoming difficulties and building stronger relationships’.192
The different types of children’s centres
There have been two waves of Sure Start. First, Sure Start local programmes 
were established from 1998 and targeted at the most deprived 20% of areas with 
an emphasis on community development. They were expanded into Sure Start 
Children’s Centres (SSCCs) in 2003, with greater focus on providing integrated 
support to families as part of a universal service. SSCCs were rolled out in three 
phases between 2003 and 2010 to achieve a target of 3,500 centres. In 2013, a new 
‘core purpose’ shifted the focus to targeting ‘families in greatest need of support’. 
Funding fell by 60% between 2011-12 and 2016-17 and reduced the number of 
187 Social Mobility Commission, State of the nation 2018-19: Social mobility in Great Britain, 2019.
188 Social Mobility Commission, The stability of the early years workforce in England, 2020.
189 Education Policy Institute, Early years workforce development in England, 2020.
190 Early Years Alliance, One in five early years workers considering leaving the sector, Accessed June 2021.
191 Institute for Fiscal Studies, Challenge for the childcare market: the implications of COVID-19 for providers in England, 2020.
192 Family Hubs Network, What is a Family Hub?, 2021.
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SSCCs from 3,620 in 2010 (the peak) to 2,323 in 2020.193 Closures of Sure Start and 
Children’s Centres – which have undermined outcomes for young children and their 
families – have been found to disproportionately impact on the outcomes of children 
from more disadvantaged backgrounds.194, 195 
Since 2019, there has been a growing focus on Family Hubs. In November 2020, 
roughly 150 hubs across were registered with the Family Hubs Network.196 
The original Sure Start programmes had largely positive benefits for disadvantaged 
families. They successfully reached the most disadvantaged families and helped 
improve family functioning (including the quality of parenting) alongside maternal 
wellbeing.197, 198 They significantly reduced hospitalisations for children in primary school 
(so much so that the Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS) suggested this benefit alone 
could offset 6% of the programme’s cost).199 Parents highly valued the programme 
(although this high regard faltered after financial cuts eroded benefits) and evaluations 
suggested it was an effective delivery of multi-agency services.200, 201 The programme’s 
one disappointing outcome, though, was that no improvements were identified for child 
development outcomes.202, 203
The new Family Hubs, aimed at providing support for children from birth to 19, 
have yet to be reviewed but they seem to be applying some of the lessons learned 
from Sure Start.204, 205 Due to cuts to local authority budgets, local areas have been 
experimenting with delivery, including moving to digital working (which might be 
problematic for disadvantaged families who lack access or skills to work digitally), 
taking more coordinated and strategic approaches to bring in families less likely to use 
early childhood services, and developing multi-agency support pathways for families, 
including establishing clear protocols for data sharing.206, 207 Many of these approaches 
could mean a strong and thriving offer for disadvantaged families if they are supported 
and expanded across the country.
193 Department for Education, Number of children’s centres, 2003 to 2019, 2019.
194 Local Government Association, Children’s care cash crisis: children’s centres in fight for survival, 2019.
195 The Health Foundation, Health equity in England: The Marmot review 10 years on, 2020.
196 Early Intervention Foundation, Planning early childhood services in 2020: Learning from practice and research on children’s centres and family 
hubs, 2020.
197 The National Evaluation of Sure Start Team, The impact of Sure Start Local Programmes on seven year olds and their families, 2012.
198 Wong, S. and Sumsion, J., Integrated early years services: a thematic literature review: Early years, 2013.
199 Institute for Fiscal Studies, The health effects of Sure Start, 2019.
200 Department for Education, The impact of children’s centres: studying the effects of children’s centres in promoting better outcomes for young 
children and their families, 2015.
201 Hall, J. S. et al., Relationships between families’ use of Sure Start Children’s Centres, changes in home learning environments, and preschool 
behavioural disorders, 2019.
202 The National Evaluation of Sure Start Team, The impact of Sure Start Local Programmes on seven year olds and their families, 2012.
203 Wong, S. and Sumsion, J., Integrated early years services: a thematic literature review: Early years, 2013. 
204 HM Treasury, Budget 2020. Delivering on our promises to the British people, 2020.
205 Lewing, B., et al., Planning early childhood services in 2020: Learning from practice and research on children’s centres and family hubs, 2020.
206 Early Intervention Foundation, Children’s centres and family hubs: complementary visions, 2020.
207 Lewing, B. et al., Planning early childhood services in 2020: Learning from practice and research on children’s centres and family hubs, 2020.
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Schools (5-18)
Lockdown transformed the education system – and not in disadvantaged students’ 
favour. Learning loss has disproportionately affected disadvantaged students, who in 
general lacked access to digital infrastructure, had less face-to-face time with teachers, 
did not have quiet or sufficient spaces to work, and were less likely to have degree-
qualified parents to help guide their learning at home. 208, 209, 210 Additionally, they were 
less likely to have additional support such as tutoring or subscription education services, 
which more advantaged families could provide.
Early reports from the autumn 2020 term show disadvantaged pupils in primary 
school are now seven months behind their more advantaged peers in total
Early reports from the autumn 2020 term show disadvantaged pupils in primary school 
are now seven months behind their more advantaged peers in total.211 In primary and 
secondary school, COVID-19 has increased the pre-existing gap by 0.5-1 months more 
for disadvantaged students just by the autumn term.212, 213 
But these figures only show the gap by the autumn 2020 term. Data is not yet available 
beyond that, and it is likely that this gap could grow larger due to further lockdowns. 
Even the smaller of these figures is the equivalent to erasing between a third and two-
thirds of the last decade’s progress on closing the educational attainment gap.214 The 
Education Endowment Foundation has warned that schools should anticipate wider 
gaps between students by socio-economic background and that lockdowns may reverse 
all of the progress we have made in the last decade on closing the attainment gap.215, 216
208 Institute for Fiscal Studies, Family time use and home learning during the COVID-19 lockdown, 2020.
209 Education Endowment Foundation, Impact of school closures on the attainment gap: Rapid evidence assessment, 2020.
210 The DELVE Initiative, Balancing the risks of pupils returning to schools, 2020.
211 Education Endowment Foundation, Impact of school closures and subsequent support strategies on attainment and socio-economic wellbeing in 
Key Stage 1: Interim paper 1, 2021.
212 Department for Education, Understanding progress in the 2020 to 2021 academic year: Complete findings from the autumn term, 2021.
213 Education Endowment Foundation, Impact of school closures and subsequent support strategies on attainment and socio-economic wellbeing in 
Key Stage 1: Interim paper 1, 2021.
214 Department for Education, Understanding progress in the 2020/21 academic year, Complete findings from the autumn term, 2021.
215 Education Endowment Foundation, Best evidence on impact of COVID-19 on pupil attainment, 2021.
216 Education Endowment Foundation, Chief executive’s letter: COVID-19 has created the test of a generation, 2020.
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Schools with higher rates of disadvantaged pupils suffered greater losses. 
Specifically, the north-east and Yorkshire and the Humber had more than double the 
learning loss in the south-west (equivalent to 2.3-2.6 months of lost learning)
Learning loss has not been spread equally across regions. Schools with higher rates 
of disadvantaged pupils suffered greater losses.217 Regions such as the north-east and 
Yorkshire and the Humber had more than double the learning loss than the south-west 
(equivalent to 2.3-2.6 months of lost learning).218
In developing its recovery efforts further, part of the DfE’s focus must go towards solving 
two major weaknesses of the educational system that COVID-19 has exposed: lack of 
flexibility and funding.
Funding
There is no way around it; good quality teachers are critical to raising pupils’ 
attainment.219 Schools in the most deprived areas outside London are far less likely than 
schools in affluent areas to employ teachers with a relevant degree, a proxy for teacher 
quality.220 This is particularly the case in some STEM subjects where, outside London, 
51% of maths teachers have a relevant degree in the most affluent areas, compared to 
37% of teachers in the most deprived areas.221 
Retaining good teachers costs money and evidence shows that targeted disadvantaged 
funding, which could help schools do this, has fallen in recent years.222 The UK 
Government has introduced a new national funding formula which is more responsive to 
changes in pupil demographics and consistent across England, but analysis finds that 
the new formula delivers greater increases to more affluent pupils.223, 224, 225 
217 Department for Education, Understanding progress in the 2020/21 academic year, Complete findings from the autumn term, 2021.
218 Ibid.
219 Hanushek et al., Generalizations about using value-added measures of teacher quality, 2010.
220 Education Policy Institute, The teacher labour market in England, 2018.
221 Ibid.
222 Institute for Fiscal Studies, 2020 Annual report on education spending in England: schools, 2020.
223 Education Policy Institute, The national funding formula: Consideration of better targeting to disadvantaged pupils, 2021.
224 Education Policy Institute, School funding and the disadvantage gap at the local level, 2020.
225 The Guardian, Funding for deprived schools in England has shifted to wealthy areas, study finds, 2021
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Pupils living in persistent poverty (who have spent more than 80% of their 
time in school on Free School Meals) are a shocking 22.7 months behind 
non-disadvantaged pupils on average
Pupils living in persistent poverty (who have spent more than 80% of their time in school 
on Free School Meals) are a shocking 22.7 months behind non-disadvantaged pupils 
on average.226 There is a strong case for reviewing whether funding formulas should 
be targeted to those pupils living in persistent poverty.227 This is particularly important 
in light of COVID-19. Disadvantaged pupils will not recover their learning loss overnight 
and education funding mechanisms must reflect the sustained and targeted support this 
group will need in perpetuity.
Further education (ages 16-24)
Technical education, mainly delivered within Further Education Colleges, is the 
unsung hero of social mobility. Yet the sector is under-resourced, over-balanced with 
disadvantaged students and tasked with catching students up on basic academic 
qualifications (primarily English and maths) while also administering high quality trade-
based courses.228 FE is the last point at which many disadvantaged students achieve 
their final qualification before entering the labour market.
In 2021, the Department for Education released an FE white paper to position the sector 
as a leader for skills and post-COVID-19 recovery. This white paper had encouraging 
signs and is laudable for its ambition to create a truly equitable technical education 
track. But it fell short in a number of critical ways. 
First and most importantly, due to delays in the UK Government’s spending review 
process, the white paper was published without any significant funding investment 
– without Treasury’s backing, the white paper is largely symbolic. We applaud the 
announcements that were made, such as the £95 million for the Lifetime Skills 
Guarantee and the £43 million for Skills Bootcamps.229 However, in our 2018-19 State 
of the Nation, we called on government to raise the base rate of funding.230, 231 While this 
was raised by 4.7% as part of the UK Government’s package of £400 million in 2019 for 
16-18 education, this fell far short of what the sector needs.232, 233, 234
226 Education Policy Institute, Education in England: Annual Report 2020, 2020.
227 Gorard S., A cautionary note on measuring pupil premium attainment gap in England, 2016.
228 Social Mobility Commission, State of the nation 2018-19: Social mobility in Great Britain, 2019.
229 Department for Education and Department for Work and Pensions, Hundreds of free qualifications on offer to boost skills and jobs, 2021.
230 Social Mobility Commission, State of the nation 2018-19: Social mobility in Great Britain, 2019.
231 Department for Education, Funding boost for construction skills bootcamps, 2021.
232 HM Treasury and Department for Education, Chancellor announces £400 million investment for 16-19 year olds’ education, 2019.
233 Institute for Fiscal Studies, 2020 Annual report on education spending in England: schools, 2020.
234 In cash terms, the allocation of £190m from the package of investment meant an uplift of 4.7% in the 16-18 base rate.
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Second, the white paper exhibited siloed ways of working. This paper could have been 
the opportunity for meaningful strategic vision across DfE, the Department for Work and 
Pensions (who oversee Job Centre Plus referrals and adult training programmes), and 
the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (who oversee industrial 
growth, of which skills gaps is a crucial component). Neither department is mentioned 
even in passing (though we acknowledge an illustrative case study from a Job Centre) – 
a significant omission at a time when Job Centre Plus visits are soaring and retraining is 
critical for adults in declining sectors.
Within FE delivery, COVID-19 has had other impacts. Increasingly, programmes 
within FE rely on work experience, including the mandatory 45-day work experience 
placement for T Levels. It is all but certain that the pandemic has significantly reduced 
the value of this opportunity and has had particular impact on disadvantaged students 
who already lacked access and networks to high quality work experience. 
We welcome the UK Government’s response to this by announcing, earlier in May, the 
T Level Employer Incentive Scheme, where employers will be eligible to claim a £1,000 
payment for hosting a T Level industry placement that commences between 27 May 
2021-31st July 2022. However, this remains a short-term initiative and fails to adopt a 
targeted approach or extra consideration for disadvantaged learners who face further 
barriers to get placements.
16-19 student premium
A 16-19 Student Premium is a relatively easy and effective way to address 
disadvantage gaps and address COVID-19-caused learning loss. Our rationale is 
simple. Government and schools need a way to target resources to students most 
impacted by the pandemic, whose needs are most acute (because they will soon 
transition to a new phase of education or work) and who are at the stage of their 
education where it will have the most impact on their future life chances. Schools 
need flexibility to adapt to their own contexts, while government needs to ensure 
there is accountability for public money. A Student Premium achieves all of this. 
We currently have an Early Years Premium and a Pupil Premium, and we support 
students in higher education from low-income households. It is a bizarre quirk of the 
education system that we assume disadvantage disappears between ages 16-19. 
Although current 16-19 disadvantage block funding helps to address some of the 
costs associated with studying (travel, equipment, etc), it simply was not designed 
to address the attainment gap. A Student Premium would build on evidence-backed 
gains made by the Pupil Premium to close attainment gaps and will balance flexibility 
with accountability.
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Higher education (ages 18+)
Higher education has long been the bedrock of an individual’s chances of upward 
mobility. Participation in higher education delivers benefits for individuals and 
societies, and the global labour market increasingly demands a degree as a necessary 
prerequisite for higher-skilled jobs. Over the last few decades, more and more young 
people are accessing university – but the key question is the extent to which ambitions 
to increase participation are working. This section will look at HE admissions policies, 
data quality and HE institutions as employers.
Before the pandemic, there was a 19 percentage point gap in access by socio-
economic background (45% of non-FSM students vs 26% FSM students in 2018-
19). This is the largest the gap has been for more than a decade. In other words, the 
more educationally advantaged a child’s background, the more likely they are to go to 
university, and the more likely they are to go to the top third of HE institutions by UCAS 
entry tariff.235 COVID-19 has further exacerbated this gap; around 30% of disadvantaged 
students report they are less able to afford to study because of the pandemic.236 
Improving the measurement of disadvantage in HE
Underlying all efforts to improve access to HE is a critical question – how to assess 
whether a potential student is disadvantaged? 
Universities have long used a measure called POLAR quintiles to answer this question. 
But this measure is fundamentally flawed. POLAR quintiles split people into five groups, 
based on geographic areas, rather than individuals’ circumstances. This means that 
a poorer kid living in a leafy area could be mistakenly labelled as privileged (or vice 
versa). Recent research from the Sutton Trust has shown how badly this measure 
correlates with low family income (scoring just 0.22 on Pearson correlation, compared to 
a high score of 0.69 for number of years on free school meals).237 
We want to encourage universities, the Office for Students and UCAS to move 
away from sole use of this measure. We recognise that there is some benefit in 
tracking uptake of HE places from areas that are historically underserved but think 
that institutions should consider the findings of the Sutton Trust’s recent research 
that suggests that ACORN and the Index of Multiple Deprivation are higher quality 
area measures. 
To further strengthen universities’ understanding of the actual socio-economic 
background of their student body, we recommend use of both the ‘years eligible for Free 
School Meal measure’ and for universities to ask for applicants’ parental occupation. 
Parental occupation is one of the best ways to assess someone’s socio-economic 
background – it is the measure we use throughout our reports and the one we tell 
employers to use. Including this measure will allow universities a more accurate way to 
235 Department for Education, Widening participation in higher education, academic year 2018/19, Accessed June 2021.
236 The Sutton Trust, COVID-19 and social mobility impact brief #2: university access and student finance, 2020.
237 The Sutton Trust, Measuring disadvantage, 2021.
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measure the socio-economic background of the entire student body. Further, it has the 
added benefit of enabling employers to directly understand how to target recruitment 
efforts to institutions with high populations of low socio-economic background students. 
Applications
Faced with a renegade algorithm in 2020, it was clear that higher education institutions 
couldn’t follow the typical pattern of holding placements based on predicted grades.238 
There is good evidence that this practice should become the status quo, post-
COVID-19. Predictive grades are wildly inaccurate across the board; research shows 
over 80% of predictions are inaccurate.239 High achieving disadvantaged young 
people are slightly more likely to be under-predicted than their more privileged peers, 
which could threaten their ability to be placed at higher tariff universities (24% of 
high achieving disadvantaged students were under-predicted vs. 20% of similar 
privileged students).240
Higher education institutions and regulators have expressed concern over the phasing 
out of predictive grades due to the delay in awarding admissions placements.241, 242 This 
concern is surmountable. Faced with pandemic-caused disruption in 2021, schools and 
universities planned on condensing exams into a three-week period. This was possible 
in part due to efficiency gains we have made in our examination system (such as virtual 
marking). Additionally, exams could be moved earlier in the school year to ensure actual 
grades can be used in applications. This could create an added benefit – currently, 
students leave school four to six weeks before the end of term. With earlier exams, 
schools could keep students in school to focus on employability and life skills (e.g. CV 
writing, budgeting etc.).
But predictive grades are just one side of the story. Disadvantaged young people often 
undermatch their own ability, choosing institutions and courses that are less selective 
than their grades would otherwise allow.243, 244 This is likely to have consequences 
for their outcomes following graduation and for social mobility more widely.245 The 
Commission has shown that disadvantaged young people undermatch their post-16 
course choice.246 Students facing disadvantage start thinking about university later, and 
are more likely to report regretting that they didn’t have the right A level choices to study 
subjects such as medicine.247 More must be done to determine how to give adequate 
careers information, advice and guidance, and proactive engagement from universities 
to recruit disadvantaged students into more selective courses.
238 BBC, A-levels and GCSEs: U-turn as teacher estimates to be used for exam results, Accessed June 2021.
239 University College London, Predicted grades: Accuracy and impact, 2016.
240 Ibid.
241 Ofqual, Post qualifications admissions consultation response, 2021.
242 Institute for Fiscal Studies, Post qualification admissions and the tale of two (and a half) models, 2021.
243 Campbell, S. et al., Mismatch in higher education: prevalence, drivers and outcomes, 2019.
244 Department for Education, Progression to higher education or training, Academic Year 2018/19, Accessed June 2021.
245 Ibid.
246 Social Mobility Commission, The road not taken: drivers of course selection, 2021.
247 The Universities and Colleges Admissions, What next? What influences the choices school leavers make?, 2020.
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Socio-economic diversity in the HE workforce 
In many locations around the country, HE institutions are anchor institutions for 
their communities. They help develop a regional skills base, drive economic growth 
and social mobility, improve health and education outcomes and support their local 
communities.248 But in our experience, HE institutions have resisted thinking about their 
own role in promoting socio-economic diversity and inclusion. Despite the valiant effort 
and focus on widening participation for their student body, very little has been done to 
consider how their own workforce practices could drive social mobility.
The Commission launched a thriving programme of work with employers in 2020. As 
part of that effort, we work with employers large and small to provide advice, toolkits, 
training materials, case studies and more to drive best practice.249 Universities are 
notably underrepresented in this conversation. As a first step, universities should follow 
the lead of other public sector bodies, like the Civil Service, and dozens of private sector 
entities; they should ask and report on their workforce’s socio-economic background 
using parental occupation as the key question.250
248 Higher Education Policy Institute, Making universities matter: How higher education can help to heal a divided Britain, 2020.
249 Social Mobility Commission, Toolkit for socio-economic diversity and inclusion, Accessed June 2021.
250 Social Mobility Commission, Measurement, Accessed June 2021.
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Amran Hassan, a  
21-year-old psychology 
student from London, was 
working in hospitality at a 
stadium when COVID-19 
brought things to an 
abrupt stop. 
“That job was really big for me, because it was casual so I could do it 
alongside my education and studies.”
Amran was told she was no longer needed.
“They said they’d let us know, but there hasn’t been any work since. That job 
helped me a lot with my personal life and going out with my friends, and now 
that’s been stopped too. I enjoyed working, meeting new people, seeing work 
colleagues.” 
Amran, who lives at home with her family, couldn’t find other part-time work, so is now 
working full-time alongside her psychology degree. 
“My student loan isn’t enough, so I’ve had to start working 40 hours a week in 
a warehouse. It’s the only thing that’s come up. Because I’m the oldest child 
in a low-income family, I’ve taken on responsibility for some bills and helping 
with rent. Small things like the internet bill. We do get a student loan, but it’s 
not enough.”
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COVID-19 has had an impact on Amran’s studies too. 
“It affected me because I’m a learner where I love to ask for help. I want a 
teacher there telling me what’s right for me and where did I go wrong, and 
that really affected me because I couldn’t get that virtually.”
She found learning remotely challenging in general.
“I did struggle with time management around March and April, when we had 
our coursework deadline, and at the end of the school year. At university, we 
used to have lecturers, small sessions with seven or eight people, and drop-in 
clinics where you could ask the teacher any questions.”
Since COVID, they have completely stopped. Now they do it all 
over video. It affected everyone, but some people more than others. 
I think I was one of those people. I love to hear the teacher talk.  
And get feedback.
Job-finding also comes with extra difficulties. 
“Right now, I’m in the process of applying to graduate schemes. We were 
getting trained for the application process to be in person and obviously now 
everything’s virtual. Things have to be approached differently and we didn’t 
get taught that way.” 
Despite this, Amran is determined to push on with her career plans. 
“Because of the effects of COVID-19 psychologists are needed more than ever, but 
that’s not the route I want to go. I wanted to work for a council in the public sector – 
that’s my plan. I was thinking of becoming a teacher.”
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Employment
The COVID-19 pandemic has had a profound effect on people’s working lives in 
England and the impacts could be severe. In this section, we look at pre-pandemic 
employment trends, the unequal impact of lockdown and the long-term implications for 
social mobility.
During the 2010s, there were a number of positive developments in the labour market in 
England. Unemployment rates fell sharply from a peak of 8.5% in 2011 to 4% in 2019.251 
Employment had risen to record levels and, as the labour market tightened, greater 
numbers of less advantaged people were able to secure work, contributing to a fall in 
the disability employment gap and some narrowing in ethnic employment gaps. The 
introduction of the National Living Wage in 2016 boosted the wages of the lowest paid 
and led to a reduction in earnings inequality in the lower half of the distribution.252 
However, the 2010s was a disappointing period for wage growth, labour productivity, 
precarious work and in-work poverty.253 In addition, regional disparities in unemployment 
and low pay remained entrenched. 
251 Office for National Statistics, Labour market overview, UK: April 2021, 2021. 
252 Centre for Analysis of Social Exclusion, The national living wage and falling earnings inequality, 2020.
253 Centre for Analysis of Social Exclusion and London School of Economics, The conservative governments’ record on social policy from May 2015 to 
pre-COVID-19 2020: Policies, spending and outcomes, 2021.
PHOTO REDACTED DUE TO THIRD PARTY RIGHTS OR OTHER LEGAL ISSUES 
Social Mobility Commission | State of the nation 2021 | 69
England
Where is deprivation geographically located?
254 Office for National Statistics, Exploring local income deprivation, 2021. 
255 Ibid.
256 Social Mobility Commission, Long shadow of deprivation: differences in opportunities, 2020.
257 Centre for Analysis of Social Exclusion and London School of Economics, The conservative governments’ record on social policy from May 2015 to 
pre-COVID-19 2020: Policies, spending and outcomes, 2021.
258 Ibid.
259 Bank of England, The Monetary Policy Report January 2020, 2020.
We tend to see more income-deprived neighbourhoods in urban areas, including 
in Greater London, around Birmingham, and in the north-east; however, there are 
also deprived areas outside of urban centres, including in coastal towns like Great 
Yarmouth, Hastings and Blackpool.254 Within local authorities, there are sometimes 
significant divides, such as in Wirral, Middlesbrough, Blackpool and Birmingham, 
and those with the highest income deprivation often have the greatest internal 
disparities.255 We found deprived areas with limited opportunities adjacent to more 
affluent areas with greater opportunities throughout England. Areas with lower 
pay for disadvantaged sons and less equality of opportunity are typically more 
deprived, with lower house prices, fewer labour market opportunities in professional 
occupations and fewer education opportunities in ‘Outstanding’ schools.
Our own work has shown how people experience life in very different ways within 
places – for example, our report on geographic inequalities showed even some 
affluent areas like Chiltern had significant class pay gaps and poor outcomes from 
their working class residents.256 One in six local authorities (50 LAs) has both low 
pay for disadvantaged sons and large pay gaps in adulthood between sons from 
disadvantaged and more affluent families. These areas stretch across England: 
there is unequivocally a postcode lottery for social mobility across England.
We will continue to monitor how initiatives such as the Town’s Fund, Opportunity 
Areas and the UK Shared Prosperity Fund, set up to replace structural funding from 
the EU, will benefit areas of England which face some of these challenges.
Despite the gains mentioned above, inequalities in employment and pay by disability 
and ethnicity remained stubbornly high. The downward trend in young people not in 
employment, education or training (NEET) levelled off after 2016, and the number of 
vacancies fell after 2018 following a period of growth from 2010.257 
Towards the end of the decade, and on the eve of the COVID-19 pandemic, there were 
signs that progress was stalling.258 The Bank of England’s January 2020 Monetary 
Policy Report noted a “softening” in a number of labour market indicators despite record 
levels of employment.259 
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How the pandemic shaped jobs
When lockdown first arrived, unemployment was a significant risk. Yet, while 
unemployment has risen since March 2020, the increase has been much smaller than 
anticipated due in large part to the UK Governments’ response to the crisis. Comparing 
employment statistics in the three months before the first lockdown with a year later 
shows that employment in England fell by 1.5 percentage points and unemployment 
increased by 1 percentage point over the course of the year. This leaves England 
with the lowest rates of unemployment in the UK, with Scotland close behind (see 
Chapter 1). 
Much larger falls in employment occurred in London (2.3 percentage points) and the 
south-west of England (2.2 percentage points).260 The unemployment rate in England 
is currently 5% (7.2% in London). Prior to COVID-19, unemployment was falling fastest 
for those from low socio-economic backgrounds, who made up the highest proportion 
of the unemployed, but early 2020 data shows pandemic-related unemployment is fairly 
equally distributed by socio-economic background (see figure 2.5, which shows a three-
year moving average for sample size purposes). 
260 Office for National Statistics, Labour market overview, UK, Accessed June 2021.





















Source: SMC Analysis of Labour Force Survey (ONS)
Notes: People age 16 to 64 Margin of error varies from 0.3% to 0.5% for individual statistics. See Appendix Table B3 for sample 
sizes and 95% confidence intervals. Those who are on the Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme (furlough) are not classed as 
unemployed and so are not included in this chart
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This better-than-expected performance during the pandemic is largely due to the impact 
of two drivers. First and foremost, the Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme (CJRS) and 
the Self-Employed Income Support Scheme (SEISS), have been very effective (for 
more, see Chapter 1). When CJRS comes to an end in September 2021, though, many 
more workers risk losing their jobs. Those in working class jobs are most at risk, as 
they are overly represented in the scheme. Since these jobs are predominantly held 
by those from working class backgrounds, there could be a significant socio-economic 
disparity in unemployment in the near future. Second, young people are staying on in 
education or are withdrawing from the labour market and are therefore not captured in 
unemployment statistics. 
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Andrea Evans, 30, from Liverpool, was 
working as a cleaner at a local university 
and volunteering at a National Trust 




“I was really active, really busy. Always on the go.”
But after lockdown began, her asthma and fibromyalgia meant she had to shield, and 
she was unable to continue at her job. 
“Everything stopped for me. Work. The lot. And I could only exercise for an 
hour a day. This caused my health issues to kick off.”
Although Andrea tried to remain active, it was difficult to exercise in a one-bedroom flat.
“I’ve had the biggest flare-up ever since my diagnosis. And I put on about four 
stone. Now I have to lose the weight so we can carry on with our IVF journey, 
which also got halted because of the lockdown.”
The flare-up compromised Andrea’s ability to walk, and she now uses mobility 
aids full time. 
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For me, as long as I have a routine and I’m active I’m fairly okay, 
although I still struggle. When it kicks off, I end up needing to use a 
walking stick. I live in a tiny one-bed flat and even walking round that 
leaves me breathless. It’s frustrating. I’m at the point where I’d expect 
to be in my seventies in my thirties.
Andrea was on furlough initially, but her worsening health problems meant she was 
unable to return to work when the lockdown eased and, after a period on sick pay, is 
now on unpaid leave. 
“The fact we’re still not fully opened up means I’ve not been able to 
rehabilitate or get back to my normal. The main struggle is not being able 
to go home or exercise in the way I would normally to keep my health 
under control.”
Andrea remains concerned about protecting herself from COVID-19.
“Basically, we’re still trying to keep me safe because I know how my body 
reacts to illness. Even just a cold can knock me off my feet and it takes me 
a while to recover. I know that if I end up with COVID-19 I will end up in 
hospital because of my asthma and the pneumonia I’ve had multiple times 
in the past.”
But she is also concerned about the impact lockdown and its effect on her health issues 
has had on her ability to work.
“My employer has been amazing. They were furloughing people and trying 
to keep us safe, but it’s not that easy – especially if you’ve got staff with 
health problems.”
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In response to COVID-19, the UK Government announced a new three-year scheme in 
England and Wales which will provide Universal Credit claimants who have been out of 
work for between 12 to 18 months, enhanced support to find jobs. The Restart Scheme 
has been allocated £2.9 billion to deliver tailored support for individuals on a pay-per-
outcome basis.261 
Youth unemployment began to climb post-COVID-19. England has utilised the 
Kickstart Scheme to help address this (see Chapter 1), along with a youth employment 
programme and an expansion of traineeships, among other initiatives.262
Apprenticeships 
The majority of apprentices are not from lower socio-economic backgrounds. Perhaps 
this is an obvious statement, but policymakers and employers alike often talk about 
this route to employment as if it is an incontestable social mobility tool helping the 
disadvantaged. This is not the case. Before the pandemic began, the Commission’s 
work had exposed how the apprenticeship programme in England was failing to deliver 
on its potential for those from working class backgrounds.263 Poorer apprentices 
were less likely to get onto schemes and were more likely to be clustered in lower 
returning and lower-level apprenticeships than their peers from higher socio-economic 
backgrounds.264 Disadvantaged apprentices face gaps at literally every stage of the 
system – from access to levy funding, quality to attainment and progression to pay. 
The only silver lining was that, when apprentices from poorer backgrounds overcome 
all of these barriers, they receive a bigger boost to their wages than their more 
advantaged peers. 
On the eve of the pandemic, the patterns we identified were already worsening for 
disadvantaged students. In February 2020, the overall number of starts in 2019-20 
was already 10% lower than the number of starts in the same period of 2018-19 (both 
from August to February).265 The decline was concentrated at Levels 2 and 3, which 
disadvantaged learners were most likely to be clustered in. Moreover, levy-funded starts 
– which disadvantaged learners are less likely to benefit from – represented two thirds 
of all new starts in the first seven months of 2019-20 (compared to 56% in 2018-19).266 
So with these worrying factors already in play, COVID-19 hit. Apprenticeship starts 
dropped 7% in the first half of the 2019-20 academic year. By May 2020, that number 
was set to fall further with almost one in four employers stating that fewer than 50% 
of their apprentices would resume once economic restrictions had relaxed.267 31% of 
employers reported that they were likely to hire fewer apprentices over the coming 
261 Department for Work and Pensions, How the Restart scheme will work, 2020.
262 Department for Work and Pensions, Guidance: help to find work for Universal Credit claimants aged 18 to 24, 2021.
263 Social Mobility Commission, Apprenticeships and social mobility: Fulfilling potential, 2020.
264 Social Mobility Commission, State of the nation 2018-19: Social mobility in Great Britain, 2019.
265 Department for Education, Apprenticeships and traineeships: April 2020, 2021.
266 Ibid.
267 The Sutton Trust, COVID-19 and social mobility impact brief #3: Apprenticeships, 2020.
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year, or none at all.268 Younger apprentices from lower socio-economic backgrounds 
were particularly likely to have been in sectors which saw apprenticeship declines, for 
example the hospitality sector. 
The pandemic has further exacerbated the pre-existing trend towards higher 
apprenticeships (with higher apprenticeships rising from 18% of starts from August 
to January in 2018-19 to 32% in the same period in 2020-21), further reducing 
opportunities for learners from low socio-economic backgrounds who are less likely to 
be on these courses.269
What remains evident is the lack of monitoring data needed to provide further analysis, 
both across the sector and with regional insight, of the full impact of COVID-19 on 
apprenticeships. The Commission welcomed the UK Government’s announcement in 
the 2020 Summer Statement to introduce incentive payments for employers for hiring 
new apprentices – initially £2,000 for apprentices between 16 and 24 and £1,500 for 
those over the age of 25 – and agree with the subsequent decisions to increase the 
incentive to £3,000 following significant low take up.270 Although the UK Government 
had budgeted for 100,000 incentive payments for new apprenticeship hires, DfE data 
showed that just over half of that allocation had been taken up, before the decision 
to extend the scheme was taken.271, 272 We urge the UK Government to go further 
with the aims of this scheme and leverage it, not merely as a stop-gap in response 
to COVID-19, but as a tool to address the persistently disadvantaged gaps in higher 
level apprenticeships. 
268 Ibid.
269 Department for Education, Apprenticeships and traineeships: Academic year 2020/21, 2021.
270 Department for Education, Incentive payments for hiring a new apprentice, 2021.
271 Department for Education, Apprenticeships and traineeships, Academic year 2020/21, Accessed June 2021.
272 HM Treasury, Plan for jobs, 2020.
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Connecting employers with NEET adults
Since the beginning of the pandemic, apprenticeship starts have 
fallen by 50%, and those still being provided are predominantly going 
to people from privileged backgrounds. The move to remote work 
accelerated the need to create virtual work experience programmes to 
make sure that young people who are not in education, employment 
or training (NEET) across the UK could continue to benefit from 
opportunities 
to improve their 
technical and 
employability 
skills and access 
mentors remotely. 
 
Accenture has provided work placements and job opportunities for young people who 
are NEET since 2014. To continue to reach those from under-privileged backgrounds, 
the firm rolled out a one week virtual ‘tech-taster’ programme – aimed at this 
demographic and designed to be inclusive – which offered an introduction to their 
‘Innovation Centre’.
Through a series of virtual team sessions and self-directed learning sessions, 
participants were exposed to coding, design thinking, and key employability skills (such 
as presentation skills, team working, mock interviews and CV workshops). Each of the 
15 participants was provided with the necessary technology and support to complete 
the programme, including a laptop and a dongle to ensure that they were able to access 
the internet during the week, regardless of personal circumstances.
One individual commented, 
“To be a part of it, even for just one virtual week feels amazing…you 
have made it work so well! I know future participants for this scheme will 
definitely enjoy it!”
Successful participants of the programme were fast-tracked to Accenture’s Assessment 
Centres for open apprenticeship roles, which led to 28% of participants securing 
offers for the firm’s Newcastle-based apprenticeship. Based on the success of this 
pilot, a further 75 participants from across the UK have taken part in virtual taster 
weeks. Accenture has captured the learnings in their virtual work experience toolkit 
and used them to support other employers to virtualise their own programmes with 
inclusion in mind.
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Adult training and skills
Apprenticeships are one tool among many to help adults upskill. We have focused 
extensively on how those from lower socio-economic backgrounds are the least 
likely to access training or education after leaving school – but also how good quality 
training can help adults escape low paid jobs.273, 274 We’ve shown how the UK’s lack of 
investment in adult education (both from the UK Government and employers) is harming 
‘second chances’ and contributing to skills gaps. And, we have released behavioural 
insights-backed tools for employers to increase how training and progression is 
allocated to low-skilled, frontline workers. Based on this knowledge and insight, we 
provided extensive evidence to the In-Work Progression Commission’s call for evidence 
which we hope mirrors our recommendations to the UK Government.275, 276 
The most important recommendation we had given to the UK Government on 
this area was this: ensure good quality, high-returning, free and flexible offers are 
available to adults at Level 3 and below. That is why we were particularly pleased 
when DfE responded with its announcement of a new Lifetime Skills Guarantee. This 
guarantee gives all adults without a current Level 3 the ability to get one for free. It 
promises degrees of flexibility and attempts to help target courses that return labour 
market returns.
We have given the UK Government further advice on how to shape this offer for 
success – for example, by providing maintenance grants for associated non-learning 
costs and using behavioural insights research (like ours) and other methods to inspire, 
support low skilled workers to progress up from foundation levels to the Level 3 offer, 
and consider specific, targeted support for the groups our research found are most at 
risk of becoming stuck in low pay.277
273 Social Mobility Commission, Adult skills gap and the falling investment in adults with low qualifications, 2019.
274 Social Mobility Commission, Learning ladders: adult training and progression out of low pay, 2020.
275 Social Mobility Commission, Increasing in-work training and progression for frontline workers, 2020.
276 UK Parliament, DWP commission: Statement made on 16 March 2020, 2020.
277 Social Mobility Commission, Learning ladders: adult training and progression out of low pay, 2020.
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Child poverty, inequality and social security
Child poverty is inextricably linked to low levels of social mobility. Children who are 
exposed to poverty have worse health, education, development and ultimately, worse 
outcomes in the labour market compared to more affluent children. 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283 
No other country in the world that performs well on social mobility also has high rates of 
poverty and inequality.
278 Cooper, K., and Stewart, K., Does household income affect children’s outcomes? A systematic review of the evidence, 2020.
279 Duncan, G.J. et al., Economic deprivation and early childhood development, 1994.
280 Economic and Social Research Council, Economic deprivation and early childhood development, 2000.
281 Bradshaw J., Child poverty and child outcomes, 2002.
282 Joseph Rowntree Foundation, The Costs of Child poverty on individuals and society, 2008.
283 The organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, A broken social elevator? how to promote social mobility, 2018.
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In England, child poverty has remained high for many years, leaving the country 
with effectively the joint highest rate in the United Kingdom (England is at 30.4%, 
Wales at 30.6% - see figure 2.6). Prior to the pandemic, there were no signs to show 
that poverty rates were improving and these are expected to further worsen due to 
COVID-19 impacts.284
284 Department for Work & Pensions, Households below average income: an analysis of the income distribution FYE 1995 to FYE 2020, Accessed June 
2021.
285 Institute for Public Policy Research, No longer ‘managing’: The rise of working poverty and fixing Britain’s broken social settlement, 2021.

















































































































Source: Department for Work and Pensions, Households Below Average Income statistics, 2021
Note: This is based on a poverty line defined as 60% of the contemporary median after deducting housing costs
Where is child poverty concentrated?
In all regions of England, more than one in five children are living in relative poverty 
(see figure 2.7). This rises to more than a third of children in Yorkshire and the Humber, 
the West Midlands, the north-east and London. 
London consistently ranks as the region with the highest rates of poverty, driven in large 
part by the high cost of housing (indeed, London’s ‘before housing costs,’ one measure 
of poverty, track closely with England’s average). This housing costs issue means that 
in-work poverty rates are also particularly high in London, where more than one in five 
working households live in poverty.285 Interestingly, in the five-year period following 
the financial crisis, the fall in child poverty was much less pronounced in London than 
in many other English regions. Despite London’s consistent concentration of poverty, 
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neighbouring south-east England is consistently the best performer of the nation, with  
still around a quarter of children in poverty. These massive geographical divides show 
important inequalities in the country.
Children living in the north of England have contrasting fortunes. In the north-east, 
despite a 15-year drop between 1997-2013, child poverty rates have risen sharply by 
around 11 percentage points in little more than five years and are once again close to 
the rates observed in London. In contrast, the north-west outperformed, falling after 
2015-16 and 2016-18.286
The West Midlands is another region where child poverty has risen since 2010 (in 1997-
98 child poverty rates in the West Midlands were the same as the England average). 
In contrast, the East Midlands has one of the lowest rates of child poverty across 
English regions. 
286 End Child Poverty, Child poverty in your area 2014/15-2019/20, Accessed June 2021.
Figure 2.7: Child income poverty rates (after housing costs) UK, England and by 
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Source: Department for Work and Pensions, Households Below Average Income statistics, 2021
Notes: Figures are for the United Kingdom from 2002-03 to 2004-05 onwards. Earlier years are for England, Scotland, Wales only. 
The all children figures here are three-year averages and are therefore not directly comparable with the totals in the main tables. 
See Technical Annex B for further methodological notes
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The Starting Point Community Learning Partnership
The Starting Point Community 
Learning Partnership in 
Stockport is a social enterprise
and coffee shop that works to 
promote health and wellbeing, 
community organising and 
digital inclusion.  
Over the past year, because of the pandemic taking so much of life online, digital 
inclusion has been a particular focus.
Community organiser Nicola Wallace Dean says the events of 2020 exposed the digital 
divide like never before. 
“We had one person in our community who had COPD (Chronic Obstructive 
Pulmonary Disease). He was classified as vulnerable and not allowed to 
leave the house. He had no access to his bank account, no access to food 
and no credit on his phone as he’d always topped up at the Post Office. He 
had to hold a piece of paper up to our window, asking one of the organisers 
to phone and help. That shouldn’t be the only way someone can contact the 
outside world.”
Nicola says the pandemic has also worsened digital inequality in the workplace – 
from people in “low-paid, no-rights jobs” who aren’t supported by their employers 
to buy the equipment they need to work efficiently from home; to people who found 
themselves employed but lacking the technical know-how to work for online companies 
like Deliveroo. “It put a massive chasm in the middle of society between those online 
and those not.”
She has also spoken to people struggling to buy food. 
“It’s not just a case of supporting people how to go online shopping; it’s 
the fact they’ve not got debit cards to be able to do that in the first place. 
The huge amounts of barriers people have to overcome that other people 
take for granted are phenomenal. If it hadn’t been for the local mutual aid 
group, I genuinely don’t know how some people would have been able to 
get shopping.”
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Starting Point has seen others with bad credit, and therefore reliant on pay-as-you-go 
internet contracts, being charged as much as £30 a week to stay in touch with family. 
“For us that was a huge issue. We were constantly hearing about people 
running out of data. We heard of people getting sanctioned by the job centre 
because they were running out of data mid-month and so couldn’t regularly 
look for work.”
Home-schooling was another bone of contention.
It was laughable to think some people in our community were going 
to be able to home school for a variety of reasons, but actually it’s not 
laughable: it’s tragic.
Starting Point tackles these issues by running regular digital skills classes over Zoom; 
operating a lending library of 300 devices; and running coffee mornings staffed by digital 
champions, and well as campaigning on the issue of digital poverty.
We’re trying to encourage telecoms companies to support people who are in crisis. 
We know as a small organisation why, for some people, data needs to be free.
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How has policy tackled this?
Leading up to the pandemic, poverty rates were soaring not by chance but by choice. 
A decade of aggressive fiscal consolidation, coupled with welfare reforms, have left 
England with large cuts to benefits and tax credits. 
The UK Government’s approach was built on a principle that work alleviates poverty, 
and that a smaller welfare bill – £10 billion smaller in England, Scotland and Wales, 
in fact – supported post-recession recovery.287 But this approach is flawed. Work is 
an individual measure of income, while poverty is a household measure. Individuals 
most at risk of poverty – single parents, multi-child households, those with long-term 
disabilities – simply could not offset the massive reduction to their household finances. 
Put another way, rises in the minimum wage could not offset cuts to the benefits system 
and the poorest households were squeezed on every front.
In stark contrast to Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales, England has no official 
poverty or child poverty reduction strategy. This is despite a commitment made in all 
three Conservative party manifestos from 2015 to reduce child poverty.288 We cannot 
say whether this alone has led to England’s poor performance, but it certainly will not 
help it improve.
Significantly, legislative changes rolled back key elements that should form a strategy, 
such as the Welfare Reform and Work Act replacing the Child Poverty Act in 2016. The 
Act removed all income and material deprivation-based indicators and child poverty 
reduction targets and replaced them with indicators of household ‘worklessness’ and 
children’s educational attainment at age 16.289 Amendments from the House of Lords 
ensured that the UK Government must still publish the scrapped measures annually, but 
formal reporting to Parliament now sidesteps direct measures of child poverty.290
It is still too early to assess the impact of the pandemic on poverty using official 
statistics, but it is clear that COVID-19 has had an uneven impact on household 
finances, with disadvantaged groups losing out compared to more advantaged 
households. With an unprecedent uplift in Universal Credit claimants, England relied on 
the UK-wide £20 per week uplift to benefits (discussed more in Chapter 1). As across 
the UK, there are significant risks of rising rates of poverty if this uplift expires in autumn 
as planned.291
All the signs are that poverty will increase in the years ahead. During COVID-19, the UK 
Government has shown it has the ability to address these monumental challenges and 
address crises with action. Recovery must now focus on our growing poverty crisis to 
avert poor outcomes for a generation of children.
287 Centre for Analysis of Social Exclusion and London School of Economics, The conservative governments’ record on social policy from May 2015 to 
pre-COVID-19 2020: Policies, spending and outcomes, 2021.
288 Ibid.
289 Stewart, K., and Roberts, N., Child poverty measurement in the UK: Assessing support for the downgrading of income-based poverty measures, 
2019.
290 Ibid.
291 Joseph Roundtree Foundation, Keep the lifeline: why the Government should keep the £20 uplift to Universal Credit, 2020.
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Living standards, wealth and housing
Living standards not only matter because of their propulsive power to improve future 
upwards mobility and to protect against economic shocks, but also because of the 
emotional, wellbeing and general improvements to quality-of-life higher living standards 
bring.292, 293 In other words, we care not just about the type of job or income a person 
has but how they feel.
Living standards and intergenerational unfairness 
In any recession, living standards, wealth and assets will swing. But this recession had 
unique features that have severe consequences. Stamp duty holidays (in England and 
Northern Ireland) and low interest rates allowed better-off households to increase their 
assets in the property market, helped by their growing savings accounts (accumulated 
over the lockdown months with nowhere to spend).294 Due to the differentiated impact 
on working class and professional jobs, income inequality is likely to increase, while 
younger people have faced disrupted schooling and a tougher job market.295 Meanwhile, 
the pandemic had an uneven impact on other groups. Emergency policy measures 
(like the Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme and benefit uplifts discussed earlier) have 
helped to protect many from plummeting income, but the socio-economic inequalities 
have still taken shape. (For more, see Chapter 1.)
Pre-pandemic, living standards varied across England and there remains a broad 
north-south divide. In 2020, median income was highest in London and lowest in the 
north-east.296 
Wealth
Parental wealth in England had been increasing for younger generations and is very 
unequally distributed.297 Transfers of wealth between generations contributes to high 
rates of wealth inequality and, even prior to the pandemic, unequal inheritances were 
projected to increasingly limit social mobility prospects for people from lower wealth 
backgrounds.298 In particular, the increasing size of inheritances received by individuals 
from wealthier family backgrounds are set to increasingly limit prospects of upward 
mobility for those from poorer backgrounds.299 
292 Office for National Statistics, Personal and economic well-being in the UK, 2021.
293 Institute for Fiscal Studies, Inheritances and inequality over the life cycle, 2021.
294 Bank of England, How has COVID-19 affected household savings?, 2020. 
295 Institute for Fiscal Studies, Inequalities in education, skills and incomes in the UK: The implications of the COVID-19 pandemic, 2021.
296 Department for Work and Pensions, Apprenticeships and traineeships, Academic year 2020/21, Accessed June 2021.
297 Institute for Fiscal Studies, Inheritances and inequality within generations, 2020.
298 Palomino, J.C. et al., Wealth inequality, intergenerational transfers and socio-economic background, 2020.
299 Institute for Fiscal Studies, Inheritances and inequality over the life cycle: What will they mean for younger generations?, 2021.
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Conclusions
England faces a profound uphill battle to improve the socio-economic disparities that 
lead to poor social mobility. Child poverty is high, generational and socio-economic 
divides in living standards are widening, outcomes are tied to the place you grew up for 
too many and stubborn educational attainment gaps are growing. All of this was true 
before an unprecedent pandemic caused the largest shockwave in a century and will 
certainly get worse. Things will not improve without purposive action.
But there is still room for change. The UK Government’s response to COVID-19 was 
laudable and focused on raising welfare payments, keeping workers paid through 
the Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme, keeping schools open and keeping people 
in their homes, without the threat of eviction. These priorities are set against the pre-
pandemic backdrop of rises in the National Living Wage, a growth in professional jobs 
which can allow more people to be upwardly mobile, and the UK Government’s new 
focus on geographic and socio-economic inequalities in the Cabinet Office’s Equality 
Hub. Levelling up could help tie these threads together by focusing on inequalities that 
people experience in the places they live. But these issues will not be solved without 
concerted, focused and funded efforts. We urge the UK Government to focus the next 
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Highlights
42%
Significant gaps in school 
attainment exist between 
free school meal-eligible 
and non-eligible pupils; 
these gaps are larger at 
Level 2 for boys (30.6 
percentage points) than 
for girls (27.7 percentage 
points) and larger for 
disadvantaged Protestant 
pupils (33.1 percentage 
points) than for 
disadvantaged Catholic 
pupils (27.1 percentage 
points). COVID-19 will 






securing the peace and 
tackling paramilitarism 
are essential but 
draw a lot of policy 
focus and resources, 
making it harder 
to set and pursue 
bold programmes 
such as improving 
social mobility.
Qualification levels, wages, 
proportion of high-paid jobs, 
rate of job creation and new 
start-up growth are all lower 
in Northern Ireland than the 
UK average; one quarter of 
jobs pay less than the real 
Living Wage of £9.30.
The grammar school 
system impedes social 
mobility, as places 
disproportionately go 
to children from more 
advantaged backgrounds; 
44% of children attend 
selective post-primary 
schools, but only 14% of 
pupils in selective schools 
are eligible for free school 
meals (compared to 37% 
in non-selective). 
The proportion of 
professional jobs has 
increased creating 
potential opportunity 
for social mobility, but 
the rate is lower than 
in the rest of the UK 
(42% vs 49%). Those 
from professional 
backgrounds are 80% 
more likely to be in 
those jobs than those 
from working  
class backgrounds.
Northern Ireland’s economy is 
heavily reliant on sectors such  
as agri-food, retail and hospitality, 
which have been hardest hit by 
COVID-19 and face the most 
uncertain recovery. 
Almost one-quarter (24%) of 
children in Northern Ireland live 
in a household that, on income 
levels alone, struggles to provide 
the basics of heat, food and 
clothing or meet childcare  




Social Mobility Commission | State of the nation 2021 | 89
Northern Ireland
Introduction
Since partition in 1921, Northern Ireland (NI) has been beset by political tensions. 
These escalated into an intense period of conflict known as the Troubles, which lasted 
from the late 1960s until the paramilitary ceasefires of 1994 and the historic Belfast 
(Good Friday) Agreement of 10 April 1998. An estimated 3,636 people died during 
this period.300
While there has been no significant resumption of violence since then, the Troubles 
continue to cast a dark shadow over the population. The Commission for Victims and 
Survivors in Northern Ireland reported that around 500,000 people, from a population of 
1.9 million, feel their lives have been profoundly impacted by the conflict.301 
Political tensions remain. For three of the past five years, Northern Ireland had 
no Executive after a bitter dispute between the two largest political parties – the 
Democratic Unionist Party and Sinn Féin – over a renewable heat incentive scheme in 
January 2017.
Devolved powers in Northern Ireland
The Northern Ireland Assembly, sometimes referred to as Stormont, has full 
legislative powers over several policy areas vital for social mobility, including health, 
social services, early years, education, housing, social security, child support and 
equal opportunities. In contrast to Scotland and Wales, income tax remains overseen 
by the UK Government. The Northern Ireland Executive is responsible for issues of 
equality, poverty and community relations.
How has Northern Ireland addressed social mobility historically?
Community division continues to affect many areas of life, particularly housing and 
education. The political system, which involves a cross-community power-sharing 
coalition of the five main parties in government, is still evolving; it has faced difficulties 
building consensus on major policy issues and delivering strong programme 
interventions.302 Like in other nations, the COVID-19 pandemic and lockdowns have 
affected all aspects of life in Northern Ireland.
300 McKittrick, D., et al., Lost lives: The stories of the men, women and children who died as a result of the Northern Ireland Troubles, 1999.
301 Commission for Victims and Survivors Northern Ireland (CVSNI), Victims’ and survivors’ service and comprehensive needs assessment, 2011.
302 Equality Commission for Northern Ireland, Equality Commission for Northern Ireland, Accessed June 2021.
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Trends in social mobility in Northern Ireland
Northern Ireland has consistently had a lower proportion of professional jobs in the 
labour market when compared to the other UK nations (see figure 3.1). Conversely, 
Northern Ireland has one of the highest rates of working class jobs when compared to 
the UK as a whole (33% and 29% respectively).
Figure 3.1: Percentage of people in professional jobs across the labour market, in each 










Source: SMC Analysis of Labour Force Survey (ONS)
Note: Data refers to those in employment
In a socially mobile society, each occupational group – working class, intermediate and 
professional – would be made up of people from different socio-economic backgrounds 
in similar proportions to the make-up of the workforce as a whole. But that is not the 
case in Northern Ireland.
The percentage of those in professional occupations in Northern Ireland who are 
also from professional backgrounds is similar to that of the UK overall (60% vs. 62% 
respectively). Like the other parts of the UK, Northern Ireland has seen a modest recent 
rise in the proportion of people from working-class backgrounds in professional jobs. 
This could be a sign of upward absolute mobility, as more people access better-paying 
jobs. But those from professional backgrounds also saw a rise in access to professional 
jobs. In other words, it could be that there are more professional jobs than before, but 
the proportion of people from working class backgrounds accessing those jobs has not 
increased significantly. 
Social Mobility Commission | State of the nation 2021 | 91
Northern Ireland
Privileged people are now 80% more likely than those from working class 
backgrounds to be in professional occupations
Privileged people are now 80% more likely than those from working class backgrounds 
to be in professional occupations; this is down slightly from about twice as likely in 2014 
and 2015 (see figure 3.2).
Figure 3.2: How likely are people from different backgrounds to be in a professional 




















Source: SMC Analysis of Labour Force Survey (ONS)
Note: Margin of error varies from 2.8% to 7.1% for individual statistics, so individual changes should be interpreted with caution. 
See Appendix Table B2 for sample sizes and 95% confidence intervals
An individual in Northern Ireland from a working class background is about twice 
as likely as someone from a professional background to be in a working class job. 
The picture is similar to that of the UK overall: 33% of individuals in working class 
occupations are from working class backgrounds (the UK-wide figure is 31%), while 
16% are from professional backgrounds (UK-wide: 14%) (see figure 3.3).
92 | Social Mobility Commission | State of the nation 2021
Northern Ireland
Figure 3.3: How likely are people from different backgrounds to be in a working class 
























Source: SMC Analysis of Labour Force Survey (ONS)
Note: Margin of error varies from 2.8% to 5.9% for individual statistics, so individual changes should be interpreted with caution. 
See Appendix Table B1 for sample sizes and 95% confidence intervals
303 Department for Education, School enrolments - Northern Ireland summary data, 2021.
In the remainder of this chapter, we look at how these trends play out in the specific 
domains of education, employment and poverty.
Education
The school system in Northern Ireland has two characteristics that mark it out from the 
rest of the UK.
First, schools remain largely denominational: most children attend either Catholic 
maintained or (predominantly Protestant) controlled schools, with a small minority 
(almost 25,000, 7% of the school population) attending formally integrated schools. The 
Irish-medium school sector has grown rapidly over the past 20 years and now has over 
7,000 pupils – 2% of the school population.303
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44% of children attend selective 
and 56% attend non-selective 
post-primary schools.
Second, Northern Ireland still has a grammar school system, with academic selection 
at age 11 in most areas; 44% of children attend selective and 56% attend non-selective 
post-primary schools. Social mobility through education is therefore dependent for many 
on the outcome of the transfer tests, which children from disadvantaged backgrounds 
are less likely to succeed in.
Issues of educational inequality and social mobility are therefore often seen through the 
lens of community differences, parental choice and equality of opportunity in accessing 
the desired post-primary educational setting. Since the Northern Ireland Executive 
was established, numerous initiatives have been developed to address educational 
underachievement, which was identified first with Catholic and now with Protestant 
working class boys in particular. A recent report by an Expert Panel on educational 
underachievement (a ‘New Decade, New Approach’ commitment) was endorsed by the 
Northern Ireland Executive on 27 May 2021.
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Early years education and care 
Early years education has a positive impact on the life chances of children from 
disadvantaged backgrounds, and closing the achievement gap between children from 
different backgrounds is important for social mobility.304, 305 
Northern Ireland has recognised this with several major initiatives:
• Since 1998, all children have received at least one year of funded pre-school 
education.306 Before the pandemic, almost 24,000 children (92% of three-year-olds) 
were in funded pre-school education.307
• The Northern Ireland Department of Education (DE) invests just over £25 million 
each year in Sure Start, a targeted programme for children under four and parents 
living in the 25% most socially deprived areas, supporting speech, language and 
communication skills to assist learning.308
• The cross-departmental Early Intervention Transformation programme (EITP) ran 
until 2019, (when it became a mainstream programme) aiming to improve outcomes 
for specific groups of children, young people and families. Atlantic Philanthropies 
and the Northern Ireland Executive have invested £30 million over a six-year period 
(2014-2020) in this programme.309
• Enhancing play and leisure opportunities is a key outcome of the Executive’s new 
Children and Young People’s Strategy 2020-2030 to improve the wellbeing of 
children and young people in Northern Ireland, building on DE’s commitment to a 
Play Matters campaign.310
Despite these initiatives, the quality of provision and outcomes is varied for particular 
groups of learners, such as children entitled to free school meals (FSM), those with 
special educational needs, newcomers to Northern Ireland, looked-after children and 
boys.311 There is evidence that a degree-level qualification in early years education 
has improved the capacity of some early years staff, suggesting Northern Ireland may 
benefit from similar lessons we have concluded about developing the early years 
workforce in England.312, 313 
304 Department for Education, Early education use and child outcomes up to age 3, 2017.
305 Save the Children, Education and Child Protection: Tackling Poverty, 2017.
306 Department for Education in Northern Ireland and Department of Health, Social Services and Public Safety, Investing in early learning, 1998.
307 Education Policy Institute, A comparison of school institutions and policies across the UK. 2021.
308 Education and Training Inspectorate, Sure Start evaluation report, 2018.
309 Health and Social Care Northern Ireland, The early intervention transformation programme, 2019.
310 Department of Education, Play matters, Accessed June 2021.
311 Education and Training Inspectorate, The Chief Inspector’s report, 2018.
312 Ibid.
313 Social Mobility Commission, The stability of the early years workforce in England, 2020.
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Despite the success of Sure Start in Northern Ireland, the initiative is heavily 
oversubscribed and is only available to the 25% most socially deprived areas.314 As 
a result, many children under three, including those living in poverty, cannot access 
and benefit from these quality services.315 The evaluation also highlights that almost 
all of the projects are at a very early stage of developing meaningful self-evaluation for 
improvement, and there is insufficient communication and partnership working between 
Sure Start projects, pre-schools and schools.316 
Common mood disorders such as anxiety and depression affect 12.6% of children 
and young people in Northern Ireland – around 25% higher than in other UK nations
Common mood disorders such as anxiety and depression affect 12.6% of children 
and young people in Northern Ireland – around 25% higher than in other UK nations. 
Emotional problems are particularly common among boys aged 5-10, especially in 
the most deprived quintile.317 This suggests a possible need to focus on mental health 
support in schools.
Evidence shows a strong association between child poverty and poorer cognitive and 
language outcomes on entry to primary school, and this disadvantage gap persists 
throughout school.318 An expert panel appointed by the NI Minister of Education has 
prioritised investment in early years education and care from before birth to age six as 
the way forward to addressing this gap.319
The pandemic has had a significant impact on Northern Ireland’s youngest children. 
Although childcare remained open and pre-school education provision remained open 
for vulnerable children and those of key workers, other children of pre-school age 
accessed pre-school education via remote learning until pre-school settings re-opened 
on 8 March 2021. While losing access to face to face early education is likely to have 
affected all young children, its impact on those from more disadvantaged backgrounds 
may be even more significant, widening existing learning gaps.320 
The COVID-19 restrictions also resulted in closures of playgrounds and public parks. 
The loss of access to outdoor play can be hugely detrimental to a child’s healthy 
development.321 During lockdown, the percentages of school-aged children active 
in play dropped from 53.2% to 31.4% and participation in social play decreased 
314 Education and Training Inspectorate, SureStart evaluation report, 2018.
315 Save the Children, Tackling the poverty-related gap in early childhood learning in Northern Ireland, 2017.
316 Education and Training Inspectorate, SureStart evaluation report, 2018.
317 Bunting, L. et al., Youth wellbeing, 2020
318 Save the Children, Tackling the poverty-related gap in early childhood learning in Northern Ireland, 2017.
319 Department of Education, Expert panel on persistent educational underachievement linked to social disadvantage, 2021.
320 Centre for Research in Education Underachievement, Understanding parents’ experiences of home-schooling in Northern Ireland, 2020.
321 Bento, G. and Dias, G., The importance of outdoor play for young children’s healthy development, 2017.
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dramatically from 58.9% to 5%, while technology-based play increased from 33.9% to 
55.7%.322 This lack of physical activity and socialisation raises significant health and 
wellbeing concerns, and the need for playful experiences and interactions may be more 
important than ever after lockdown.323
Recent surveying suggests most early years teachers (58.6%) believe that children’s 
levels of engagement, social skills and ability to stay on task have been impacted 
negatively following COVID-19 restrictions and that children’s levels of anxiety have 
increased, with constant reassurance required on the part of staff to encourage some 
children to try out new things and engage in play.324 DE guidance issued in March 2021 
prioritises play and socialisation, with the emphasis on reassuring children and parents 
and supporting children to reconnect and build positive relationships.
Schools
Concerns about the inappropriateness of the traditional curriculum, particularly for those 
from disadvantaged backgrounds, led to a pilot play-based intervention, the ‘Enriched 
Curriculum’, which was introduced in over 100 primary school settings throughout 
Northern Ireland.325 This ran until 2009 and was replaced by the revised Northern 
Ireland curriculum which was introduced for all schools in 2007. The curriculum is 
designed to give schools as much flexibility as possible in what they choose to teach 
and to use approaches that best suit the needs of their pupils. Throughout, there is a 
stronger emphasis on preparing young people for life and work. 
The Northern Ireland Curriculum includes a separate Foundation Stage Curriculum for 
pupils in Years 1 (age 4-5) and 2 (age 5-6) of their primary education. The overarching 
aim of the Foundation Stage is that children learn through well-planned, challenging 
play that develops their interests, curiosity and creativity according to their individual 
age and stage of development. The key principle underpinning the Foundation Stage 
Curriculum is that young children learn best when learning is interactive, practical and 
enjoyable. Nurture Units are another area of support for primary school children. 
Education providers in Northern Ireland have to demonstrate their contribution 
to progress on the Executive’s priority indicators, as part of its commitment to 
evidence-based policy. The most relevant to social mobility is the attainment gap. It 
demonstrates persistent educational underachievement among socio-economically 
disadvantaged pupils. 
322 Playboard Northern Ireland, The impact of COVID-19 on children and young people’s play and education in Northern Ireland, 2020.
323 Centre for Educational Underachievement, Life after lockdown in the early years classroom: Embracing challenges as opportunities, Accessed June 
2020.
324 Playboard Northern Ireland, COVID-19 restrictions impacting children’s play, 2020.
325 Walsh, G. et al., Implementing a play-based and developmentally appropriate curriculum in Northern Ireland primary schools: what lessons have we 
learned?, 2010.
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Since 2005, the gap between those eligible for FSM and others is generally improving. 
However, significant divides remain. Figure 3.4 shows that boys eligible for FSM are 
achieving lower grades on average than FSM eligible girls. Although pupils of Catholic 
and Protestant backgrounds achieve similar grades on average, we can see from 
figure 3.5 that the attainment gap between Protestant pupils eligible for FSM and those 
who are not is wider than the equivalent gap for Catholics. This does not mean that 
achievement is not an issue for Catholic pupils. 
Figure 3.4: Gap between % non-FSM school leavers and % FSM school leavers 

































































Source: The Executive Office, Indicator 12 data, 2020
Note: Data stops at 2018-19 due to the cancellation of exams during the COVID-19 pandemic. FSM = Free School Meal
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Figure 3.5: Gap between % non-FSM school leavers and % FSM school leavers 





































































Source: The Executive Office, Indicator 12 data, 2020
Note: Data stops at 2018/19 due to the cancellation of exams during the COVID-19 pandemic FSM = Free School Meal
326 Department of Education, Children and young people, 2021.
327 Department of Education, A Fair Start, June 2021.
Educational underachievement has long been recognised as an issue by the DE and 
Education Authority. The Children’s Services Co-operation Act (Northern Ireland) 2015 
requires government departments to work together to improve the wellbeing of children 
and young people, including in relation to learning and achievement. The Children 
and Young People’s Strategy notes that “social disadvantage has the greatest single 
impact on educational attainment” and commits to closing the attainment gap.326 This 
cross-departmental strategy is an opportunity to increase joined-up efforts to address 
many challenges.
Under the terms of the ‘New Decade, New Approach’ political settlement, two significant 
reviews of education have been initiated:
• An expert panel was appointed in July 2020 to report to the education minister 
with a costed action plan to tackle persistent educational underachievement linked 
to social disadvantage by the end of May 2021. This report (A Fair Start), was 
endorsed by the Executive on 27 May 2021 and has been published.327
• An Independent Review of Education, starting in September 2021, to consider 
systemic educational issues such as post-primary transfer and a single 
education system.
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These strategic moves are grounds for optimism, but it is too early to judge if they 
are yet translating into effective programmes and a significant impact on young 
people’s lives.
Even before the COVID-19 pandemic, the most recent Northern Ireland Skills 
Barometer report highlighted a “noticeable squeeze in the expansion demand within 
occupations which have traditionally been low skilled with regard to formal qualification”, 
and indicated that pupils leaving school with low qualification levels were increasingly 
likely to struggle to find secure, well-paid employment.328
Previously spending per pupil in Northern Ireland decreased by over 10% in real terms 
since 2009-10, more than in any other parts of the UK. A total budget decrease of 5% 
in real terms, coupled with a 6% increase in school population put acute pressure on 
school funding.329 Both the number of children with SEN and associated costs have 
risen significantly year on year and funding and provision, particularly in mainstream 
schools, are widely felt to be inadequate.330 
So far, evidence suggests a widening ‘lockdown learning gap’. This is created by 
differential access to digital devices, internet connectivity, and parental capacity for 
home-schooling. Research shows that children of working class parents spent less time 
on school work during lockdown than their wealthier peers, received significantly less 
adult supervision and teaching, and were less likely to have an individual device for 
accessing online learning.331, 332
For the 2020-21 school year, as part of a broader catch-up package of spend, DE 
has put in place an £11.2 million ‘engage’ programme to support the recovery from 
lost learning time, with about 50% of the funding going to schools with high levels 
of disadvantage. DE have also allocated £7 million for devices for children and 
young people from disadvantaged backgrounds for remote learning, among other 
initiatives.333, 334 It remains to be seen whether the catch-up package will succeed in 
benefiting marginalised groups facing socio-economic disadvantage. The programme is 
continuing in the 2021-22 academic year.
328 Ulster University Economic Policy Centre, Northern Ireland skills barometer: 2019 update, 2019.
329 Institute for Fiscal Studies, 2020 Annual report on education spending in England: schools, 2020.
330 Northern Ireland Commissioner for Children and Young People, Centre for Research in Educational Achievement and Stranmillis University College, 
Too little, too late: The views of parents/carers on their child’s experiences of the Special Educational Needs (SEN) process in mainstream schools, 
2019.
331 Walsh, G. et al., Home-schooling in Northern Ireland during the COVID-19 crisis: the experiences of parents and carers, 2020.
332 Ibid.
333 Department of Education, Investment to support remote learning, 2021.
334 Education Policy Institute and Nuffield Foundation, Education reopening and catch-up support across the UK, 2021.
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Selective schools
The socio-economic divide between pupils at selective and non-selective schools 
has widened since 2010 (figure 3.6). In 2020-21, only 14% of pupils in selective 
schools were eligible for FSM, compared with 37% in non-selective schools
The ability of Northern Ireland’s state-funded grammar schools to rival the educational 
outcomes of expensive fee-paying independent schools in other parts of the UK is 
a source of great pride for many in the country.335 These schools are theoretically 
accessible to all, but transfer test results at age 10/11 are affected by high parental 
aspirations and rates of private tutoring in high-income households. This means that 
grammar school places disproportionately go to children from more socio-economically 
advantaged backgrounds.336 The socio-economic divide between pupils at selective 
and non-selective schools has widened since 2010 (figure 3.6). In 2020-21, only 
14% of pupils in selective schools were eligible for FSM, compared with 37% in non-
selective schools.
335 Northern Ireland Commissioner for Children and Young People, A ‘free’ education? The Cost of education in Northern Ireland, 2017.
336 Jerrim, J. and Sims, S., Why do so few low- and middle-income children attend a grammar school? New evidence from the Millennium Cohort Study, 
2019.
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Figure 3.6: Percentage of pupils entitled to free school meals at selective and non-
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Source: Northern Ireland Department of Education, School Enrolments – post primary school data, 2020
Note: Changes to the eligibility criteria for FSM in 2014/15 saw the proportion of FSME pupils grow in both types of school
337 Gallagher T., Education, equality and the economy, 2019.
338 Department of Education, Qualifications and destinations of Northern Ireland school leavers 2019/20, 2021.
Non-selective schools have falling pupil rolls and consequent funding, as selective 
schools have been able to keep their rolls topped up by accepting pupils with lower 
transfer test scores.337
The socio-economic divide between selective and non-selective schools impacts on 
educational outcomes and future employment. Selective school pupils are more likely to 
enter higher education, while non-selective school pupils are more likely to enter further 
education, vocational training or employment.338




Steven Jones, 29, from Bangor in Co. 
Down, Northern Ireland, had worked in 
healthcare for almost 10 years when he 
injured his back at work. After spinal 
surgery, he found he was no longer 
able to continue in his role. Having to 
change careers after a decade came 
as a shock. 
“I had to change my career plan entirely. I hadn’t a clue where to start.”
His experiences of school were mainly negative, and he left at 15 with no GCSEs. 
“When you’re in your final year of primary school, you’re pushed to do the 
transfer test to go into a grammar school. If you didn’t go to a grammar 
school, the education authority didn’t care. You got the basic education you 
could get and that was it. The teachers gave up on us. They didn’t care. 
Any bullying that happened was brushed under the rug. High school was a 
horrible experience.”
After leaving healthcare, Steven found local employment opportunities were thin on the 
ground. Most jobs available were in retail and competition was tough. 
“I applied for a few jobs at Tesco or Asda, but there were maybe a few 
positions available and four or five hundred people applying for them. You had 
to be very good to get one of the posts.”
After doing some research, Steven decided to retrain as a hairdresser. He applied to a 
course at a local college and got a place. But due to COVID-19, most of the course was 
being taught online and Steven didn’t have a laptop.
“It was just finance. I just didn’t have enough money for one because they’re 
quite expensive. It’s not something I ever needed previously. I think I had an 
old one, but it didn’t work.”
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He saw a post on social media from the Prince’s Trust saying they were providing 
laptops to help people get into education, so Steven got in touch. “I got a laptop 
completely free of charge, which was amazing.”
Without it, says Steven, it’s very unlikely he’d be able to train. 
From December until a few weeks ago, when hairdressers re-
opened, we’ve been doing all of our studying online, with our 
tutors coaching us through the camera. Without that it would 
have been possible to do bits on my phone, but when it came to 
the essential skills, which I’ve just finished, I wouldn’t have been 
able to do it without a laptop.
Now Steven has nearly finished his Level 2 hairdressing course. 
“I have just finished all three of my essential skills and I’ve passed them all 
pretty much top of my class. I’ve applied to do my Level 3 hairdressing, which 
I’m starting in September.”
From there, he hopes to open his own hairdressers. 
“My partner is a hairdresser as well. We’re hoping to make a little 
family business.”
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For two decades, reports have highlighted the problems that academic selection creates 
for social mobility and allocating resources effectively.339, 340 In 2008, the Department 
of Education discontinued the 11+, but similar tests are still run by private companies. 
Primary schools were initially told not to run special preparation classes for these 
unofficial tests, but this decision was overturned in 2016.341 In 2020, the debate was 
reignited by the decision to postpone and then cancel the unofficial transfer tests owing 
to COVID-19, to be replaced with a range of (mostly non-academic) criteria depending 
on the individual school.
The effect of this on grammar school intakes remains to be seen. We will soon release 
work showing the importance of socio-economic mix in school settings, which further 
supports the need for non-selective school structures.
If academic selection had taken place as normal this year, it is likely that social mobility 
would have suffered further; children from poorer families are likely to have spent 
significantly less time learning at home, with less parental support, than children from 
wealthier families.342 Future comparison with outcomes in selective areas of England 
where transfer tests did proceed in 2020 might shed light on this question. 
In April 2021, the Northern Ireland Assembly voted in favour of a motion calling for a 
system of post-primary transfer “without academic selection”. However, this was not 
legally binding and strongly diverging views on the issue between the main parties in 
the fragile power sharing Executive mean that agreement is unlikely to be reached in 
the near future. The forthcoming Independent Review of Education may provide an 
opportunity for reform in the medium-term. Significant reform is unlikely to work without 
political agreement and support from a range of sector organisations such as the main 
churches and grammar schools.
The lockdown learning gap between children based on socio-economic background, 
combined with a return to usual transfer arrangements, is likely to damage social 
mobility in the coming years
Some grammar schools are already announcing their intention not to use transfer 
tests in 2022. One of the two main transfer test consortia is considering alternative 
examinations based on verbal and numerical reasoning. However, the lockdown 
339 Department of Education, The effects of the selective system of secondary education in Northern Ireland: Main report, 2000.
340 Queen’s University Belfast, Investigating links in achievement and deprivation: Final summary report, 2017.
341 Gallagher, T., Education, equality and the economy, 2019.
342 Queen‘s University Belfast, Understanding parents’ experiences of home-schooling in Northern Ireland, 2020.
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learning gap between children based on socio-economic background, combined 
with a return to usual transfer arrangements, is likely to damage social mobility in the 
coming years. 
The COVID-19 crisis has also led to a greater focus on the digital access and skills in 
Northern Ireland. Despite rapidly growing internet use in Northern Ireland in the 2010s, 
internet coverage trailed behind that of the rest of the UK.343 Northern Ireland is also the 
only UK region without a cohesive digital strategy for education: the latest policy relating 
to technology in education dates from 1997. This is significant, given the importance 
of tech and media as growth areas in the Northern Ireland economy.344 The Northern 
Ireland Council for the Curriculum, Examinations and Assessment (CCEA) is currently 
developing a Digital Skills Framework for the curriculum, starting from age 6 (key stage 
1). However, research with primary schools before the pandemic suggested wide 
variation in available digital resources. One-third reported insufficient resources to teach 
information and communication technology skills.345
The implication of the unequal impacts of the pandemic is that pupils from socio-
economically disadvantaged backgrounds, who showed persistent educational 
underachievement before COVID-19, are at significant risk of lockdown learning loss, 
with a knock-on impact on their social mobility. The story is similar in the rest of the 
UK. These challenges urgently need to be addressed to give socio-economically 
disadvantaged young people in Northern Ireland equitable opportunities. 
Further education, higher education and shared education
Further Education underwent significant change in 2007. Sixteen colleges merged to 
form six regional colleges, offering a wide range of technical and vocational courses. 
Until 2016, strategies to improve outcomes for disadvantaged young people in Northern 
Ireland are administered by the Department for the Economy. The ‘New Decade, New 
Approach’ included a commitment to develop enhanced careers advice, curriculum, 
training and apprenticeships to enhance employability and economic growth. A 
consultation on the skills strategy is currently underway to support the implementation of 
this commitment.
The total number of students enrolled at FE colleges has decreased by 18.2%, from 
93,681 in 2014-15 to 76,670 in 2018-19. This relates mainly to a reduction in part-
time student numbers and coincides with a prolonged ‘demographic dip’ among 16- to 
19-year-olds.346
More young people have gone on to higher education in the past two decades, but 
wide socio-economic disparities remain. Increased demand has not been matched by 
an increase in locally available student places by the Executive through the ‘Maximum 
Student Numbers’ mechanism. This exacerbates a long-established pattern of outward 
343 Office for National Statistics, Internet users, UK: 2020, Accessed June 2021. 
344 Invest Nothern Ireland, Key facts and figures, 2020.
345 Galanouli, D. and Clarke, I., Study into the development of digital education in primary schools in Northern Ireland: Baseline study, 2019.
346 Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency, Further education activity of students in Northern Ireland: 2014/15 to 2018/19, 2021.
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migration: thousands of young people leave Northern Ireland for higher education each 
year, mostly to the rest of the United Kingdom. This has two main effects for social 
mobility: Northern Ireland experiences a ‘brain drain’ as talented young people leave, 
and many do not return;347 and socio-economically disadvantaged students less likely to 
be able to afford higher education outside of Northern Ireland face particularly intense 
competition for local study places.
Since the Shared Education Act (Northern Ireland) 2016, the Department of Education 
(NI) and the Education Authority have played a central role in facilitating major Shared 
Education projects across Northern Ireland, aimed at increasing opportunities for pupils 
of different religious and socio-economic backgrounds to be educated together. This has 
been possible through significant investment from the Northern Ireland Executive, the 
Atlantic Philanthropies, and the European Union through the Peace IV programme. The 
positive impact Shared Education has on educational outcomes for children and young 
people has been recognised by the Education and Training Inspectorate, parents, 
children and the education settings themselves. Evaluations have outlined the positive 
impact on community relations as have reports to the Northern Ireland Assembly on 
Advancing Shared Education Report. 348, 349, 350, 351, 352 Because Shared Education takes 
different forms in different areas, it is difficult to measure its impacts on social mobility, 
but it has helped to attract social and financial investment in school improvement and 
community collaboration, in Northern Ireland and across the border with the Republic 
of Ireland.353
Shared Education can contribute to improved community relations, but also has the 
potential to help to rationalise schools and improve their provision and outcomes. This 
will take time, and political consensus on what are often deeply contentious decisions 
on school investment. 
Employment and the labour market
Even prior to the pandemic, the economy of Northern Ireland had not fully recovered 
from the global recession of 2008.354 In 2020, the economy once again contracted, 
with implications for longer-term economic revival, labour market trends and the wider 
‘levelling up’ agenda.
347 Pivotal, Retaining and regaining talent in Northern Ireland: An exploration of educational migration, 2021.
348 Centre for Research in Educational Achievement, Home-schooling in the COVID-19 crisis: second survey launched, 2021.
349 Ibid.
350 The Education and Training Inspectorate, The shared education signature project evaluation report - October 2018, 2018.
351 Department of Education, Advancing shared education report to the Northern Ireland Assembly June 2020, 2020.
352 The Education and Training Inspectorate, The shared education signature project evaluation report - October 2018, 2018.
353 Duffy, G. et al., Attitudes towards and experiences of the network for shared school improvement: a survey of teachers and school leaders, 2020.
354 Northern Ireland Statistics & Research Agency, NI: in profile, Accessed June 2021.
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Not only did Northern Ireland have the lowest job creation levels across all 12 UK 
regions but less than half (47.3%) of all jobs created were in ‘professional and 
managerial’ occupations, in comparison to three-quarters of all jobs created across 
the UK as a whole
There is a comparatively large public sector in Northern Ireland, with a weaker private 
sector base. The power of the sector has comparatively declined after a decade of 
fiscal consolidation, but a re-balancing of the economy has not yet been realised. In the 
period 2012-18, not only did Northern Ireland have the lowest job creation levels across 
all 12 UK regions but less than half (47.3%) of all jobs created were in ‘professional and 
managerial’ occupations, in comparison to three-quarters of all jobs created across the 
UK as a whole. This reduces the opportunity for social mobility, as there is less ‘room 
at the top’.
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The rate of ‘new’ business creation in Northern Ireland stands at 16%, considerably 
higher than in Wales (6%) but trailing far behind England (41%) and Scotland (51%). 
When business ‘deaths’ are taken into consideration, the net number of ‘new firms’ in 
2019 was 860 – less than half the number prior to the last global recession.355 While 
new businesses have a comparable survival rate to that of the UK as a whole (57%), 
this is tempered by the lower performance of High Growth Firms (HGFs).356 This is 
particularly relevant because, due to their rapid expansion, HGFs generally ‘punch 
above their weight’ in terms of contributing to economic growth and job creation. There 
is a sense among providers and recipients of ‘start-up’ support that the Northern Ireland 
Executive does not recognise the importance of start-ups to the wider economy.357
Northern Ireland has the lowest median wage for all employee types – 
currently 9.7% lower than the UK median
Northern Ireland has the lowest median wage for all employee types – currently 9.7% 
lower than the UK median.358 Although this is a persistent trend, the current difference in 
average hourly pay is at its widest for two decades. 
The proportion of ‘high-paid’ jobs is at a 20-year low, and Northern Ireland has the 
lowest ratio of high-paid to low-paid jobs across the 12 UK regions.359 One-quarter of 
jobs pay less than the real Living Wage of £9.30.360 The data suggests that opportunities 
for income mobility are more limited in Northern Ireland. 
The pandemic has made the pipeline of opportunity narrower and the holes in it 
wider than ever before
355 Federation of Small Businesses, Back to the start-up: A review of business start-up support in Northern Ireland, 2021.
356 High growth firms employ 10 or more employees.
357 Federation of Small Businesses, Back to the start-up: A review of business start-up support in Northern Ireland, 2021.
358 Northern Ireland Statistics & Research Agency, Labour market report – February 2021, 2021.
359 Northern Ireland Statistics & Research Agency, NI ASHE 2020 publication, 2020.
360 Northern Ireland Statistics & Research Agency, NI: In profile, Accessed June 2021.
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The pre-existing employment pattern of Northern Ireland, exacerbated by the pandemic, 
hinders social mobility, in that Northern Ireland’s reliance on lower-paid and lower-skilled 
employment types, and the low number of high-paid jobs and high-growth firms restrict 
opportunity. It is clear that, in Northern Ireland, the pandemic has made the pipeline of 
opportunity narrower and the holes in it wider than ever before. 
Income mobility is reduced by lower levels of job creation, but specifically by lower 
levels of job creation in occupations with higher rates of pay, greater opportunities for 
promotion, and longer-term stability and employment rights. Young people and those 
with lower educational attainment levels are more likely to be on short-term, temporary 
contracts and ‘zero hour’ contracts with little regulation. The so-called ‘gig economy’ has 
few benefits in terms of economics or social cohesion.361
More concerning, 10.6% of the workforce have no qualifications compared with  
8% UK-wide
The trends are further compounded by adults in Northern Ireland’s workforce having 
lower levels of third-level qualifications and higher levels of no qualifications than the 
UK as a whole: 34.9% of the workforce are qualified to degree level in NI compared 
with 39.2% UK-wide.362 More concerning, 10.6% have no qualifications compared with 
8% UK-wide .363 Such skills gaps relate to the weakness of the private sector base, the 
structure of employment, and the migration of skilled labour out of the region.
Other distinct regional features are relevant. Northern Ireland has a long-standing 
east-west economic divide and a comparative concentration of employment and 
investment opportunities in Belfast and its surroundings.364 The Department of the 
Economy recently acknowledged the need for greater investment in digital and transport 
infrastructure to address this.365 Long-standing underinvestment in infrastructure is also 
holding Northern Ireland back, and these policy commitments are particularly relevant 
for those in less densely populated areas because of difficulties accessing secure 
employment locally, limited public transport and the need for greater digital access and 
inclusion.366, 367
361 Major, L. E., and Machin, S., How to improve social mobility, 2019, Accessed June 2021.
362 Department for the Economy, Rebuilding a stronger economy – the medium term recovery, Accessed June 2020.
363 Ibid.
364 Agenda Northern Ireland, Invest NI: East-west divide in investment, Accessed June 2021.
365 Department for the Economy, Rebuilding a stronger economy: the medium term recovery, Accessed June 2021.
366 Pivotal, COVID-19 second report, 2020.
367 Special European Union Programmes Body, PEACE PLUS public consultation, Accessed June 2021.
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Source: Labour Force Survey (seasonally adjusted figures)
Note: The Labour Force Survey consider the following as ‘employed’: People aged 16-64 who did at least one hour of paid work in 
the reference week (whether as an employee or self-employed); those who had a paid job that they were temporarily away from; 
those on government-supported training and employee programmes and those doing unpaid family work
368 Northern Ireland Statistics & Research Agency, Labour market report - March 2021, Accessed June 2021.
369 Ibid.
The employment rate in Northern Ireland has never exceeded the UK average; the 
estimated rate is 69.3% (figure 3.7 for the period up until November to January 2021). 
This remains an internationally high rate of employment, but it is an annual decrease 
(May to July 2009) of 3 percentage points – which is both statistically significant and the 
largest since 2008-09.368 
The unemployment rate in Northern Ireland, estimated at 3.7%, has remained below 
the UK average since mid-2017. However, almost a third (31.4%) were ‘long-term’ 
unemployed and more than one in ten (10.7%) were young adults aged 16-24.369 
In 2020, more economically inactive people are from working class backgrounds in 
Northern Ireland (28%) than in the UK as a whole (22%), and this proportion has 
not changed significantly over time (figure 3.8). The number of inactive people from 
professional and intermediate backgrounds has fallen slightly but remains higher than 
for the UK as a whole (see figure 3.8).
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Figure 3.8: Economic inactivity rate by socio-economic background in Northern Ireland 














Source: SMC Analysis of Labour Force Survey (ONS)
Note: Margin of error varies from 1.7% to 2.7% for individual statistics, so changes across individual years should be treated with 
caution
The rate of economic inactivity was 7 percentage points higher than the UK-wide 
rate, and is the highest across all UK regions
The percentage of the Northern Ireland population deemed ‘economically inactive’ 
increased in the last quarter of 2020 to reach 28.0%. Although the increase over the 
year was not statistically significant, the rate remains 7 percentage points above the 
UK-wide rate (20.9%) and is the highest across all 12 UK regions. 
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Impact of COVID-19 on employment
While it is not yet fully known how lockdowns and other COVID-19 related factors will 
affect the labour market in Northern Ireland, it is clear that the impact has been and 
will continue to be most keenly felt among young people and those with the lowest 
qualifications and earnings, suggesting an impact in terms of relative social mobility.370 
The UK introduced the Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme (CJRS) and the Self-
Employment Income Support Scheme (SEISS) as the primary ways of propping up 
employees and keeping them tied to their employers (which would enable faster 
recovery). At the end of September 2020, 65,100 people were on the Job Retention 
Scheme in Northern Ireland, and as May 2021, there have been 282,700 unique jobs 
supported by the scheme since its inception.371 
While furlough schemes have kept many people in jobs, it has been at a maximum of 
80% of their salary. Across the UK, the greatest numbers of furloughed workers are in 
the wholesale and retail, manufacturing, accommodation, and food services sectors, 
and those from lower socio-economic backgrounds are more likely to work in working 
class jobs. The Northern Ireland economy is heavily reliant on such sectors, and so 
there is likely to be an impact on employment figures when the scheme ends. 
These impacts will follow the 5,780 confirmed redundancies in the 12 months to 
May 2021.372 These figures illustrate that although Northern Ireland’s unemployment 
rate is below the UK average, the impact of the pandemic on that rate could be 
disproportionately higher than elsewhere. While the furlough scheme has undoubtedly 
helped to protect the Northern Irish economy against a labour market shock, the shock 
may follow the end of the furlough scheme.
370 Ulster University Economic Policy Centre, Labour Market Implications of Covid-19, 2020.
371 Ibid.
372 HM Revenue and Customs, Coronavirus job retention scheme statistics: March 2021, 2021
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Derry youth and community workshop
Derry Youth and Community 
Workshop runs training 
programmes teaching 
vocational and personal 
skills to young people in 
Londonderry, Northern Ireland, 




CEO Declan Doherty says the biggest challenge is raising young people’s sights after 
years of generational unemployment. 
“The difficulty is that there aren’t the jobs.”
Historically, the shirt industry was a major employer, paying the wages of thousands 
of people at its peak. But since the industry moved abroad, joblessness has become 
endemic. The Londonderry area has suffered some of the highest unemployment levels 
in Northern Ireland and the UK for years.
Doherty says the young people he sees have often resigned themselves to a life 
on benefits. 
“The conversation I had with a kid the other day was, ‘My dad was on the dole 
all his life, and my granddad was on the dole all his life and he did alright’. 
Institutional unemployment and benefit dependency is a big issue here. 
People in that situation just learn to live with what they have.”
Adding to that, many young people move away for university and don’t return, depriving 
the local economy of innovation. 
“We have a big emigration issue. Not just to America, but to mainland UK 
or to Belfast. Universities in their own right can create industry because 
they provide entrepreneurs and highly skilled and educated people and we 
have that gap.”
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A lot of the organisation’s work involves teaching basic skills. 
Many of our young people are at the lower end of the 
educational bracket. We have a lot of people coming into us 
who would not have achieved a C in English or maths and their 
GCSEs. As well as that, their overall skill level – even manual 
skills level for the building industry – is lacking.
He says apprenticeship programmes offered through employers aren’t an option 
because the employers simply don’t exist. 
“So there is no way you can get an apprenticeship. Say a young fella 
wants to be an electrician or builder. He has to find an employer to take 
him on. But there is no-one to do that. They have to look at the whole 
apprenticeship programme.”
Despite the challenges, Doherty tells the story of how the organisation recently helped a 
young man with Asperger’s syndrome land his first job in retail.
“When he came here initially even his mum was of the opinion that he would 
never work because of his difficulties. We did a lot of work to increase his 
confidence and then we got him a work placement in Poundland. He was 
there one day a week and he attended here four days a week for training. We 
did a lot of skills work with him on reading and writing and numeracy. We did 
a retail class, taught him how to use a till and improved his communication 
skills. He eventually progressed into full-time employment. He’s now been 
made a supervisor, so he’s delighted. It’s big progress for him.”
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Younger people will be particularly badly hit, as they are both over-represented in the 
worst-affected sectors and face a double disadvantage of under-representation and less 
employment experience in more resilient occupations.373 Higher unemployment rates 
among young people will reduce social mobility for a whole generation, with those from 
less advantaged family backgrounds hit the hardest.
Compounding all of these concerns, the recently introduced Northern Ireland Protocol 
has left those in the agri-food, retail and hospitality sectors facing uncertainty, logistical 
and operational difficulties, and additional costs to trade with rest of the UK and the 
Republic of Ireland.
In June 2020, the Department for the Economy published ‘Rebuilding a Stronger 
Economy: The Medium-Term Recovery’, identifying “decisive interventions” to deliver 
higher-paying jobs, a highly skilled and agile workforce, and a more regionally balanced 
economy. Interventions include investing in employment sectors where Northern Ireland 
has existing strengths to generate more higher-paying jobs; in digital skills and lifelong 
learning to upskill and reskill workers; and in rural broadband and measures to increase 
consumer confidence in local towns.374
Northern Ireland is starting from a much lower ‘baseline’ of social mobility than most 
UK regions
Such measures will be essential, as the labour and economic trends described above 
will have longer-term impacts on social mobility patterns. Northern Ireland is starting 
from a much lower ‘baseline’ of social mobility than most UK regions.375 There is an 
ever more pressing need to consider ‘what works’ in comparable economic regions, to 
introduce targeted interventions in areas suffering from multiple deprivation, to enable 
equitable access to skills development, and to engender confidence in entrepreneurial 
capacity to address the current ‘uneven’ playing field and drive economic growth to 
promote absolute mobility.
373 The National Learning and Work Institute, Facing the future - employment prospects for young people after coronavirus, 2021.
374 Department for the Economy, Rebuilding a stronger economy – the medium term recovery, 2020.
375 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, A broken social elevator? How to promote social mobility, 2018.
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Inequality, welfare, poverty, living standards
Social mobility is inextricably linked to low levels of poverty, and no country in the world 
that performs well on social mobility also has high rates of poverty and inequality. 
Children who are exposed to poverty have worse health, education, development 
and ultimately, worse outcomes in the labour market compared to more affluent 
children.376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381
Meanwhile, living standards matter not only because of their power to improve future 
upward mobility and protect against economic shocks, but also because of the 
emotional, wellbeing and general improvements to quality of life that higher living 
standards bring.
One in five people are considered to be in relative poverty
Poverty rates in Northern Ireland have remained stable over the past decade, with one 
in five people considered to be in relative poverty.382 Some groups experience much 
higher rates: for example, although the rate for lone parent households has declined in 
the past decade, two in five remain in poverty.383 
Relative poverty levels are slightly lower for couples with children and lone parents than 
in England and Wales, but higher than in Scotland.384 This can be explained by lower 
housing costs, resulting from a comparatively strong social housing sector.
376 Cooper, K., and Stewart, K., Does household income affect children’s outcomes? A systematic review of the evidence, 2020.
377 Duncan, G.J. et al., Economic deprivation and early childhood development, 1994.
378 Bradshaw J., Child poverty and child outcomes, 2006.
379 Ibid.
380 Joseph Rowntree Foundation, The costs of child poverty for individuals and society: a literature review, 2008.
381 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, A broken social elevator? How to promote social mobility, 2018.
382 Figures relate to average poverty rates between the years 2003 and 2006 and 2013 and 2016. Relative poverty relates to poverty rates after 
housing costs.
383 Joseph Rowntree Foundation, Poverty in Northern Ireland 2018, 2018.
384 Ibid.
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Source: Department for Work and Pensions, Households below average income: for financial years ending 1995 to 2020 - GOV.UK 
(www.gov.uk), 2021
Note: This is based on a poverty line defined as 60% of the contemporary median after deducting housing costs
385 Northern Ireland Statistics & Research Agency, NI: In profile, Key statistics on Northern Ireland, Accessed June 2021.
386 Department for Communities, Report from the anti-poverty strategy expert advisory panel, 2021.
As noted throughout, disadvantage at an early age can negatively impact social 
mobility. DWP data shows that almost one-quarter (24%) of children in Northern Ireland 
live in a household that, on income levels alone, struggles to provide the basics of heat, 
food and clothing or meet childcare costs. Northern Ireland is doing better at tackling 
child poverty compared to England (30%). This impacts not only on collective health 
and wellbeing, but also on children’s educational attainment and adults’ ability to work 
outside the home.385 
The Department for Communities established an expert panel in 2020 to prepare a 
‘Recommendations for an Anti-Poverty Strategy’. Its report noted that around 121,000 
children (27% of all children) are living in poverty in Northern Ireland, and highlighted 
evidence of the positive effects of income on children’s outcomes, including cognitive 
development and school achievement.386 It recommended introducing a new non-
taxable weekly Child Payment for all 0- to 4-year-olds and for 5- to 15-year-olds 
receiving FSM, encouraging higher take-up of FSM at the same time by using FSM as 
the ‘passport’ for the payment.
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Prior to the pandemic, Universal Credit figures indicated a significant rise in the 
numbers of ‘working poor’. Just under 100,000 households currently receive Universal 
Credit, with more than half (56%) being single households with no children.387 An 
additional 49,000 in-work families (with children) receive working-tax credits and child-
tax credits, and 13,000 in-work families (with no dependents) claim working-tax credits 
only to top up their income.388 Like the rest of the UK, Northern Ireland saw significant 
spikes in new applications for Universal Credit at the start of the first lockdown in 
March-April 2020.389, 390 The UK Government temporarily increased the annual Universal 
Credit allowance to £1,040 in March 2020, and increased the amount of earnings a 
household could receive before losing entitlement to Universal Credit. Entitlement was 
also widened to groups such as self-employed people not able to work and people with 
COVID-19 symptoms required to self-isolate but not eligible for Statutory Sick Pay. 
Those on furlough and low-income workers were also potentially eligible.391
Households are less confident of their financial position in 2020 than in 2019: 45% state 
that after ‘essential’ household outgoings, they have a ‘disposable income’ of £300 or 
less each month.392 
The poorest households in Northern Ireland have longer-term debt and financial 
sustainability problems. One in ten (11%) are in problem debt (behind on any household 
bill or commitment); almost two-thirds of these are unable to contribute to a private 
pension scheme.393 Some welfare reform measures are currently mitigated in Northern 
Ireland.394 Current patterns suggest that this masks longer-term poverty concerns that 
will hit harder when the mitigations end. The unrealised socio-economic impacts of 
COVID-19 and the Brexit transition will further exacerbate this.
COVID-19 has increased financial pressures on already disadvantaged families, and it 
has pulled some into poverty for the first time.395 Barnardo’s Northern Ireland highlights 
the urgent need to ensure that support such as FSM is “extended to all families who 
have been pulled into poverty as a result of the pandemic”.396 At the same time, social 
distancing restrictions have made it harder for organisations to fully support families.397
387 Northern Ireland Statistics & Research Agency, NI: In profile, Key statistics on Northern Ireland, Accessed June 2021.
388 Northern Ireland Statistics & Research Agency, NI: In profile, Key statistics on Northern Ireland, Accessed June 2021.
389 Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency, NI Universal Credit statistics February 2020, 2021.
390 Ibid.
391 Ibid.
392 The Consumer Council, Tracker – Wave 1, Accessed June 2020.
393 Joseph Rowntree Foundation, Poverty in Northern Ireland 2018, 2018.
394 These include protection for households affected by cuts to a range of welfare payments, including protecting benefits for those with disabilities 
(for up to one year), protecting some families with dependents from the impact of the Benefit Cap, extension of discretionary support payments for 
claimants of Universal Credit and the non-implementation of the ‘under-occupancy penalty’ (‘bedroom-tax’).
395 Northern Ireland Council for Voluntary Action, COVID-19: The impact on children and families, Accessed June 2021.
396 Ibid.
397 Ibid.
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Housing
While Northern Ireland has comparatively strong social housing provision, it has not 
kept up with demand
Access to housing is important to promoting social mobility. Good-quality, affordable 
housing provides a safe, secure environment and mitigates poor health outcomes. 
It has become harder to buy or rent property across Northern Ireland because of 
income levels and housing costs.398 The region remains a nation of ‘homeowners’, 
but the private rented sector (PRS) has grown significantly over the past decade: 
19% of the population now rent from private landlords and a further 14% either rent 
from housing associations or live in social housing.399 While Northern Ireland has 
comparatively strong social housing provision, it has not kept up with demand. Figures 
for those on the waiting list (38,745) and in housing stress (27,745) are at their highest 
recorded levels.400
Half of PRS tenants are aged 18-34; 27% of all tenants pay more than 30% of their net 
household income on housing costs.401 This is compounded because younger people 
are entitled to less assistance with housing costs and tenants’ rights have not kept 
pace with PRS growth. There are also concerns about the quality and management 
of social housing, especially for households with vulnerable members.402 The Equality 
Commission for Northern Ireland (ECNI) has expressed concern that those from 
minority ethnic groups, who may lack knowledge of their housing rights, face additional 
risks from poor landlord or letting agency practices.403 Such groups who are less able to 
secure or maintain a tenancy may be at greater risk of homelessness.
Measures have been introduced in Northern Ireland in the past year to ‘mitigate’ 
the worst impacts of the pandemic on housing insecurity, for both owner occupiers 
(mortgage payment holidays, freezes on involuntary lender repossessions) and private 
tenants (‘notice to quit’ period extension, suspension of eviction proceedings). However, 
as noted by the NI Housing Executive, employment loss and reduced incomes work in 
the opposite direction, making it harder for many people to meet their housing costs, 
and potentially reducing social mobility. On top of this, disruption in the construction 
industry over the past year has impacted on the supply of new housing stock.404
398 Nevin Economic Research Institute, Housing provision in Northern Ireland and its implications for living standards and poverty, 2018.
399 Over two-thirds (65%) either own a property outright, or with a mortgage.
400 Housing stress means that applicants for social housing have 30 or more selection points and are likely to be living in unsuitable or unsafe 
accommodation. 2020 figures are the highest since records began in 2002-03. 
401 Nevin Economic Research Institute, Housing provision in Northern Ireland and its implications for living standards and poverty’, 2018.
402 Centre for Housing Policy and The University of York, Centre for Housing Policy, 2015.
403 Equality Commission for Northern Ireland, Housing communities: Summary report, 2017.
404 Northern Ireland Housing Executive, Housing market analysis, Accessed June 2021. 
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Northern Ireland specific factors: community division, 
paramilitarism and social mobility
Political tensions rose within the loyalist community in 2021 over the post-Brexit 
introduction of checks on certain goods moving from the rest of the UK to Northern 
Ireland, which has remained within the European Union single market.405 This was cited 
as one of the contributory factors to the sustained outbreak of street violence in March-
April 2021.406 
405 Cabinet Office, The Northern Ireland protocol, 2020.
406 BBC, Belfast: Rioting ‘was worst seen in Northern Ireland in years’, Accessed June 2021.
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Evidence suggests a strong link between levels of social disadvantage, community 
segregation and the prevalence of a range of illegal paramilitary activity in both loyalist 
and republican communities.407 Independent Reporting Commission (IRC) analysis 
shows that 9 of the 10 most socially deprived wards also contained at least one 
paramilitary indicator (paramilitary assaults, shootings, bombings, murals etc.), while 8 
of the 10 contained at least one indicator at a higher frequency than the average.
Northern Ireland continues to experience unique post-conflict circumstances which 
affect society at every level. The impacts include many areas of single-identity 
community housing, the still largely denominational school system, divergent community 
responses to the Irish language and, most recently, heightened post-Brexit tensions, 
with loyalist anger at the implementation of the Northern Ireland Protocol and republican 
calls for an Irish border poll. The financial cost of division is difficult to estimate, but one 
study suggested it could be £400–£830 million per year, with the most significant cost 
linked to policing and justice, but additional costs in the areas of housing, education, 
health and leisure facilities.408 More than 20 years after the Belfast (Good Friday) 
Agreement in 1998, paramilitary organisations continue to exert a negative influence 
over many communities, hindering investment, freedoms, educational opportunity and 
social mobility.409, 410, 411, 412, 413
The UK and Irish Governments established the Independent Reporting Commission 
to monitor progress on tackling paramilitary activity in Northern Ireland. This followed 
a commitment in the Fresh Start Agreement (November 2015) to end paramilitarism 
“once and for all” and was a specific recommendation of the subsequent Northern 
Ireland Executive’s Action Plan on Tackling Paramilitary Activity, Criminality and 
Organised Crime. 414, 415 The UK Government and the Northern Ireland Executive each 
committed £25 million to implementing this plan over five years (2016–21). It includes 
a commitment by the Executive to address underlying systemic issues, including 
educational disadvantage. The Northern Ireland Executive has agreed to extend the 
Programme to March 2024, subject to matched funding by the UK Government.
407 Independent Reporting Commission, IRC first report, 2018.
408 Economic Policy Centre, Storey welcomes report on cost of division in society, 2016.
409 Ibid.
410 Independent Reporting Commission, IRC third report, 2020.
411 Purdy, N. et al., Loyalist & Republican perspectives on educational underachievement in NI, 2021.
412 Ulster University, Economic Policy Centre, Cost of division: a benchmark of performance and expenditure, 2016.f
413 McAlister, S. et al., Experiencing paramilitarism: understanding the impact of paramilitaries on young people in Northern Ireland, 2018.
414 Northern Ireland Office and The Rt Hon Theresa Villiers MP, A fresh start for Northern Ireland, Accessed June 2021.
415 Northern Ireland Executive, Tackling paramilitary activity, criminality and organised crime - Executive action plan, 2016.
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Many of the communities where the paramilitaries exert greatest control have long 
suffered from deprivation and disadvantage, much of which was exacerbated by the 
Troubles and clearly identifies socio-economic deprivation as the ‘fuel’ and ‘driver’  
for paramilitarism
The most recent IRC Report claims that “many of the communities where the 
paramilitaries exert greatest control have long suffered from deprivation and 
disadvantage, much of which was exacerbated by the Troubles and clearly identifies 
socio-economic deprivation as the ‘fuel’ and ‘driver’ for paramilitarism ”.416 Along with 
regional deprivation, a higher level of violence itself negatively affects educational 
achievement: the number of children meeting or exceeding the minimum expected 
Level 4 pass is lower in areas with more violence.417
Although the number of deaths, shootings and bombings related to the security situation 
has declined over the past decade, the number of casualties as a result of paramilitary-
style assaults has increased, from 50 in 2010-11 to 67 in 2019-20.418 However, the 
PSNI concluded that loyalist paramilitaries were not directly involved in the most 
recent outbreak of street violence in March-April 2021, despite initial suggestions to 
the contrary.419 
The IRC has proposed a “Twin Track Approach” to the challenge of paramilitarism. 
Track One prioritises policing and justice responses, to tackle the criminality of 
paramilitarism (e.g. the establishment of the Paramilitary Crime Task Force). Track 
Two is a programme to tackle the underlying socio-economic issues prevalent in 
communities where paramilitaries operate, such as educational underachievement, 
adverse childhood experiences, unemployment, poverty, lack of investment, mental 
health issues and drugs.
In its first report, the IRC identified the need to prevent young people from being drawn 
into paramilitary activity and recommended that the Executive commission appropriate 
initiatives to promote lawfulness in schools and through youth work in communities. 
In its most recent report, the IRC notes progress in a range of educational domains, 
including case studies of how educational underachievement has been successfully 
addressed through multi-level interventions in other areas, such as Birmingham, 
Glasgow and Limerick. 
416 Independent Reporting Commission, IRC third report, 2020.
417 Ferguson, N. and Michaelsen, M., Money changes everything? Education and regional deprivation revisited, 2015.
418 Police Service of Northern Ireland, Security situation statistics, 2021.
419 BBC, Belfast: Rioting ‘was worst seen in Northern Ireland in years’ - BBC News, Accessed June 2021.
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The 2020 IRC Report also outlines resources to promote active citizenship and 
lawfulness among young people developed by the Council for the Curriculum, 
Examinations and Assessment. A range of initiatives carried out through the Education 
Authority’s Youth Service Capacity Building Programme have begun to deliver 
significant results for vulnerable young people at risk from paramilitary groups, often 
through partnership with the PSNI, such as the ‘Steer Teenagers Away from Recurrent 
Trouble’ (START) programme and the ‘Supporting Youth Through Engagement 
Programme’. Four geographical interventions in East Belfast, South Belfast, Rathcoole 
and Derry, where educational support is provided to children and young people via the 
WRAP Programme (to provide wraparound education services to children and young 
people facing significant challenges) is also delivering positive results.
As discussed above, ongoing COVID-19-related disruption has been compounded 
by further economic and political uncertainty caused since January 2021 by the 
implementation of the Northern Ireland Protocol. There is a corresponding concern 
that any increase in socio-economic deprivation as a result of the current COVID-19 
pandemic may help to tighten the grip of paramilitary groups still further in certain 
communities.420
Conclusion
There are specific, persistent and often intractable challenges in improving social 
mobility in Northern Ireland. While the Troubles may have ended, many problems 
remain, including high levels of community division, social deprivation and economic 
inactivity, over-reliance on public sector employment, and a shortage of social housing. 
These challenges have been exacerbated by several specific circumstances, most 
notably the collapse of the Northern Ireland Executive and devolved legislative 
Assembly from January 2017 to January 2020, and the post-Brexit Northern Ireland 
Protocol, which has created new bureaucratic challenges for Northern Ireland 
businesses trading with the rest of the UK. 
The COVID-19 pandemic has clearly further compounded existing challenges. 
This will have a profound impact on social mobility, as evidenced in education 
and employment in particular, with the young and economically disadvantaged 
disproportionately affected.
420 Independent Reporting Commission, Third Report, 2020.
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Highlights
Scotland has 
consistently had low 
rates of child poverty 
compared to England 
and Wales, but 24.3%, 
or 240,000 children, 
remain in poverty. This 
is damaging to those 
children’s future social 
mobility prospects. 
Scotland has more 
generous child poverty 
benefits than the UK 
Government and 
strategically focuses on 
lowering rates, which 
we applaud. 
Scotland is often 
perceived to be a place 
with good prospects for 
social mobility; reality 
does not always match 
this – although the 
Scottish Government 
has used devolved 
powers to develop many 
ambitious policies and 
initiatives on poverty 
and inequality that could 
impact social mobility in 
decades to come, social 
mobility outcomes have 
not yet shifted and there 
is no explicit strategy 
to address it.
The proportion of 
professional jobs has 
increased, creating space 
for mobility. However, 58% 
of those from professional 
backgrounds end up in 
these jobs, compared to 
36% of those from working 
class backgrounds. 
Scotland was the 
first UK nation to 
have enacted a 
‘socio-economic 
duty’, requiring public 





gaps, a key driver of 
metric of social mobility, 
are narrowing but they 
are still substantial. Only 
about 83% of pupils 
from the most deprived 
areas reach the expected 
standard at secondary 
school, compared to 
96% of pupils from the 
least deprived areas. The 
gap has been stuck at 
14 percentage points for 
the last three years and 
will likely be exacerbated 
by COVID-19.
Unemployment among 
those from working 
class backgrounds and 
young people fell more 
in Scotland than in other 
UK nations before the 
pandemic (around one 
extra percentage point 
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Place matters in 
Scotland: deprived 
and post-industrial 
areas have the 
worst education and 
employment outcomes. 
Poverty, a key factor 
in social mobility, 
is concentrated in 
the larger cities but 
also some areas 
surrounding Glasgow 
and rural areas.
Free tuition creates 
equality of opportunity to 
access higher education 
but not necessarily of 
outcome. Lack of fees 
may inadvertently benefit 
students from wealthier 
backgrounds more and 
leave fewer funds to 
support disadvantaged 
students. The gap in 
progression to higher 
education between 
young people from 
most and least deprived 
areas is large (24.5% 
and 57.2% respectively 
in 2018-19) although it 
has narrowed in the last 
decade (from 38.1 to 32.8 
percentage points).
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The social mobility context in Scotland
Scotland has a tradition of being attached to the idea that a ‘lad o’pairts’ – in 
modern terms, a talented youth – will be able to realise their full potential.421 
Arguably, this is as important to Scotland’s self-image as the ‘American Dream’ is to 
that of the USA.
However, this portrayal of a nation that harnesses social mobility for individual 
advancement and common good may not be historically accurate. In the 19th and 
for much of the 20th century, many Scots emigrated to seek opportunities they were 
denied at home. Many contemporary Scots also seem sceptical about it. Only 49% of 
Scottish respondents in our 2021 ‘Social Mobility Barometer’ felt that there were ‘good’ 
opportunities available for people in Scotland to progress.422
This current pessimism may reflect concern about the disproportionate impact of the 
pandemic on the most disadvantaged in society. Women, disabled people, children and 
young people, and those from ethnic minority backgrounds were already at greater risk 
of living in poverty, and COVID-19 has only added to this disparity.423 
As well as increased poverty, disadvantaged people in Scotland have experienced, 
and are likely to continue experiencing, decreased educational attainment and poorer 
employment opportunities as a result of the pandemic.424 
421 A term from Scottish educational history referring to a boy, particularly one from a humble background, who is considered talented or promising. It 
represents an ideal within the Scottish education system of the time that talented young men should be able to achieve success through open access 
to education.
422 Social Mobility Commission, Social mobility barometer 2021, 2021.
423 Poverty Alliance, A Scotland for all of us: Poverty Alliance 2021 Scottish Parliament election manifesto, 2021.
424 Housing and Social Justice Directorate, The impact of COVID-19 on equality in Scotland, 2020.
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What powers does the Scottish Government and Holyrood hold?
The Scotland Act 1998 and previous legislation gave devolved responsibility to the 
Scottish Government and Parliament (Holyrood) in several areas central to social 
mobility (such as education and training), some areas important to it (such as 
housing, local government, internal transport, health, social work and local economic 
development) and others that are more marginal (such as justice and policing, 
environment, tourism, sport and heritage, and agriculture, forestry and fisheries). 
Notably, some key areas central to social mobility such as employment, equal 
opportunities (excluding public boards), financial and macro-economic matters, and 
work-related social security remained with the UK Government.
Devolution was deepened in 2016 as a direct response to the referendum on 
independence. The Scotland Act 2016 gave the Scottish Government responsibilities 
in additional areas pertinent to social mobility, such as social security and taxation 
(with the specific power to raise income tax rates by +/- 3%). 
The policy and strategy context
There is no specific social mobility strategy in Scotland.
The Scottish Government has used its devolved powers to pass legislation, set targets 
and take action to reduce poverty and increase fairness, some of which is pertinent to 
social mobility. However, there is no specific social mobility strategy in Scotland . Social 
mobility is implied rather than pursued directly; it may result if actions in related areas 
are successful, but it is not the primary focus. To achieve social mobility, a combined 
focus on poverty, inequality and social mobility is required.
Furthermore, the Scottish Government is still working in silos and policies do not always 
align, with relevant measures in the three areas covered below – education, work and 
poverty – not always effectively joined up.425
425 Coutts and Brotchie, The Scottish Approach to Evidence, 2016.
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Several overarching national strategies and vision statements set out the nation’s 
priorities.426, 427, 428 The advisory Poverty and Inequality Commission, set up in 2016 and 
made statutory in 2019, provides oversight of progress in some of these areas.
The Fairer Scotland Action Plan sets out an “ambition for a country where poverty rates 
are amongst the lowest in Europe, and where there is genuine equality of opportunity 
for all by 2030”.429 The plan’s five ambitions are: a fairer Scotland for all, ending child 
poverty, a strong start for all young people, fairer working lives and a thriving third age. 
These ambitions and many of the 50 actions in the plan help to shape the environment 
necessary for social mobility, with some directly focused on particular aspects of it. 
These include community-based interventions to reduce reoffending and help past 
offenders to move on; widening access to university; and supporting experienced 
women to return to work after a career break.
Many of the 81 National Indicators in Scotland’s National Performance Framework are 
relevant to monitoring progress on social mobility, including indicators of educational 
attainment, workplace learning and social capital. The Scottish Government’s ‘Equality 
Evidence Finder’ breaks down changes in these indicators by age, disability, ethnicity, 
gender, religion, sexual orientation, socio-economic status and transgender status.430
Scotland became the first UK nation to enact a socio-economic duty.
In 2018, Scotland became the first UK nation to enact a socio-economic duty alongside 
the protections for vulnerable groups provided by the Equality Act 2010. The Fairer 
Scotland Duty requires public authorities to give due regard to socio-economic 
inequalities when making decisions. The Scottish Government is currently consulting 
on updated guidance on this.431 An evaluation of the impact of the socio-economic 
duty so far by the Equality and Human Rights Commission found that several public 
bodies report that the duty is beginning to have an impact and influence the outcomes 
of decisions.432 However, several things were identified, such as clearer success criteria 
and impact measurement, and greater focus on changes to outcomes, as vital to ensure 
the future success of the duty.433 
426 Scottish Government, National Performance Framework, Accessed March 2021.
427 Housing and Social Justice Directorate, Fairer Scotland Action Plan, 2016.
428 Housing and Social Justice Directorate, If not now, when? - Social Renewal Advisory Board report: January 2021, 2021.
429 Housing and Social Justice Directorate, Fairer Scotland action plan, 2020.
430 Scottish Government, Equality evidence finder, Accessed March 2021.
431 Housing and Social Justice Directorate, Fairer Scotland Duty: interim guidance for public bodies, 2018.
432 Equality and Human Rights Commission, Evaluating the socio-economic duty in Scotland and Wales, 2021.
433 Ibid.
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In education, legislation includes a focus on improving attainment for pupils from 
poorer backgrounds and increasing access to higher education (HE) for under-
represented groups.
The most recent major initiative relevant to social mobility in Scotland is the Scottish 
Government’s response to the Social Renewal Board, established to recommend ways 
to address the challenges raised by the COVID-19 pandemic. The Board’s report issued 
20 ‘calls to action’. As with the national strategies, this challenge report (‘If Not Now, 
When?’) relates to the conditions required for social mobility, but it also recommends 
some direct actions, most notably: “focus Fair Work actions on the people most affected 
by the pandemic”. The Scottish Government’s response broadly welcomed the report 
and committed to a more detailed action by action response in the near future.434
In short, current and previous Scottish governments have stated firm commitments to 
greater equality of opportunity, addressing socio-economic inequalities and increasing 
social inclusion, and there has been a wealth of activity to support these commitments. 
However, these efforts have not yet shifted outcomes and delivered significant 
increases in social mobility, nor have they altered the deeper social and economic 
conditions which determine it.
In our State of the Nation 2017 report, we noted that the approach to social policy in 
Scotland often differed from that of the UK as a whole. Actions to tackle poverty, reduce 
income inequality and address area deprivation are aimed at increasing community 
empowerment and emphasise equality and citizenship rights.435 For example, several 
major ‘equality’ measures (e.g. free prescriptions) are presented as preserving universal 
citizenship rights or addressing particular disadvantages faced by protected groups 
(e.g. women, disabled people, carers). Whilst there are policies more closely related to 
social mobility outcomes, particularly those set out in the Tackling Child Poverty Delivery 
Plan, the focus is more on reaffirming rights and entitlements rather than promoting 
social mobility. This reflects the Scottish Government’s commitment to ‘inclusive growth’, 
aiming to provide a foundation of entitlements that leaves no one behind. 
While these policies may contribute to social mobility in some ways and mirror some 
aspects of wider UK policy, the approach has not always ensured sufficient progress.
While these policies may contribute to social mobility in some ways and mirror some 
aspects of wider UK policy, the approach has not always ensured sufficient progress. 
Our analysis shows persistent opportunity gaps in recent years. Despite significant 
investment, there have been no marked or sustained recent reductions in educational 
434 Director-General Education and Justice, Social Renewal Advisory Board: our response, 2021.
435 Social Mobility Commission, State of the nation 2017, 2017.
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attainment gaps, increases in relative access to higher-paid jobs and more valued 
occupations, income and wealth inequalities or in overall poverty levels. We note 
that Scotland has had consistently lower rates of child poverty compared to England, 
Northern Ireland and Wales but even there, rates of persistent child poverty have 
become entrenched.
In this chapter, we argue that more focus is needed on the causes of inequalities 
and disadvantage. The Scottish Government’s efforts to reduce inequalities and 
disadvantage would be enhanced if overlayed with a social mobility strategy. This would 
enable a move away from some of its current universal entitlement policies, which most 
benefit those in more affluent areas, who live longer and whose children are more likely 
to attend university. 
More measures are needed to improve the circumstances of the lowest-income 
households. These include increasing the value of the Scottish Child Payment and 
reversing recent cuts by the UK Government to welfare rights and money advice 
services in some parts of Scotland. Scotland also needs to develop ways to replicate 
the advantages enjoyed by more privileged groups for disadvantaged young people, 
such as by extending opportunities for learning and acquiring employment experience 
through paid internships and employment experience placements. 
Trends in social mobility in Scotland: Overview
As with the rest of the UK, the proportion of professional jobs in Scotland has increased 
over time, with more marked increases in recent years (see figure 4.1). The percentage 
of individuals in professional or managerial occupations (see Technical Annex A for 
definition) in Scotland was 46% in 2020, slightly lower than for the UK as a whole 
(48%), but higher than in Wales and Northern Ireland. The proportion of workers in 
professional or managerial occupations in Scotland is now more than double the 
proportion in working class occupations (46%, compared with 22% in 2020). 
This could provide more opportunities for social mobility, as it means more room at the 
‘top’ and thus more opportunities for those from lower socio-economic backgrounds 
(see Technical Annex A for definition) to be upwardly mobile.436 
436 This section draws on analysis commissioned by SMC.
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Figure 4.1: Percentage of people in professional jobs across the labour market, in each 










Source: SMC Analysis of Labour Force Survey (ONS)
Note: Data refers to those in employment
437 For definitions of socio-economic background please see the glossary in Technical Annex A.
However, those from professional backgrounds are still better able to access 
professional jobs than those from intermediate and working class backgrounds in all the 
UK nations.437 
In Scotland, the share of individuals from professional backgrounds who are themselves 
in professional and managerial occupations is slightly lower than for the UK as a whole 
(58% vs. 62% respectively), with no overall change between 2014 and 2020. Scotland 
has slightly outperformed in this manner. In England and Northern Ireland, those from 
professional backgrounds have increased their share of professional jobs since 2014, 
whereas in Scotland is has flatlined. Scotland is still far off from good levels of social 
mobility – those from professional backgrounds are still more likely to get ‘top’ jobs – 
but holding constant while other nations get worse is a small comparative gain. Wales, 
by comparison, has seen more improvement with a decline in those from professional 
backgrounds in professional jobs.
While access to professional jobs for those from intermediate and working class 
backgrounds is still poor (48% and 36% respectively) than it is for those from 
professional backgrounds, it has improved (figure 4.2). This is true across the UK – 
slightly more people from working class backgrounds are becoming upwardly mobile – 
though progress is slow moving.
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Source: SMC Analysis of Labour Force Survey (ONS)
Note: People age 25 to 60. Margin of error varies from 2.4% to 4.6% for individual statistics, so individual changes should be 
interpreted with caution
Individuals from working class backgrounds (See Technical Annex A for definitions) 
are twice as likely as those from professional backgrounds to be in working class 
occupations. Trends over time are similar to UK-wide trends, with a falling share of 
those from intermediate and working class backgrounds in working class jobs (for 
example, from 39% of those from working class backgrounds in 2014 to 35% in 2020). 
(See figure 4.3).
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Source: SMC Analysis of Labour Force Survey (ONS)
Note: People age 25 to 60. Margin of error varies from 2.4% to 4.6% for individual statistics, so individual changes should be 
interpreted with caution. See Appendix Table B1 for sample sizes and 95% confidence intervals
438 Scottish Parliament, Children and Young People (Scotland) Act 2014, Accessed March 2021.
In the remainder of this chapter, we look at how these trends play out in relation to 
social mobility indicators in the specific domains of education, employment and poverty.
Education
Education reflects and reinforces economic and social divisions if the circumstances 
which impede children’s learning are not addressed. High-profile Scottish Government 
interventions have aimed at improving educational outcomes, focusing particularly on 
improved attainment among the most disadvantaged but the evidence suggests that 
success has been limited. 
Pre-school education
The Children and Young People Act (Scotland) 2014 created a statutory duty for 
Scotland’s 32 local authorities to provide 600 hours of funded early learning and care to 
eligible two-year-olds (where the family receives qualifying benefits) and all three- and 
four-year-olds.438 In April 2018, the Scottish Government and the Convention of Scottish 
Local Authorities (COSLA) agreed to almost double the commitment to 1,140 hours a 
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year from August 2020. This obligation was paused while local authorities responded to 
COVID-19, before being reset for August 2021. The aims of the Act include improving 
children’s outcomes, helping to close the poverty-related attainment gap, and supporting 
parents into work, study or training, all of which are relevant to social mobility.
There is abundant evidence that expanding funded childcare can enable better 
outcomes for children, as well as reducing costs and freeing parents (primarily 
mothers) to take up employment opportunities. The success of this depends on 
overcoming barriers that can prevent people from taking up the available childcare, 
such as a perception of low-quality provision, or care that is not available at the times 
when parents need it for labour market participation. A critical issue is that the cost of 
additional childcare beyond the 1,140 hours may still too high for low-income families. 
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Zahida Kosar, 40, from Glasgow, found 
herself struggling after her marriage 
broke up. Taking care of a young child 
with health difficulties by herself meant 







“I worked most of my life. Then I went on maternity leave. Then my marriage 
broke up and my daughter was really ill. When I did go back to work, I couldn’t 
fit everything in because the nursery would ring me and say ‘She needs to go 
to hospital’.”
Zahida took some time off, but without local family and friends to support her, she was 
unable to continue working. 
“I was left alone and lost my job and it all started collapsing on me; one thing 
after another. It’s hard for a single mum to obtain a full-time job when a child 
is ill and in and out of hospital.”
Soon Zahida got into financial difficulties. 
“I couldn’t afford to keep my electric going and I couldn’t afford to buy milk. 
I was watering down milk for my daughter. I was in a bit of a state. I was 
in financial crisis. I just didn’t know how to do anything. Didn’t know about 
benefits or anything.”
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A health visitor noticed Zahida was struggling and referred her to One Parent Families 
Scotland (OPFS), an organisation that gives support and advice to single parents. 
“Joining the course, I was very scared. I could hardly speak without actually 
crying. I avoided the meetings at first. I just wouldn’t turn up. I didn’t want to 
get out. I think it was facing reality.”
Zahida has now been working with OPFS for several years, taking courses on health 
and wellbeing, first aid, and employment skills.
“They helped me sort out my benefits and apply for those I was entitled to. 
I think I’ve grown in confidence. I can talk better. Just being able to make a 
CV and know what my strengths are is important. I used to think: why would 
anyone want to employ me? Now I know I can turn my dreams into reality.” 
Times have been tough, but Zahida is hopeful for the future. 
I want to give my daughter a present on Eid or Christmas and 
be able to give her nice, warm surroundings and a roof over 
her head. I want to be able to go out and work and show my 
daughter that if my daughter wants something it’s not always 
‘Mummy can’t afford that just yet,’ and show her that if we 
work hard, we can enjoy life. Also, I’ve always wanted to be 
a teacher. Maybe once I’m out there, and I’ve got a job I can 
afford to go out there and get a course done and maybe take 
that first step.
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School education
The Scottish Attainment Challenge (launched in 2015) aims to reduce the gap in 
education outcomes in literacy, numeracy, and health and wellbeing in Scottish schools. 
The Challenge also tackles “the poverty-related attainment gap” for children and young 
people living in deprived areas. It includes a mixture of targeted interventions and 
universal support. Targeted interventions are funded by the Attainment Scotland Fund 
in nine ‘Challenge Authorities’ (Glasgow, Dundee, Inverclyde, West Dunbartonshire, 
North Ayrshire, Clackmannanshire, North Lanarkshire, East Ayrshire and Renfrewshire). 
Efforts initially focus on primary schools – targeting improvements in literacy, 
numeracy, health and wellbeing. A Scottish Attainment Challenge v2.0 will be launched 
later in 2021.
The Schools Programme supports primary schools (and some secondary schools) 
outside Challenge Authorities where a significant proportion of pupils are judged to be 
disadvantaged. The Pupil Equity Fund allocates additional funding directly to schools 
(from Primary 1 to Secondary 3) on the basis of free school meals (FSM) entitlement, 
with head teachers responsible for local interventions. This is underpinned by a wider 
package of universal support, including a named attainment adviser in each local 
education authority.
Despite such efforts, challenges remain in tackling the poverty-related attainment gap. 
Educational outcomes are particularly poor for care-experienced young people, Gypsy/
Travellers and White Scottish/UK boys.439 Audit Scotland has been critical of the return 
on the investment in closing the poverty-related attainment gap.440
There is a flourishing private education sector in Edinburgh and Glasgow, and private 
tutoring is more prevalent in more affluent areas as parents seek advantage for their 
children. Parents with more resources are better able to secure advantages within 
the state system by moving to areas with what are perceived as ‘better schools’. The 
Poverty Alliance has commended some of the actions taken to mitigate disadvantage, 
such as the use of contextualised offers to students applying for university.441 These 
measures only partially compensate for the structural factors that limit educational 
opportunity in Scotland. 
On the other hand, there is some evidence of progress in improving educational 
outcomes for the most disadvantaged, in work that tackles some of the factors that 
hamper social mobility.442 For example, there is evidence of small increases in the 
proportion of pupils achieving the expected Curriculum for Excellence (CfE) levels in 
reading, writing, listening and talking, literacy, and numeracy.443 
439 The Poverty Alliance and The Robertson Trust, The poverty-related attainment gap, 2021.
440 Audit Scotland, Improving outcomes for young people through school education, 2021.
441 The Robertson Trust, Poverty-related attainment gap: evidence review, 2021.
442 Cabinet Secretary for Education and Skills, Closing the poverty-related attainment gap: progress report 2016 to 2021, 2021.
443 Education Scotland, What is curriculum for excellence?, Accessed June 2021.
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However, a significant minority of pupils are not achieving expected levels. The 
proportion of Secondary 3 pupils attaining the fourth level in CfE outcomes is particularly 
concerning: below 60% in reading, writing, listening and talking and in numeracy, and 
just 48% in literacy. When we look at the third level of those outcomes, the proportion of 
pupils in the most deprived areas achieving this standard in literacy and numeracy has 
increased from around 81% to 83% from 2016-17 to 2018-19. However, the proportion 
of those from the least deprived areas achieving this standard has also increased 
slightly; this means that the gap between these groups has remained fairly steady at 
around 14 percentage points over this time.444
The key for social mobility is not the overall performance of all children in Scotland but 
the attainment gaps between children from different backgrounds. Although narrowing, 
these gaps are substantial and the pace of change falls far short of transformative, as 
figure 4.4 shows for primary pupils. 
444 Cabinet Secretary for Education and Skills, Closing the poverty-related attainment gap: A report on progress report 2016 to 2021, 2021.
Figure 4.4: Percentage of pupils achieving expected level in Literacy and Numeracy by 
Scottish Index of Multiple Deprivation decile
SIMD quintile 5 - least deprived
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Source: Cabinet Secretary for Education and Skills, Closing the poverty-related attainment gap: progress report 2016 to 2021, 2021
There may also be a geographical element to these performance patterns, with children 
from remote areas (small towns and rural areas) consistently underperforming relative 
to those from urban and more accessible rural areas. These differences are marked in 
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primary school but less so in secondary school: 66% of pupils in remote small towns 
and 70% in remote rural areas meet CfE Second Level standards in numeracy by 
Primary 7, compared with 76% for Scotland as a whole.
Local authorities are still investigating the learning loss caused by COVID-19-related 
lockdowns, and the Scottish Government has begun to take steps to mitigate this loss 
and help young people to catch-up. Higher and Advanced Higher exams (see glossary), 
in 2021 as in 2020, will be based on teacher judgement, evidenced through local 
assessment. An enhanced ‘summer of play’ is designed to support general wellbeing.445 
In announcing this initiative in March 2021, the Scottish Government gave notice 
that it would develop other aspects of its education recovery strategy “over the next 
few months”.
Further and higher education
Scottish colleges educate over 260,000 students and receive funding of around £650 
million each year, with a mission to develop an educated and skilled workforce.446 
However, they work in an increasingly tight financial environment, and most colleges 
predict a financial deficit by 2022-23.447
This could lead to downward social mobility if it results in an increase in the already-
large attainment gap in further education (FE) between those from different socio-
economic backgrounds or reduces the sector’s contribution to upskilling those from 
lower socio-economic backgrounds to move from unskilled to skilled occupations or 
from non-working to working status.
Scotland’s Framework for Fair Access helps to plan and evaluate ways of assisting 
those from disadvantaged backgrounds to access higher education.448 Scotland’s 
Commissioner for Fair Access is responsible for overseeing the framework, introduced 
in May 2019, and reporting on annual progress.449, 450
Equality of opportunity to access higher education does not assure equality of outcomes 
in education. Indeed, there is concern that free tuition fees hinder social mobility by 
inadvertently benefitting students from the wealthiest backgrounds who are more 
likely to go to university, and participation rates amongst poorer students are lower in 
Scotland than elsewhere in the UK where tuition fees are paid.451 At the same time, 
fewer funds are available to provide financial support for the most disadvantaged 
students, with the system providing only small bursaries and access to loans to support 
living costs during study.452
445 Scottish Government, Enhanced summer offer for all children, 2021.
446 Colleges Scotland, Keyfacts 2020, 2021.
447 Audit Scotland, Scotland’s colleges 2019, 2019.
448 Advanced Learning and Science Directorate, Universities: framework for fair access, Accessed March 2021.
449 Advanced Learning and Science Directorate, A blueprint for fairness: final report of the Commission on Widening Access, 2016.
450 Commissioner for Fair Access, Fair access to Higher Education: progress and challenges, 2020.
451 Sutton Trust, Access in Scotland, 2016.
452 Centre for Research in Education Inclusion and Diversity, CREID briefing 33: access to higher education in Scotland, 2016.
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The gap in progression to higher education between young people from most and 
least deprived areas is large (24.5% and 57.2% respectively in 2018-19).
Post-school destinations are tracked as a way of measuring performance: higher 
education, further education, training, employment, voluntary work, personal skills 
development or (between 2010-11 and 2017-18) an activity agreement are defined 
as positive destinations. Most pupils in Scotland progress from school to a positive 
destination: 92.9% in 2018-19, a significant increase on 85.9% a decade ago. But 
progress has now stalled, the effect of the pandemic is yet to be known, and positive 
destinations are less likely for those from the most deprived areas (88.3% in 2018-19, 
compared with 96.7% from the 20% least deprived areas). The gap in progression to 
higher education between young people from most and least deprived areas is large 
(24.5% and 57.2% respectively in 2018-19), although it has narrowed significantly over 
the last decade (from 38.1 to 32.8 percentage points).
An FE/HE Student Hardship Taskforce was formed in February 2021 to assess the 
impact of the pandemic on student hardship and to determine if support (national and 
institutional) is sufficient. This work is still in progress. Some institutions introduced a ‘no 
detriment’ policy, and all have introduced a range of measures to mitigate the impact of 
the pandemic on disadvantaged students.453
453 ‘No detriment’ is the principle that, when there is significant and unavoidable disruption to studies, students are not disadvantaged by receiving 
grades that are lower than might otherwise be expected. The approach to applying ‘no detriment’ varies across institutions.
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Impact of COVID-19
In relation to education across all ages and levels in Scotland, there is little evidence of 
significant reductions in attainment gaps or improved social mobility opportunities.
The effects of the pandemic seem likely to reinforce this conclusion. Research has 
found high levels of concern among senior local leaders about the impact of COVID-19 
on children’s education experiences and attainment.454
Particular concern was expressed about varied experiences of online learning and 
the potential negative consequences of digital exclusion. The Scottish Government 
has invested £43 million to improve digital access for 50,000 low-income households, 
providing a device, internet connection, training and support to get people online. The 
Fairer Scotland Action Plan progress report also acknowledged the issue, and that the 
Scottish Government committed to investing £30 million in a ‘digital boost’ that includes 
£25 million to provide laptops for disadvantaged children and young people to enable 
them to study online.455
However, a recent review of COVID-19-related catch-up programmes across the UK 
found that funding per pupil, announced to date, was less generous in Scotland than in 
Wales and England and previous analysis has shown it is ‘poorly targeted’, with a lower 
proportion of funds directed at the most disadvantaged pupils.456, 457
Employment 
The Scottish Government’s approach to employment has laudable aspirations. It is less 
clear whether enough resources are being invested in employability initiatives that can 
meet those aspirations. In particular, there is little or no evidence that the level of quality 
on-the-job training needed to strengthen employment as an engine of social mobility 
is being provided. The persistent labour market challenges faced across the UK are 
present in Scotland; for example, many low-paid employees become ‘stuck’ in low-paid 
work rather than being able to use it a first step on the ladder of career progression.458 
There are no signs of significant change in this. In fact, concerns have been raised in 
Scotland about young people’s experience of the labour market and future employment 
prospects, including their exposure to precarious working conditions.459 
454 Scottish Poverty and Inequality Research Unit, Learning from local responses to child poverty during the COVID-19 crisis, 2021.
455 Ibid.
456 Education Policy Institute, Education reopening and catch-up support across the UK, 2021. 
457 Education Policy Institute, Comparing education catch-up spending within and outside the UK, 2021.
458 Social Mobility Commission, The great escape? Low pay and progression in the UK’s labour market, 2017. 
459 Progressive Partnership for the Scottish Government, Young people’s experiences of precarious and flexible work, 2021. 
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Unemployment among those from working class backgrounds had fallen more in 
Scotland than in other UK nations.
Prior to the pandemic, unemployment among those from working class backgrounds 
had fallen more in Scotland than in other UK nations (figure 4.5).460 
460 Uses 3 year moving average to get sufficient sample sizes. Changes across individual years should be treated with some caution due to margin of 
error.
Figure 4.5: Unemployment of those from working class backgrounds in each nation in 












Source: SMC Analysis of Labour Force Survey (ONS)
Note: UK: People aged 16 to 64. Margin of error varies from 0.3% to 0.5% for individual statistics. England: Margin of error varies 
from 0.2% to 0.3% for individual statistics. Northern Ireland: Margin of error varies from 0.6% to 1.1% for individual statistics, so 
changes across individual years should be treated with caution. Scotland: Margin of error varies from 0.6% to 0.9% for individual 
statistics, so changes across individual years should be treated with caution. Wales: Margin of error varies from 0.8% to 1.2% for 
individual statistics, so changes across individual years should be treated with caution. See Appendix Table B3 for sample sizes and 
95% confidence intervals
The rate had fallen for 16- to 64-year-olds from all backgrounds but had, for the most 
part, been relatively higher for those from working class backgrounds.
At the onset of COVID-19, the risk of unemployment notably became marginally 
lower for those from intermediate and working class backgrounds than for those 
from professional backgrounds (respectively, 3.4%, 3.8% and 4.5%, see figure 4.6). 
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Although this appears to be a continuation of a trend for those from working class 
and intermediate backgrounds, it diverges from the trend for those from professional 
backgrounds. It will be important to pay attention to future data to establish whether this 
is part of a new trend and to consider the impact of the pandemic on these trajectories.
461 HM Revenue and Customs, Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme statistics: 6 May 2021, 2021. 



















Source: SMC Analysis of Labour Force Survey (ONS)
Note: People age 16 to 64. Margin of error varies from 0.6% to 0.9% for individual statistics, so changes across individual years 
should be treated with caution. See Appendix Table B3 for sample sizes and 95% confidence intervals
Security of employment and career progression prospects in roles taken up by those 
entering employment must also be considered to fully understand whether or not these 
jobs are contributing to social mobility in Scotland.
As discussed in Chapter 1, the efficacy of the UK’s introduction of the Coronavirus Job 
Retention Scheme (CJRS) has been vital to protecting jobs. Without this and other 
similar schemes, higher rates of unemployment would have been expected during 
the pandemic.461 
Nonetheless, employment sectors that provide the first rung on the ladder for many (e.g. 
hospitality, retail) may take several years to recover; even then, they may not provide 
the same kind of employment opportunities as before. There is a risk that the jobs which 
replace those lost will be of poorer quality.
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Before the pandemic, Scotland was on course to reduce youth unemployment by 
40% by 2021. It is clear this target will not now be met.
The COVID-19 pandemic seems likely to exacerbate some of the negative trends, 
particularly for young people.462 Before the pandemic, Scotland was on course to 
reduce youth unemployment by 40% by 2021 – one of the ‘Fairer Scotland Action Plan’ 
commitments. It is clear that this target will not now be met. The relevant skills and 
funding bodies are looking in more detail at the implications the pandemic will have for 
the implementation of the ‘Developing the Young Workforce’ (DYW) youth employment 
strategy and for the wider skills landscape.463
462 Ibid.
463 Scottish Government, Fairer Scotland action plan: progress report 2020, 2020. 




Street League works with young 
people, using sport to help them 






Steven Jardine, Operations Manager for Edinburgh and Lothians, says the young 
people they work with are struggling with numerous issues, including urban deprivation, 
low educational attainment and lack of preparation for the workplace. 
“Some are second or third generation unemployed and haven’t experienced 
the world of work. Broken homes. Care experienced. The young people we 
receive who are school leavers aren’t aware of what the world of work is. That 
could be as simple as knowing what a CV is, how to set up an email address, 
reply to an email, or attach a document to an email.”
Some also have limited experience of travelling independently. 
“We work in Livingston, which is only 15 miles from Edinburgh, but some 
of the young people have never been. They don’t always have the means 
to do it. They make the decision to leave school and they may no longer 
receive Education Maintenance Allowance. You have to spend around £20 a 
week to get a bus pass. That’s a big ask when maybe at that age you have 
different priorities.”
Street League uses sports, including football, multi-sports, fitness and dance, to connect 
with young people and encourage them to engage with their personal development and 
life skills programme. 
“You are more likely to engage with this than standing up at a whiteboard and 
writing. That young person in the corner who’s not saying much? As soon 
as they’re out on the football pitch, they’re instructing people and shouting at 
top of their voice. It’s taking them to an area they’re comfortable with to make 
sure you can get potential out of them.”
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Football is also accessible to people from diverse backgrounds. “If you get people from 
all walks of life onto a football pitch and roll a ball about, you know they’re all going to 
join in. There’s a shared language.”
Born in Bulgaria, Shenol Ahmed, 17, from Edinburgh, joined Street League after arriving 
in Scotland from Poland at 15. 
I came with my family, my mum and dad. First it was hard 
because I wasn’t speaking English. I knew only ‘Hi, how  
are you?’.
Shenol attended Street League after leaving school. Now he is studying football 
coaching at college. 
“I study because I like football and I want to be a football player.”
Steven Jardine says what the young people need above all is better information about 
the world of work. 
“We believe that by using sport to get people onside and build a rapport 
with them they’re much more up for talking about CVs and how they should 
behave in a job interview. The majority of people we work with are school 
leavers. This is their first experience of the big wide world.”
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The Scottish Government’s December 2020 progress report acknowledges that it is 
not only young adult workers who have been vulnerable to disproportionate adverse 
impact from COVID-19: “The pandemic has had a disproportionate impact on women’s 
jobs and incomes. Women have made up the majority of the workforce in many ‘shut 
down’ sectors, and in our care sector, as well as undertaking additional unpaid caring 
responsibilities.” The Scottish Government has made welcome commitments to 
addressing such gender inequalities in the impact of the pandemic, although questions 
remain about whether the scale of investment is enough to tackle the challenge.464 
However, this too reflects the Scottish Government’s approach of focusing on fairness 
and equalities but not necessarily on social mobility, and there is still a need to give 
the same weight to considering how socio-economic background has compounded the 
impacts of COVID-19.
Significant employment differences are also evident across ethnic groups. The 
employment rate for the minority ethnic population aged 16-64 in Scotland in 2018 
was 55.4%, compared with 75.1% for the non-minority (White) population, and 
unemployment rates were much higher for minority ethnic people.465 In 2019, the gap in 
employment rates between minority ethnic and non-minority (White) people in Scotland 
was over 16%, and as high as 26.1% among 16- to 24-year-olds. Minority ethnic groups 
are more likely to work in low-paid sectors with less chance of career progression, 
and minority ethnic graduates in Scotland are up to three times more likely than white 
graduates to be unemployed.466 This is despite the fact that rates of participation in 
education, employment or training are higher among minority ethnic groups than 
among those from non-minority (White) ethnic groups, suggesting a lack of mobility into 
employment for people from a minority ethnic background.467
The jobs that are available or accessible to lower-income workers (service sector work 
in retail, catering and care provision) generally do not provide a secure, decent standard 
of living, let alone progression or career advancement. To increase social mobility, it is 
not enough to equalise access to professional occupations (difficult as that has proven 
to be): all groups must have access to sectors of employment growth and stability and 
progression opportunities.
The Scottish Government’s overarching strategies focus strongly on employment and 
on what is required in order to prosper through work. Targets in the Fairer Scotland 
Action Plan that reflect this include a ‘Young Person’s Guarantee’ to ensure that all 
young people have access to a job, education, training or a development programme, 
and retraining opportunities through a new National Transition Training Programme to 
support those aged 25 and over at risk of redundancy. In March 2021, a further £70 
million was committed to the Young Person’s Guarantee.
464 Fair Work, Employability and Skills Directorate, A fairer Scotland for women: Gender pay gap action plan, 2019.
465 Ibid.
466 Coalition for Racial Equality and Rights, Ethnicity and Poverty in Scotland 2020: Analysis and Reflection on the Impact of COVID-19, 2020.
467 Ibid.
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The Fair Work Convention introduced in April 2015, which acts as an independent 
advisory body to Scottish ministers, is also important in this context. The Convention’s 
vision is that by 2025, people in Scotland will have a world-leading working life 
where fair work drives success, wellbeing and prosperity for individuals, businesses, 
organisations and society. In 2019, the Scottish Government also launched a suite of 
Fairer Work Action Plans covering provision for Disabled People, the Gender Pay Gap 
and Future Skills. Fair Start Scotland, the Scottish Government’s devolved employment 
support service, began in April 2018 to provide a personalised package of support to 
people facing challenges in accessing work. 
Progress is tracked using National Performance Indicators (such as the target to reduce 
the proportion of employees earning less than the voluntary Living Wage in Scotland – 
which fell from 18.8% in 2012 to 15.2% in 2020) and the annual reports of the Fair Work 
Action Plan.468, 469 The importance of employment is also clear in the actions called for 
by the Social Renewal Board, such as working in partnership to develop a new social 
contract on Fair Work. 
These efforts should be applauded. What is not clear is the extent to which the 
Scottish Government’s strategies, conventions and performance monitoring are 
expected to impact on equitable employment outcomes and social mobility. There is a 
presumption of positive impact, without specification of targets being set, or a statutory 
obligation to do so.
Poverty
Every Scottish government since devolution has presented a plan to tackle poverty 
or income inequality in Scotland. This recognises that poverty is a key determinant 
of social mobility, with children exposed to poverty having worse health, education, 
development and, ultimately, labour market outcomes than more affluent children.470, 
471, 472, 473, 474, 475 In addition to the many anti-poverty actions outlined in this chapter, two 
recent actions of the current Scottish government stand out.
468 The voluntary Living Wage is set independently by the Living Wage Foundation. It is an hourly rate which is calculated according to the basic cost of 
living in the UK. The living wage is an informal benchmark, not a legally enforceable minimum level of pay, like the national minimum wage.
469 Fair Work, Employability and Skills Directorate, Fair work: action plan, 2021. 
470 Cooper, K. and Stewart, K., Does household income affect children’s outcomes? A systematic review of the evidence, 2020.
471 Duncan, G.J. et al., Economic deprivation and early childhood development, Article, 1994.
472 Bradshaw J., Poverty: the outcomes for children, 2000.
473 Bradshaw J., Child poverty and child outcomes, 2002.
474 Joseph Rowntree Foundation, The costs of child poverty for individuals and society: a literature review, 2008.
475 The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, A broken social elevator? How to promote social mobility, 2018.
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This Act commits public bodies (local government and local NHS boards) to working 
together to eradicate child poverty by 2030.
In 2017, the Scottish Parliament unanimously passed the Child Poverty Act 2017.476 
This Act commits public bodies (local government and local NHS boards) to working 
together to eradicate child poverty by 2030. The general features of the Act will be 
familiar to observers of social mobility and tackling poverty in the UK, as it drew on 
the targets of the UK Child Poverty Act 2010.477 This allowed the Scottish Government 
to take ownership of poverty reduction ambitions even after UK-wide targets were 
repealed by the Welfare Reform and Work Act 2016 in the UK Parliament.478 The first 
of three national delivery plans required by the Act was published in 2018.479 Annual 
reports on progress will be published by the Scottish Government and local areas.480, 481
The second key action, also provided for by the Act, is the statutory establishment 
of the Poverty and Inequality Commission as a non-departmental public body 
providing independent advice to and scrutiny of Scottish ministers. The Act requires 
the Commission to provide advice and comment on progress towards tackling child 
poverty. The Public Services Reform (Poverty and Inequality Commission) (Scotland) 
Order 2018 widened the Commission’s remit to focus more generally on poverty and 
inequality in Scotland.482 These legislative moves represent important steps by Scottish 
governments to monitor and hold themselves to account on progress in tackling poverty.
Although it has lower rates of both child poverty and poverty overall than other parts 
of the UK, the trends in Scotland are broadly comparable with the rest of the UK. 
Poverty is not decreasing.
Although it has lower rates of both child poverty and poverty overall than other parts of 
the UK, the trends in Scotland are broadly comparable with the rest of the UK. Poverty 
is not decreasing (figure 4.7). 
476 Scottish Parliament, Child Poverty (Scotland) Act 2017, Accessed March 2021.
477 Ibid.
478 Ibid.
479 Housing and Social Justice Directorate, Every child, every chance: tackling child poverty delivery plan 2018-2022, 2018.
480 Housing and Social Justice Directorate, Tackling child poverty: Second year progress report (2019-2020), 2020.
481 For example, Renfrewshire Council, Local child poverty action report Renfrewshire 2019/2020, 2021.
482 Scottish Parliament, The Public Services Reform (Poverty and Inequality Commission) (Scotland) Order 2018, Accessed March 2021.
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Almost one in four of Scotland’s children live in poverty.
More disturbingly, an increasing number of children in Scotland experience poverty 
that can be described as ‘severe’. The latest data (for 2017-20) show that after 
taking housing costs into account, almost one in four of Scotland’s children live in 
poverty (24.3%, or 240,000 children), and one in eight in income poverty and material 
deprivation combined (12.5%, or 120,000 children). Child poverty is also persistent: 
during 2015-19, one in seven children (16%) lived in poverty in three out of four years.

















































































































Source: Department for Work and Pensions, Households Below Average Income, 2021
Note: This is based on a poverty line defined as 60% of the contemporary median after deducting housing costs
Children, working-age adults and pensioners all experienced an increase in poverty 
between 2012-15 and 2017-20. The number living in relative poverty (after housing 
costs) increased by 30,000 for each age group, to 240,000 for children, 650,000 for 
working-age adults and 150,000 for people of pensionable age.
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In our ‘State of the Nation 2017’ report, we also observed that “place matters in 
Scotland”, identifying notably poorer education and employment outcomes in more 
deprived and post-industrial areas compared with more affluent and some rural areas.483 
Poverty too is unevenly distributed. The highest numbers of people living in poverty are 
found in the largest cities, particularly Glasgow, but high proportions of people living 
in poverty are also found in surrounding areas, such as West Dunbartonshire, North 
Lanarkshire and Inverclyde. Poverty is also widespread in rural Scotland.
More positively, Scotland’s lower average housing costs, assured quality 
accommodation (in the social rented sector) and assured security of tenure (in the 
private rented sector) are significant.484 Yet there is a problematic relationship between 
housing status, access to opportunities and outcomes, particularly in the larger urban 
centres. For example, in West Central Scotland, where someone lives is associated 
with the educational outcomes that influence their social mobility prospects. 
A recent review of Scottish Government actions to tackle poverty and income inequality 
over the last parliamentary term noted signs of a distinctive ‘Scottish approach’ to policy 
and observed that the foundations for progress are being laid locally (through annual 
Local Child Poverty Action Reports) and nationally (through the Child Poverty Delivery 
Plan).485 It is important to note that this has not yet led to significant reductions in child 
poverty. However, it may have stopped the situation from being as bad as it could have 
been in the context of more than 10 years of spending cuts.
The 2021 forecasts for relative child poverty in Scotland are now 29.1% by 2023-24 
and 38% by 2030.
Pre-pandemic projections estimated that the 2023-24 interim child poverty targets set in 
the 2017 Child Poverty (Scotland) Act (one of which was to reduce the relative poverty 
level to 18%) would not be met, unless substantial measures were taken. The 2021 
forecasts for relative child poverty in Scotland are now 29.1% by 2023-24 and 38% by 
2030 (rather than below 10% as intended).486, 487
The priority groups identified in the Child Poverty Delivery Plan are at greater risk of 
poverty than children in general (figure 4.8). Children of lone parents are almost twice 
as likely as those in two-parent households to be living in poverty (38%, compared with 
20%). Most children and working-age adults in poverty live in a household where at 
least one adult is in paid employment (68% and 61%, respectively).
483 Social Mobility Commission, State of the nation 2017, 2017.
484 Joseph Rowntree Foundation, A stronger Scottish lifeline in the economic storm, 2020.
485 McKendrick J. et al., Policies and processes for tackling poverty in Scotland: towards a 2030 without poverty?, 2021.
486 Resolution Foundation, The living standards outlook 2021, 2021.
487 Resolution Foundation, Wrong direction: can Scotland hit its child poverty targets?, 2019.
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Figure 4.8: Incidence of relative poverty among priority groups identified in the Child 














Sources: Scottish Government (2021) Poverty and Income Inequality in Scotland 2017-20 - gov.scot (www.gov.scot) and Scottish 
Government (2020) Poverty and Income Inequality in Scotland, 2016-2019, Supplementary Tables, Child Poverty
488 Poverty and Inequality Commission, Poverty and Inequality Commission strategic plan 2020-2023, 2021.
489 Minister for Equalities and Older People, Funding to tackle poverty and inequality, 2021.
490 Ibid.
Official figures on income poverty and inequality for 2020-21 will not be available 
until 2022. At present, it is not possible to state definitely what the immediate impact 
of COVID-19 will be. However, Scotland’s Poverty and Inequality Commission has 
stated that “We can be under no illusions; the pandemic is likely to increase poverty 
and inequality in Scotland and this makes it all the more important that transformative 
action is taken”.488
Like the UK Government, the Scottish Government has acted to protect people at risk 
of poverty during the pandemic, though its ability to increase financial support has been 
constrained by the limits of its revenue-raising powers. A combined total of £1 billion 
has been allocated to help local communities through the coronavirus (COVID-19) 
pandemic.489 £37.2 million was announced to tackle poverty and support people on 
low incomes.490 This included a £100 COVID-19 Spring Hardship Payment for children 
receiving FSM on the basis of low income. Those claiming Universal Credit will also be 
receiving the UK-wide £20-per-week uplift to Universal Credit, scheduled to remain in 
place until the end of September 2021. The acknowledged impacts of poverty on social 
mobility are only likely to be intensified by the effects of the pandemic.
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Conclusion 
There is an abundance of vision statements on what Scotland should be... but a key 
practical challenge is the ‘policy implementation gap’.
The Scottish Government does not lack high-level ambition. On the contrary, there is 
an abundance of vision statements on what Scotland should be, with many actions 
and multiple plans in place to achieve this. However, these approaches are not always 
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effectively joined up. A key practical challenge is the ‘policy implementation gap’ and the 
extent to which public bodies have the resources (rather than the inclination) to deliver 
on national visions.491
We have observed that there is no specific social mobility strategy in Scotland. The 
policy tendency is towards reducing deprivation and providing universal services rather 
than targeting entrenched inequalities and removing the barriers to mobility. This 
approach is reinforced by actions with a focus on equalities – directed towards particular 
protected groups such as women, minority ethnic groups and people with disabilities. 
Some interventions are targeted at disadvantaged groups, such as the work in the 
Attainment Challenge. Other policies focus strongly on universal entitlements, such 
as free personal care, free higher education and free bus transport for those aged 
over 60. In some cases the principal beneficiaries of these policies are those in more 
affluent areas.
Much of this work is relevant to social mobility, but it does not provide an overarching 
social mobility framework or a driver directly underpinning progress on social mobility. 
The potential contribution of social mobility to Scotland’s declared national purpose 
needs to be articulated more clearly. Alongside this, the structural causes of immobility 
need to be tackled more specifically. These include the persistent and cumulative 
factors that reproduce disadvantage among people living in particular communities, 
or the financial and cultural advantages of those in more prosperous areas, including 
access to schools (public and private) with higher attainment rates. These causes will 
only be addressed through concerted, sustained and strategic action to reduce the 
income differences which maintain opportunity gaps.
Scotland requires a robust appraisal of how much particular universal and targeted 
interventions can do to increase social mobility and achieve socially just outcomes. 
Increased social mobility could be conceived as the ultimate outcome of the Scottish 
Government’s focus on entitlement and equality rather than an alternative or an 
afterthought. The current absence of a Scottish social mobility strategy could be 
addressed by considering how social mobility may be aligned with, and could be an 
outcome of, actions aimed at creating a more egalitarian society.
We have commended actions taken to extend free childcare, address education 
attainment gaps, and widen access to further and higher education, and we urge this 
work to continue.
491 Creegan, C. and Adam, L., Scotland in a post-pandemic world, Accessed April 2021. 
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We agree with the Poverty and Inequality Commission that “there is a great deal of 
commitment across government and society in Scotland to reducing poverty and 
inequality.”492 But while the Scottish Government may have taken a different direction to 
the UK Government on child poverty and social mobility policy, it has not yet achieved 
significantly different outcomes. It appears that the measures introduced in Scotland 
in the past five years mitigate some of the worst effects of deprivation rather than 
promoting mobility and equal life chances. The Equality and Human Rights Commission 
(2018) is right to say that recent and current policies might stop the rate at which gaps 
widen but do not significantly narrow them, risking disadvantage becoming further 
entrenched for generations to come.493
Once more, however, commitments urgently need to be strengthened to ensure that 
the needs of those already disadvantaged are met.
Several further measures should be taken to improve the circumstances of the 
lowest-income households, such as increasing the Scottish Child Payment. However, 
measures to protect income will not have much impact on the persistent opportunity gap 
and mobility barriers in Scotland. We have commended actions taken to extend free 
childcare, address education attainment gaps, and widen access to further and higher 
education, and we urge this work to continue. We also commend the foresight shown 
by the Scottish Government to commission a Social Renewal Board to reflect on what is 
required to recover from COVID-19. Once more, however, commitments urgently need 
to be strengthened to ensure that the needs of those already disadvantaged are met as 
the nation rebuilds from this generational shock.
Social mobility depends not just on increasing resources available to those at the 
bottom of the income distribution scale, but also on preventing those at the top from 
restricting access by ‘opportunity hoarding’ and preserving privilege.494 The Scottish 
Government needs to develop ways to replicate the advantages enjoyed by more 
privileged groups for disadvantaged young people, such as extending opportunities 
for learning and acquiring employment experience through paid internships and 
employment experience placements. Only then can Scotland credibly present itself as a 
place where a lad (and lassie) o’pairts can progress.
492 Poverty and Inequality Commission, Poverty and Inequality Commission strategic plan 2020-2023, 2021.
493 Equality and Human Rights Commission, Is Scotland fairer?, 2018.
494 Social Mobility and Child Poverty Commission, Downward mobility and opportunity hoarding, 2015.
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Highlights
44% of people are now 
in professional jobs in 
Wales; an increase in the 
proportion of professional 
jobs represents an 
opportunity for social 
mobility – depending 
on who gets these jobs. 
People from professional 
backgrounds are still 
50% more likely than 
those from working class 
backgrounds to access 
these professional jobs. 
There has been some 
progress in this area, as 
they were about twice as 
likely in 2014-15.
The Welsh Government 
has prioritised raising 
standards in education 
and invested in early 
years, but there 
has been limited 
progress in closing 
the attainment gap 
between the most and 
least disadvantaged. 
The gap between the 
proportion of those 
receiving free school 
meals and other pupils 
who achieve a good 
standard at GCSE has 
remained the same 
since 2007, at around 
32 percentage points.
The Wellbeing of Future 
Generations Act and 
enactment of the socio-
economic duty are areas 
of progress, making it 
mandatory for public bodies 
to safeguard the needs of 
future generations by tackling 
poverty and inequalities, and 
by requiring public authorities 
to consider socio-economic 
inequalities when  
making decisions.
The unemployment rate 
for those from working 
class backgrounds in 
Wales has generally 
been higher than the 
rest of the UK over the 
last few years, although 
this gap is now closing 
(from 1.2 to 0.1 
percentage points).
The levels of in-work 
poverty in Wales are 
amongst the worst in the 
UK. 71% of children living 
in poverty live in working 
households, a figure 
which has been steadily 
increasing in recent years. 
An estimated 250,000 jobs 
in Wales – one in five – are 
in the sectors most impacted 
by measures to slow the 
spread of COVID-19, or 
where most businesses 
were forced to reduce 
trading or close altogether.
44% 32%
Wales has had the highest 
child poverty rates in 
the UK for much of the 
last decade with 31% of 
children in poverty on 
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Context
Wales, like the rest of the UK, is at a critical moment. Before the pandemic, there 
were already significant concerns about social mobility in the country. It has had the 
highest poverty rates compared with the other UK nations for much of the past decade 
and many people experience persistent poverty, including 15% of children between 
2015 and 2019.495, 496 This is concerning for what it tells us about both the mobility of 
those adults who have ended up in poverty and the future mobility of those children 
(since child poverty is detrimental to future outcomes).497
There is also cause for concern when we look at employment: the employment rate has 
been consistently lower than in the rest of the UK, which is bad news for mobility. Those 
who are unemployed are likely not to be ‘getting on’ and achieving better life outcomes 
but rather to be falling back.498
COVID-19 has had a profound impact, with significant implications for social mobility. 
Living standards got significantly worse by winter 2020.499 This, combined with 
rising costs, affected the poor the most, deepening poverty and inequalities.500, 501 
The pandemic also had a disproportionate impact on Black and ethnic minority groups 
and young people.502, 503 Without government action, the pandemic could be devastating 
for social mobility, increasing inter-generational inequalities and social exclusion. 
495 Joseph Rowntree Foundation, Poverty levels and trends in England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, 2020.
496 Persistent poverty defined as being in relative income poverty in at least three out of four consecutive years; Welsh Government, Persistent poverty: 
2019, 2019. 
497 See, for example: Education Policy Institute, Measuring the disadvantage gap in 16-19 education, 2021; Economic and Social Research Council, 
Child poverty casts a long shadow over social mobility, 2012.
498 Welsh Government, Labour market overview: April 2021, 2021.
499 Bevan Foundation, A snapshot of poverty in Winter 2020, 2021.
500 Joseph Rowntree Foundation, Briefing: poverty in Wales, 2020.
501 Equality and Human Rights Commission, Rebuilding a more equal and fairer Wales: focus on the unequal impact of the coronavirus pandemic, 
2020.
502 First Minister’s BAME Covid-19 Advisory Group, First Minister’s BAME COVID-19 Advisory Group: report of the socio-economic subgroup, 2020.
503 Princess Trust, Facing the future: employment prospects for young people after coronavirus, 2021.
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What powers do the Welsh Government and Senedd hold?
504 Cabinet Office, Office of the Secretary of State for Scotland, Northern Ireland Office, and Office of the Secretary of State for Wales, Devolution of 
powers to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, Accessed June 2021.
505 Bevan Foundation, A Welsh benefits system, how it can help solve poverty, 2020.
506 BBC, New income tax powers for Wales to come into force, 2019.
507 Wales Centre for Public Policy, The Welsh tax base risks and opportunities after fiscal devolution, 2018.
508 Institute for Government, Tax and devolution: explainers, 2020. 
509 Welsh Government, 2014-2020 EU Structural Funds Programme in Wales, 2021.
510 Batchler, J. and Begg, I., Cohesion policy after Brexit: the economic, social and institutional challenges, 2017.
511 Di Cataldo, M. and Monastiriotis, V., Regional needs, regional targeting, and regional growth: an assessment of EU Cohesion Policy in the UK 
regions, 2018.
512 Welsh Government, Children’s rights in Wales, 2019.
The UK Government holds most of the policy levers that impact social mobility (this 
is true across all devolved nations). However, the Welsh Government has devolved 
power over certain key areas.504 These include child poverty, family support, housing, 
health, childcare, early years, education, training and skills, economic development 
and some devolved benefits.505 The Senedd Cymru, the Welsh Parliament, has 
tax-raising powers equivalent to one fifth of tax in Wales.506 Some of these powers 
were newly introduced in 2019, deepening devolution.507 The Welsh Government has 
used these new powers to increase the threshold for paying stamp duty, but so far it 
has not diverged from England on income tax policy.508
The Welsh Government and Senedd also oversaw the final generation of European-
funded programmes. During the 2014-2020 period, Wales received over £2.1 billion 
of EU funds – the highest level of support per person in the UK.509, 510 This constitutes 
a significant proportion of the public pot – by some estimates, from 2001 to 2006, EU 
expenditure represented around 22% of total public investment in Wales.511
How does the Welsh Government promote social mobility?
The Welsh Government’s approach to social mobility has to be considered in the light of 
its philosophical commitment to social justice. This commitment is evident in the focus 
given to tackling inequalities and poverty.
Two pieces of legislation are crucial to what Wales is doing on social mobility. The 
Wellbeing of Future Generations Act (WFGA) 2015 sets out seven ‘wellbeing goals’ that 
provide the framework for policy- and decision-making in Wales. The WFGA built on 
the Welsh Government’s pre-existing commitments to the rights of children and young 
people, as defined by the Children and Young People’s Measure in 2011.512 The Act 
requires public bodies to safeguard the needs of future generations in line with these 
goals and to tackle persistent problems such as poverty and health inequalities. ‘Taking 
Wales Forward’ and ‘Prosperity for All’, which together set out the Welsh Government’s 
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strategic plan up to 2021, aim to deliver on the promises of the WFGA by making Wales 
more prosperous, equal and sustainable.513, 514 These steps towards solving poverty and 
addressing inequalities could be vital to promoting social mobility.
Secondly, in 2020 Wales also introduced the Socio-economic Duty of the 2010 Equality 
Act, following Scotland’s implementation 18 months prior to this. The Duty, in force since 
31 March 2021, aims to deliver better outcomes for socio-economically disadvantaged 
people. The Socio-economic Duty ensures that specific public bodies take account 
of the potential impact of their decisions on those who suffer socio-economic 
disadvantage. It changes the way decisions are made, putting equality at the heart 
of decision-making.515 It is too early to fully assess its impact, but its potential is 
significant.516, 517
Both Acts build on pre-existing commitments by the Welsh Government to children and 
young people’s rights enshrined in the 2011 Children and Young People’s Measure.518
COVID-19 response
The Welsh Government‘s COVID-19 response was informed by these overarching goals 
and objectives, and also by the unique challenges that flowed from the public health 
emergency.519, 520, 521 The pandemic triggered significant budgetary responses from the 
UK and Welsh Governments. On 27 May 2020, the Welsh Government published a 
historic supplementary budget, outlining the momentous changes to its funding and 
spending that had occurred since it published its Final Budget for 2020-21 in March.522
Funding for this derived mainly from funding from the UK Government through ‘Barnett 
consequentials’ triggered by UK Government spending in England. 
513 Welsh Government, Taking Wales Forward, 2016.
514 Welsh Government, Prosperity for All, 2017.
515 Well-being and Equality Working Group, Improving well-being and equality outcomes: aligning processes, supporting implementation and creating 
new opportunities, 2019.
516 Welsh Government, The Socio-economic Duty Explanatory Memorandum to the Equality Act 2010, 2021.
517 Equalities and Human Rights Commission, Evaluating the Socio-Economic Duty in Scotland and Wales, 2021.
518 Welsh Government, Children’s rights in Wales, 2019.
519 Welsh Government and Wales Trades Union Congress, Written statement: response to COVID-19 crisis, 2020.
520 Welsh Government, COVID-19 reconstruction: challenges and priorities, 2020.
521 Sefydliad Bevan Foundation, A snapshot of poverty in spring 2021, 2021.
522 Minister for Finance and Trefnydd, Written statement: supplementary budget 2020-21, 2020.
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The Barnett formula
The UK Government allocates funding broadly in two ways: either to the whole of 
the UK (for policy areas which are reserved for the UK Government, rather than 
devolved), or to England alone (for policy areas which are devolved). It uses the 
Barnett formula to ensure that when there is spending in England in devolved 
areas, a fair share of additional funding goes to the Scottish Government, Welsh 
Government and Northern Ireland Executive. These payments are known as ‘Barnett 
consequentials’. The devolved administrations decide how to use this funding.
Since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, the devolved administrations have 
benefitted from £28.1 billion of additional funding through the Barnett formula.523 
Using a newly agreed flexibility to transfer £2.1 billion between financial years, the 
devolved administrations are spending £16.8 billion of the additional funding in 
2020-21 and £11.3 billion in 2021-22.524 
Since the start of the pandemic, the Welsh Government received over £8.6 billion of 
additional funding through the Barnett formula, complementing a number of UK-wide 
support schemes including the Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme (furlough) and Self- 
Employment Income Support Scheme.525 It adapted and updated business support, 
injecting emergency funds across programmes and delivering remote business, careers 
and employability support in unprecedented circumstances.526, 527 Measures included 
a £2.5 billion business support package since the start of the pandemic, delivered 
partly-through the Wales-specific Economic Resilience Fund (ERF), as well as support 
for charities, universities and further education (FE) colleges, and the sports and 
cultural sectors.528, 529 ERF grants, provided directly to businesses, seem to have been 
particularly successful in supporting economic activity in parts of Wales suffering from 
persistent socio-economic disadvantage.530
The Welsh Government also used the funding from the UK Government to provide 
£14 million additional funding for childcare for the children of critical workers and 
vulnerable families during the first phase of the pandemic in 2020, and invested over 
£20 million to reopen the Childcare Offer for applications in the summer of 2020 and 
to support the ongoing sustainability of childcare services. An extra £14.9 million for 
the Discretionary Assistance Fund (DAF), the rules of which were relaxed to help with 
additional financial pressures.531 To help households hardest hit by the economic impact 
of the pandemic, the Welsh Government made available an additional £1.4 million 
523 Unpublished analysis by HM Treasury.
524 Ibid.
525 UK Government, The UK Government’s plan for Wales, 2021
526 Welsh Government, Written Statement: COVID-19 commitment to employability and skills, 2020.
527 Welsh Government, Written Statement: Employability plan annual statement 2021, 2021.
528 Welsh Government, COVID-19 reconstruction: challenges and priorities, 2020.
529 Welsh Government, Welsh Government Economic Resilience Fund protects 75,000 jobs, 2020.
530 Economic Intelligence Wales, COVID-19 Welsh Government financial interventions: an analysis of Welsh beneficiaries, 2020.
531 Welsh Government and Wales Trades Union Congress, Written statement: response to COVID-19 crisis, 2020.
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funding for debt advice services and a range of income maximisation initiatives.532 
The Welsh Government acted proactively to address food insecurity and school holiday 
hunger. All authorities in Wales provided emergency cash, supermarket vouchers or 
food parcels in lieu of free school meals (FSM) while schools remain closed, and these 
plans were put in place quickly.533 Although the precise impact of these schemes has 
yet to be fully evaluated, it’s likely they helped to limit the immediate impacts of the 
pandemic on struggling families and individuals.
The COVID-19 pandemic led to additional spending by both the Welsh and UK 
Governments; a stream of announcements and initiatives to support individuals, 
businesses and public services constantly added to the size of the fiscal response, with 
implications for 2021 and beyond.534, 535
Despite these measures, by winter 2020 the squeeze on household income was being 
felt generally.536
Overall trends: social mobility in Wales
As in the rest of the UK, the proportion of jobs in the Welsh labour market which are 
professional is increasing and the proportion which are working class is falling (figure 
5.1). Overall, the proportion of professional jobs is still lower than for the UK as a 
whole (44% vs. 48%). The share of individuals in working class occupations in Wales 
is similar to Northern Ireland and is higher than the UK as a whole (33% for Wales, 
29% for the UK as a whole. The growth in professional jobs creates the opportunity for 
social mobility, with more room at the ‘top’ of the labour market. Whether this potential is 
realised depends on who gets these jobs. 
532 Welsh Government, Finance Minister announces extra £1.4m funding to boost household income and manage problem debt in Wales, 2020.
533 Bevan foundation, State of Wales: free school meals and coronavirus, 2020.
534 Cardiff University Wales Fiscal Analysis, Welsh budget outlook 2020, 2020.
535 Cardiff University Wales Fiscal Analysis, UK Budget 2021: the implications for Wales and the Welsh budget, 2021.
536 Bevan Foundation, Different Experiences of Poverty in Winter 2020, 2021.
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Figure 5.1: Percentage of people in professional jobs across the labour market, in each 










Source: SMC Analysis of Labour Force Survey (ONS)
Note: Data refers to those in employment
Despite some year-on-year fluctuations and slow progress, access to professional jobs 
for those from low socio-economic backgrounds has improved since 2014. The share 
of individuals from intermediate and working-class backgrounds who are themselves 
in professional occupations has been rising steadily over time (by over 10 percentage 
points). As a result, those from professional backgrounds in Wales are now 50% more 
likely to be in professional jobs themselves than those from working class backgrounds, 
as compared with being about twice as likely in 2014 and 2015 (figure 5.2). Although 
year-on-year fluctuations in this figure are not significant, the overall trend demonstrates 
the widening access to professional jobs.
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Source: SMC Analysis of Labour Force Survey (ONS)
Note: People aged 25 to 60. Margin of error varies from 3.4% to 7.0% for individual statistics, so individual changes should be 
interpreted with caution. See Appendix Table B2 for sample sizes and 95% confidence intervals
Individuals in Wales from working class backgrounds are still about 90% 
more likely to be in working class occupations than those from professional 
backgrounds, as compared with over twice as likely for the UK overall.
In Wales, as in the rest of the UK, if you are in a working class job, you are likely to have 
come from a working class background (figure 5.3). The share of individuals in working 
class jobs who are from working class backgrounds is higher than for the UK as a whole 
(37% vs. 31% respectively). Interestingly, Wales also has a higher rate of people from 
professional backgrounds in working class jobs than for the UK (20% vs. 14%), showing 
some higher rates of downward mobility. However, individuals in Wales from working 
class backgrounds are still about 90% more likely to be in working class occupations 
than those from professional backgrounds, as compared with over twice as likely for 
the UK overall. One particular trend for Wales is the rising share of individuals from 
intermediate backgrounds who are in working class occupations (from 25% in 2014 to 
45% in 2020). This trend is not seen for other parts of the UK. 
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Source: SMC Analysis of Labour Force Survey (ONS)
Note: People age 25 to 60. Margin of error varies from 3.2% to 5.9% for individual statistics, so individual changes should be 
interpreted with caution. See Appendix Table B1 for sample sizes and 95% confidence intervals
537 Welsh Government, Education in Wales: our national mission – action plan 2017-2021, 2017.
538 Welsh Government, Education in Wales: our national mission – key planning milestones to 2022, 2018.
539 Welsh Government, Education in Wales: our national mission – achievements, 2020.
540 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, The Welsh education reform journey, a rapid policy assessment, 2017.
541 Education Policy Institute, A comparison of school institutions and policies across the UK , Accessed June 2021.
Education
Education policy is a key area of devolved power for enabling social mobility and 
improving life chances.
Over recent years, the Welsh Government has pursued reform to raise standards, 
increase equity and promote greater equality of outcomes in education.537, 538 It has 
introduced an ambitious pupil and student support package in the UK, investing in early 
years, schools, youth transitions and lifelong learning alongside specific support for 
disadvantaged pupils and learners.539, 540 However, progress has been limited, compared 
with other UK nations.541
The emphasis has been on raising standards through curriculum reform, reducing 
inequalities, particularly the attainment gap, increasing opportunities for the most 
disadvantaged and developing the learning offer for more able learners. Wales’ ambition 
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as a bilingual nation and the goals of the Wellbeing of Future Generations Act also 
frame education policy.542 In 2018, the Welsh Minister for Education committed to 
eliminating the gap between Wales and the rest of the UK at all qualification levels in 10 
years.543, 544 This commitment helps to explain investment in education over this period, 
and the priority given to supporting disadvantaged learners. 
Early years and foundation phase (ages 3–7) 
The poorest children in Wales already start school 10 months behind children from 
families with more money.
542 Cardiff Business School and Office of the Future Generations Commissioner for Wales, Education fit for the future in Wales report, 2019. 
543 Welsh Government, Education Minister sets out five key principles for schools’ return, 2018.
544 Welsh Government, Education in Wales: our national mission – achievements, 2020.
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High-quality early childhood education and care (ECEC) can unlock work opportunities 
for parents and play a vital role in children’s social and academic development.545 But 
many disadvantaged families are currently unable to access the funded childcare they 
need because of gaps in provision. The benefits of expanding free ECEC to cover 
all children in Wales outweigh the costs, and the greatest benefits go to the most 
disadvantaged families.546 Making childcare available to all parents (including those not 
working) could support social mobility, reduce inequalities and help to reduce poverty.547, 
548 The poorest children in Wales already start school 10 months behind children from 
families with more money.549 Childcare policy risks exacerbating this attainment gap 
from an early age.550
Only 63.8% of children eligible for free school meals (FSM) reach a good  
standard in maths, literacy and social development at age 7, compared with 84.2% 
of those not eligible.
There are significant gaps by socio-economic background by the end of the Foundation 
Phase (FP), which includes early years (ages 3-5) and Key Stage 1 (ages 5-7). Only 
63.8% of children eligible for free school meals (FSM) reach a good standard in maths, 
literacy and social development at age 7, compared with 84.2% of those not eligible . 
(This is broadly comparable to other UK nations).551 
Over a quarter (28% or 50,000) of under-fives in Wales were living in income poverty 
in 2018.
Falling behind in the early years makes it more likely children will struggle throughout 
their education. Over a quarter (28% or 50,000) of under-fives in Wales were living in 
income poverty in 2018; and by age five, around a third of children living in poverty (30-
35%) were already falling behind across a range of key milestones such as language 
545 Wales Institute of Social and Economic Research Data, Flexible pre-school education pilots: separating the impactful from the impractical, 2015. 
546 Joseph Rowntree Foundation, Expanding childcare in Wales could loosen poverty’s grip on families, 2020.
547 Bevan Foundation, Transforming Wales: How Welsh public services and benefits can reduce poverty and inequality, 2020.
548 Wales Centre for Public Policy, Childcare policy options for Wales, 2016.
549 Children’s Commissioner’s Office, What’s the Children’s Commissioner calling for?, 2020.
550 Ibid.
551 Statistics for Wales, Foundation phase results by free school meals entitlement, 2019.
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skills and problem solving, compared with one-fifth (20-21%) of their peers.552 Nearly 
half of children in poverty who are behind at age five remain in the lowest-performing 
group at ages seven, 11 and 14.553, 554
Wales leads the UK with flagship early years programmes such as Flying Start (FS) and 
Families First (FF).555 FS supports disadvantaged parents of two- and three-year-olds, 
providing funded quality childcare, enhanced health visiting support, support for speech, 
language and communication development and parenting support programmes. 
However, the scheme is available only in some of the most deprived areas in Wales, 
meaning that almost half of all disadvantaged children (45%) miss out.556, 557 Targeting 
FS at disadvantaged families more generally could increase life chances.558 This could 
reduce attainment gaps from an early age.559, 560
The Welsh Government has also focused on improving standards of education in the 
Foundation Phase, though problems remain. These include an attainment gap between 
advantaged and disadvantaged students, insufficient funding, and challenges to 
improving the quality of the educational experience in rural areas.561 The FP Strategic 
Action Plan (2016-2021) aimed to address these challenges.562, 563, 564 In 2017, £1 million 
was invested to support FP teachers to develop skills and share best practice through 
an FP Excellence Network. The approach is helping to raise standards, but quality and 
delivery need to be more consistent for it to achieve its full potential.565, 566
All children in Wales can access 10-12.5 hours of ECEC from the term after their third 
birthday. In addition to this, working parents of three- and four-year-olds in Wales 
receive additional hours of funded childcare, providing a combined entitlement to 30 
hours of funded ECEC a week for 48 weeks per year.567, 568 Children living in Flying 
Start areas will also receive part-time childcare between the ages of two and three for 
39 weeks per year. The Welsh childcare offer is particularly benefitting families on low 
incomes, with two-thirds (66%) of beneficiaries during the 2019 summer term earning 
the national average or less.569 This is positive news for social mobility, provided that the 
care is of sufficient quality that it can contribute to driving down attainment gaps.
552 Save the Children, Little pieces. Big picture, 2018.
553 Save the Children, Missed milestones by age 5 means many children in Wales may never catch up, 2018.
554 Save the Children, Little pieces. Big picture, 2018.
555 Public Policy Institute for Wales and Early Intervention Foundation, Quantifying the benefits of early intervention, 2015.
556 Save the Children, Little pieces. Big picture, 2018.
557 Joseph Rowntree Foundation, Expanding childcare in Wales could loosen poverty’s grip on families, 2020.
558 Public Policy Institute for Wales and Early Intervention, Quantifying the benefits of early intervention, 2015.
559 Social Mobility Commission, State of the nation 2018-2019: social mobility in Great Britain, 2019.
560 Bevan Foundation, Transforming Wales: How Welsh public services and benefits can reduce poverty and inequality, 2020.
561 Welsh Government, Foundation Phase framework, 2015.
562 Welsh Government, Foundation Phase action plan, 2016.
563 Wales Institute of Social and Economic Research Data, Report: Foundation Phase is improving standards - but not closing poverty gap, 2015. 
564 Wales Institute of Social and Economic Research Data, Foundation Phase practitioner conference, 2016.
565 Teaching Personnel, New funding allocated for Foundation Phase teaching in Wales, 2017. 
566 Welsh Government, Rural education action plan, 2018.
567 Welsh Government, Childcare for 3 and 4 year olds, 2019.
568 Joseph Rowntree Foundation, Poverty in Wales 2020, 2020.
569 Welsh Government, Welsh Government Childcare Offer helping families to earn more and boosts childcare business, 2019
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However, there are some significant gaps in ECEC provision which mean that 
many disadvantaged children miss out on support. Children who don’t live in a 
Flying Start area receive no funded childcare before the age of three; further, most 
non-working parents of three- and four-year-olds only receive the universal entitlement 
(of 10-12.5 hours).570, 571 As a result of these issues, some low-income families, 
especially single parents, miss out on the current childcare offer and cannot afford to 
pay for provision outside the scheme. Families in some ethnic minority groups are also 
less likely to meet the requirements for this provision because of lower employment 
rates (for example, among those in Black and Asian ethnic groups), and provision for 
disabled children is difficult to find.572, 573 
The impact of COVID-19 on the Foundation Phase
Preliminary evidence of how the pandemic has affected young children’s wellbeing and 
development is worrying. A study of five- to ten-year-olds in Wales found a significant 
increase in anxiety and panic symptoms in children who were vulnerable before 
the pandemic.574
Between February 2020 and 2021, the number of children attending early years 
settings, including those with government-funded places, fell dramatically. Foundation 
phase learners also had more difficulties than older children with remote learning, 
making them susceptible to ‘learning loss’ at this critical stage. It is too soon to assess 
the impact of this ‘learning loss’ but it is reasonable to conclude that poorer children will 
have suffered the most.575
The Welsh Government made some steps in attempt to address these challenges. 
An allocation of around £7 million was made available to all 22 local authorities through 
the Child Development Fund.576 The fund was established to address concerns around 
developmental delay due to lockdown as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic in areas 
such as speech, language and communication, motor skills, and personal and social 
development.577 Significant further interventions are likely to be necessary in order to 
mitigate the negative impact on the most disadvantaged children.
570 Bevan Foundation, Trapped: poverty amongst women today, 2019.
571 Bevan Foundation, Transforming Wales: How Welsh public services and benefits can reduce poverty and inequality, 2020.
572 Employment rates are 59%, 60% and 72% respectively amongst those with a Black, Asian and Mixed ethnicity, as compared to 72% amongst those 
with a White ethnicity. Statistics for Wales, Coronavirus (COVID-19) and the Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic (BAME) population in Wales, 2020.
573 Bevan Foundation, Transforming Wales: how Welsh public services and benefits can reduce poverty and inequality, 2020.
574 Adegboye et al., Understanding why the COVID-19 pandemic-related lockdown increases mental health difficulties in vulnerable young children, 
2021.
575 Education Policy Institute, EPI research for the Department for Education on pupil learning loss, 2021.
576 Welsh Government, Written Statement: Extension of the Child Development Fund, 2021
577 Ibid.
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Ages 7-18
The attainment gap has narrowed at age 11, the gap at age 16 has remained broadly 
the same since 2007.
The attainment gap between pupils eligible for FSM and non-eligible pupils exists at all 
ages but widens as children get older.578 While the gap has narrowed at age 11, the gap 
at age 16 has remained broadly the same since 2007 at around 32 percentage points 
(figure 5.4).579
578 Joseph Rowntree Foundation, Education in Wales, 2020.
579 Ibid.
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Figure 5.4: Pupils in Wales achieving five or more A*-C grades at GCSE and equivalent 
including English and maths 
Not eligible for free school meals
































Source: Joseph Rowntree Foundation, Education in Wales: JRF analysis of Welsh Government Data, 2019
Note: There is a break in the time series between 2015 and 2016 due to a change in the methodology
580 Bevan Foundation, Transforming Wales: How Welsh public services and benefits can reduce poverty and inequality, 2020.
581 Cardiff Business School and Office, Fit for the future - Education in Wales, 2019.
582 Welsh Government, Education in Wales: Our national mission – our achievements, 2020.
583 Welsh Government, Evaluation of the pupil deprivation grant - year 1 report, 2014.
584 Wales Institute of Social and Economic Research and Data, Evaluation of the pupil deprivation grant (PDG), 2015.
As well as inequalities by FSM-eligibility, there are stark inequalities in the educational 
achievements of children with additional learning needs, and those from some Black 
and minority ethnic groups compared with peers.580
Raising standards and closing the attainment gap requires proportionately more 
resources than elsewhere because of Wales’ poorer socio-economic characteristics.581 
There have been a number of policy initiatives in Wales which have aimed to reduce 
the attainment gap. Investment in reducing class sizes since 2015 is likely to have 
benefitted pupils from disadvantaged backgrounds in particular, by enabling more pupil/
teacher contact.582
The Pupil Development Grant (PDG, formerly Pupil Deprivation Grant), which provides 
direct support to schools, has been moderately successful at enabling schools to 
try initiatives that could help close the gap and support disadvantaged pupils.583, 584 
Evaluations point to “substantial improvements in softer outcomes” but no definitive 
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change yet in the attainment gap.585, 586 The PDG has secured further investment 
and ongoing expansion, with recommendations to double the grant to increase 
impact. 587, 588, 589 
Alongside the Pupil Development Grant, FSM is a key policy for reducing the cost 
of sending a child to school in Wales and supporting educational attainment for 
children from low-income families.590 591, 592 Entitlement to FSM is strongly linked to 
educational attendance, attainment and overall wellbeing.593,594, 595 However, third-sector 
organisations in Wales, including the Bevan Foundation and Save the Children have 
criticised the FSM application process as cumbersome. This, and perceived stigma, 
may reduce take-up.596, 597 Research in October 2020 also reported that over half of 
children living in poverty (70,000) were not eligible.598 While more pupils have become 
eligible during the pandemic and take-up has increased, further extending eligibility and 
reducing stigma could help struggling families to cope and help to reduce the attainment 
gap, improve educational outcomes and address child poverty.599, 600
The Curriculum for Wales is scheduled for introduction from 2022; resourcing this and 
ensuring that less advantaged learners do not lose out will be a challenge.601 Academics 
and practitioners warn that curriculum reform could make social and economic 
inequalities worse unless schools (particularly in deprived areas) receive significant 
additional investment.602, 603, 604, 605 Only 30% of 600 teachers at ‘pioneer schools’ think 
curriculum reform will benefit disadvantaged pupils.606 
Post-16
In Wales, as elsewhere, a young person leaving school at 16 without five ‘good’ GCSEs 
faces significantly lower life chances and earning potential.607 Young people have 
limited opportunities to resit GCSEs other than English, Welsh or maths, with gaps in 
585 Welsh Government, Written statement – pupil deprivation grant – second year evaluation report, 2015.
586 Welsh Government, Evaluation of the pupil deprivation grant, 2017.
587 Welsh Government, Education in Wales – Our National Mission: Update October 2020, 2020.
588 Welsh Government, Schools to share in over £90m to help disadvantaged learners, 2018.
589 Welsh Government, Education Minister Kirsty Williams doubles funding to support Wales’ most disadvantaged learners with £10m package, 2021. 
The grant’s terms were extended to allow for the purchasing of laptops and tablets in response to the coronavirus pandemic. 
590 Bevan Foundation, Transforming Wales: How Welsh public services and benefits can reduce poverty and inequality, 2020.
591 Bevan Foundation, A Welsh benefits system, how it can help solve poverty, 2020.
592 Bevan Foundation, Expanding the provision of free school meals in Wales: Practical considerations, 2021. 
593 Welsh Government, Pupil development grant – Access, Accessed June 2021.
594 Welsh Government, Achievement and entitlement to free school meals 2019, 2019.
595 Joseph Rowntree Foundation, Education in Wales, 2021.
596 Bevan Foundation, Free school meals in Wales – A policy in need of reform?, 2018.
597 Statistics for Wales, Number of pupils taking free school meals on census day by local authority, region and year, 2020.
598 Child Poverty Action Group, Wales: Over half of children in poverty missing out on free school meals, 2020.
599 Bevan Foundation, Expanding the provision of free school meals in Wales: Practical considerations, 2021.
600 Ibid.
601 Welsh Government, Curriculum for Wales: the journey to 2022, 2021.
602 Cardiff Business School and Office and the Future Generations Commissioners for Wales, Education fit for the future in Wales report, 2019.
603 Wales Institute of Social and Economic Research and Data, Curriculum reform and inequality: The challenges facing Wales, 2020.
604 Wales Institute of Social and Economic Research and Data, Successful futures for all: Explorations of curriculum reform, 2019.
605 Wales Institute of Social and Economic Research and Data, Findings from successful futures for all presented to Senedd, 2019.
606 British Educational Research Association, Curriculum reform and inequality: The challenges facing Wales, 2020.
607 Bevan Foundation, Transforming Wales: How Welsh public services and benefits can reduce poverty and inequality, 2020.
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progression to higher levels. Upon leaving school, the majority of options for full-time 
vocational subjects are in low-paid sectors such as childcare, hair and beauty, and 
administration.608
Those who remain in school or further education have access to limited sources of 
support.609 This can impact on engagement and participation among disadvantaged 
learners. The Educational Maintenance Allowance, at £30 a week for low-income 
learners, has not increased since the mid-2000s. Addressing financial barriers to 
participation is critical given the financial pressures on households as Wales emerges 
from the pandemic.610 More than 5,000 young people now take up traineeships annually, 
with 5,650 starts in 2019-20, but limited options and variable quality in placements have 
attracted criticism.611 The Financial Contingency Fund operated by colleges in Wales 
with funding from the Welsh Government is open to all students suffering hardship. 
However, it remains the case that costs can prove off-putting.612, 613
Data for 2019 showed that young people’s life chances in Wales are still determined 
more by where they grow up than by their effort or ability.
Long-term prospects are limited for young people who pursue vocational learning or 
take up a Foundation apprenticeship, a traineeship or a Kickstart opportunity (a UK-
wide policy discussed in Chapter 1 of this report). Data for 2019 showed that young 
people’s life chances in Wales are still determined more by where they grow up than 
by their effort or ability.614, 615 Those with few qualifications are most at risk of being left 
behind as we emerge from lockdown.616, 617
The Youth Engagement and Progression Framework, which aims to keep young 
people engaged in education, employment and training, has had some success. It has 
reduced the numbers of young people not in education, employment or training (NEET) 
and increased the numbers taking up apprenticeships.618, 619, 620 However, evaluation 
shows that accountability for post-18 is under-developed, with gaps in provision. The 






613 Bevan Foundation, A Welsh benefits system, how it can help solve poverty, 2020.
614 Learning and Work Institute, The ‘postcode penalty’ – What the youth opportunity index tells us about inequality of opportunity, 2019.
615 Learning and Work Institute, Youth opportunity index, 2021.
616 Learning and Work Institute, Wales faces unemployment crisis with one in five jobs in ‘shutdown sectors’, 2020.
617 Learning and Work Institute, Understanding the potential impact of coronavirus in Wales, 2020.
618 Welsh Government, Formative evaluation of the youth engagement and progression framework: Final report, 2015. 
619 Welsh Government, Youth engagement and progression framework implementation plan, 2013. 
620 Welsh Government, Evaluation of the youth engagement and progression framework: follow-up study, 2016. 
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promises a more holistic approach, supporting employers to take on young people and 
prepare them for a new world of work. The Welsh Government has recently undertaken 
consultation on the Youth Engagement and Progression Framework; improvements 
to the present offer for young people are urgently needed in view of the impact of the 
pandemic on opportunities for young people.
The Welsh Government is considering raising the compulsory age of participation 
from 16 to 18 in education or training, as a way to help to reduce social and economic 
inequalities. This should be considered in the context of ongoing reforms to school 
age and post-16 provision in Wales, and alongside alternatives to compliance such as 
financial support and incentives for those on lower incomes.621, 622, 623
Record numbers of Welsh students from disadvantaged and non-traditional 
backgrounds now go on to higher education.624, 625 However, Wales is still behind 
other nations; in August 2019, 25.8% of young people in Wales were starting an 
undergraduate course compared with 28.5% in England and 29.4% in Northern Ireland. 
Almost 16% of Welsh students from the most disadvantaged backgrounds had been 
accepted by universities compared with 17.3% in England.626, 627
While the pandemic created uncertainty for Welsh undergraduates and higher education 
institutions, academics predict that the trend of greater numbers progressing to higher 
education will continue, partly because opportunities elsewhere are limited.628 In 2020, 
almost a third of Welsh 18-year-olds applied to universities – a record proportion.629 
Fair and wider access to higher education has been a priority since the 2016 ‘Diamond 
Review’ of Higher Education Funding and Student Finance Arrangements.630 The 
review’s recommendations led to wider access, improved part-time and postgraduate 
provision, and long-term financial sustainability.631 Although tuition fees remain, the 
review also led to a more generous maintenance support package that is in line with the 
Living Wage. All students receive a grant of at least £1,000; learners from lower-income 
families receive a higher proportion of support as a grant, rather than as a loan which 
has to be paid back.632 
621 Wales Centre for Public Policy, Raising the age of participation in education or training to 18 in Wales, 2021.
622 Bevan Foundation, Transforming Wales: How Welsh public services and benefits can reduce poverty and inequality, 2020.
623 Bevan Foundation, A Welsh benefits system, how it can help solve poverty, 2020.
624 Welsh Government, Equity and excellence: further and higher education national mission report, 2021.
625 Welsh Government, Students in higher education: September 2019 to August 2020, 2021.
626 Universities Colleges and Admissions Service, Record number of disadvantaged students off to university, 2019. 
627 Universities UK, Universities UK welcomes UCAS figures on disadvantaged students, 2019.
628 Wales Institute of Social and Economic Research and Data, COVID-19 and the uncertainty for new Welsh undergraduates, 2020. 
629 Ibid. 
630 Welsh Government, The review of higher education funding and student finance arrangements in Wales, 2016.
631 Welsh Government, Welsh Government response to the recommendations from the Review of Student Support and Higher Education Funding in 
Wales (‘the Diamond Review’), 2017.
632 Wales Institute of Social and Economic Research and Data, Reflecting on the Diamond Review, 2016.




Abi Chamberlain, 20, from Chepstow, 
faced a number of challenges through 
her education, but it was only when she 
reached university that she discovered 
she had been battling dyslexia 
throughout her educational life.  
 
“No matter how hard I tried, the work I was producing was of really poor 
quality it was making completing assignments a real challenge, so I made the 
decision to drop out. It made me feel worthless.”
Anxious and worried for her future, Abi’s confidence reached an all-time low. She started 
to suffer from anxiety and depression and was referred for a series of counselling 
sessions through Mind, the mental health charity. 
With the help of counselling, she managed to regain some confidence and eventually 
found the courage to try out a business extended diploma course in Coleg Gwent. 
One of the assessments was to explore potential business ideas. Abi’s idea for this 
assignment was to launch a Welsh-themed luxury hamper, with products sourced from 
around Wales.
The college put Abi in contact with The Prince’s Trust, where she took part in The 
Trust’s Enterprise course, a week-long programme for 18 – to 30-year-olds to help them 
take their first steps into self-employment. Abi received funding to purchase initial stock, 
launch her website, and was provided with a volunteer business mentor. Abi thrived on 
the course and benefitted from meeting other young people like her with the same drive 
to “be their own boss”.
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Abi launched her business, the Welsh Luxury Hamper Company, and now provides 
luxury hampers with products sourced from all around Wales, inspired by Wales’ 
beautiful landscape and heritage.
She has successfully launched 13 new ranges of products, including a Welsh Letterbox 
range, specially adapted to be contact-free during the COVID-19 lockdown. 
Additionally, Abi has told her story on behalf of The Prince’s Trust; discussing her 
business and her battle with mental health and dyslexia to inspire other young people to 
take the next step. 
Launching a business and standing my ground in a male-
dominated world was something that worried me, but The 
Prince’s Trust helped me build up my confidence to tackle 
this and use my story to inspire and empower young people. 
Wherever you come from in life, if you work hard, anything 
is possible.
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The impact of COVID-19 on education 
COVID-19 transformed the learning landscape, exposing deep-seated inequalities 
and presented new policy challenges.633, 634 School and college closures put learners 
and families under immediate pressure.635, 636 Household costs increased across 
the board, though the impact was not evenly felt.637, 638, 639 Lower-income families 
faced particular challenges with lack of digital devices, limited data allowances and 
bandwidth restrictions. The quality of the home learning environment became a key 
determinant of educational achievement, learning, wellbeing and life chances.640, 641 
‘Learning loss’ for children and young people is expected to be significant in Wales, 
as elsewhere, impacting on future prospects for social mobility, and particularly on 
disadvantaged pupils.642, 643
Each nation developed its own policy response and ways of maintaining learning 
and handling school and college closures.644, 645 Delays in decision-making affected 
disadvantaged pupils the most across all parts of the UK.646 However, relatively 
speaking, the Welsh Government’s decision-making was swift. It targeted resources 
at those in need and focused on improving the educational experience of the 
most deprived, in line with the Sutton Trust recommendations and their own policy 
objectives.647, 648 Challenges remained for pupils in Wales studying in rural and remote 
areas due to poor connectivity and weaker infrastructure.649
The Welsh Government developed the ‘Recruit, Recover, Raise Standards’ programme 
to mitigate the impact of the pandemic on education. This provides funding to improve 
schools’ capacity to support learners, particularly those most affected by school 
closures.650 Its success will be affected by (among other things) the way that blended 
teaching and learning is delivered; the methods and models of catch-up support; and 
the design, delivery and uptake of professional development for new and existing 
education workers.651 Early findings show that across the UK, children receiving FSM, 
from single-parent households, with less-educated parents, and with Pakistani and 
633 United Nations Children‘s Fund, Children in lockdown: What coronavirus means for UK children, 2020.
634 Wales Centre for Public Policy, The education response to coronavirus: Implications for schools in Wales, 2021.
635 Wales Institute of Social and Economic Research and Data, COVID-19 and school closures, 2020.
636 Sutton Trust, COVID-19 impacts: School shutdown, 2020.
637 Bevan Foundation, Different experiences of poverty in Winter 2020, 2021.
638 Joseph Rowntree Foundation, Briefing: Poverty in Wales, 2020.
639 Bevan Foundation, New data published by the End Child Poverty Coalition highlights extent of child poverty in Wales, 2021.
640 Wales Institute of Social and Economic Research and Data, Well-being of school children in Wales: European comparisons, 2020.
641 United Nations Children‘s Fund, World’s of Influence: Understanding what shapes child well-being in rich countries, Unicef UK: Report card 16 
briefing, 2020.
642 Wales Institute of Social and Economic Research and Data, COVID-19 and school closures, 2020.
643 United Nations Children‘s Fund, Children in lockdown: What coronavirus means for UK children, 2020.
644 Wales Centre for Public Policy, The education response to coronavirus: Implications for schools in Wales, 2021.
645 Education Policy Institute, Education policy responses across the UK to the pandemic, 2020.
646 Nuffield Foundation, Poor policy decisions by UK nations during schools crisis affected disadvantaged pupil the most, 2020.
647 Sutton Trust, Social mobility and COVID-19, 2020.
648 Wales Centre for Public Policy, The education response to coronavirus: Implications for schools in Wales, 2021.
649 Wales Institute for Social and Economic Research and Data, COVID-19 and school closures, 2020.
650 Welsh Government, Recruit, recover, raise standards: the accelerating learning programme, 2020.
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Bangladeshi heritage spent significantly less time than their peers on schoolwork at 
home during lockdown. Those with additional needs and pupils with difficult home 
environments did not always receive adequate support.652
The Welsh Government’s approach prioritises the needs of such vulnerable and 
disadvantaged learners. Guidance focuses on how to accelerate learning for 
disadvantaged groups, and contingency planning for the reopening of schools in 
September 2020 was designed to benefit them specifically.653, 654
Plans to develop digital resilience were also put in place as part of COVID-19 
recovery.655 Despite attempts to mitigate the impact of ‘learning loss’ particularly on 
disadvantaged learners, early findings suggest that digital provision has been “patchy 
and inconsistent”, with Wales not mandating a minimum number of daily hours of 
remote learning. The Future Generations Commissioner in Wales has called for a 
clearer national approach, greater consistency and stronger leadership. Many students 
continued to experience a blended model of learning when schools reopened; the 
Welsh Government and delivery partners must carefully evaluate and monitor new 
modes of learning developed in light of school closures to ensure they do not increase 
educational inequalities.656 The need for consistency of standards and approach here 
reflects concerns about curriculum reform more generally. Inconsistent provision is 
likely to impact on disadvantaged learners the most. Clarity and guidance for parents 
(and children) on digital learning is essential, so that less advantaged learners and low-
income families do not lose out.657
The widening of the attainment gap between pupils mirrors the UK-wide pattern  
but is likely to be more profound in Wales due to the nation’s underlying  
socio-economic profile.
652 Wales Centre for Public Policy, The education response to coronavirus: Implications for schools in Wales, 2021.
653 Welsh Government, Guidance for supporting vulnerable and disadvantaged learners, 2020.
654 Welsh Government, Survey of effect of COVID-19 on learners (2020): Results summary, 2021.
655 Welsh Government, Enhancing digital resilience in Education: An action plan for children and young people in Wales, 2020.
656 Wales Centre for Public Policy, The education response to coronavirus: Implications for schools in Wales, 2021.
657 BBC, COVID-19 in Wales: Online education ‘patchy and inconsistent’, Accessed June 2021.
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Despite best efforts, educational inequalities in Wales will continue to increase in line 
with current trends, according to the predictions of academics and education experts. 
This will damage the prospects for future social mobility.658, 659 The widening of the 
attainment gap between pupils mirrors the UK-wide pattern but is likely to be more 
profound in Wales due to the nation’s underlying socio-economic profile.660, 661 
Employment
In Wales, unemployment among those from working class backgrounds has generally 
been higher than in the rest of the UK (figure 5.5). The pre-COVID-19 reduction may 
have been influenced by demography, as people who had been economically inactive 
since deindustrialisation in the 1980s became pensioners.662 
658 ITV, Experts warn of ‘long term damage’ to education due to school closures, 2020.
659 Education Policy Institute, Education policy responses across the UK to the pandemic, 2020.
660 ITV, Experts warn of ‘long term damage’ to education due to school closures, 2020.
661 Wales Institute of Social and Economic Research and Data, COVID-19 and school closures, 2020.
662 Bevan Foundation, unpublished analysis by Dr Steffan Evans.
Figure 5.5: Unemployment rate of people from working class backgrounds across the 












Source: SMC Analysis of Labour Force Survey (ONS)
Notes: People age 16 to 64. UK: margin of error varies from 0.3% to 0.5% for individual statistics; England: margin of error varies 
from 0.2% to 0.3% for individual statistics; Northern Ireland: Margin of error varies from 0.6% to 1.1% for individual statistics, so 
changes across individual years should be treated with caution. Scotland: margin of error varies from 0.6% to 0.9% for individual 
statistics, so changes across individual years should be treated with caution; Wales: margin of error varies from 0.8% to 1.2% for 
individual statistics, so changes across individual years should be treated with caution. See Appendix Table B3 for sample sizes and 
95% confidence intervals
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Overall, unemployment rates in Wales have fallen for all socio-economic groups since 
2016. Other than in 2020, those from working class backgrounds had the highest levels 
of unemployment (figure 5.6).
663 Welsh Government, Prosperity for all: economic action plan, 2017.
664 Welsh Government, Employability plan, 2018.
665 Welsh Government, Prosperity for All: economic action plan, 2017.
666 Carnegie Trust, Making Wales a fair work nation, 2019. 
667 Welsh Government, Employability plan progress report, 2018.
668 Welsh Government, The valleys taskforce, 2016-2021: a final report, 2021.




















Source: SMC Analysis of Labour Force Survey (ONS)
Notes: People aged 16 to 64. Margin of error varies from 0.3% to 0.5% for individual statistics; see Appendix Table B3 for sample 
sizes and 95% confidence intervals. Those who are on the COVID-19 Job Retention Scheme (furlough) are not classed as 
unemployed and so are not included
The Welsh Government Economic Action Plan, launched in 2017, prioritises inclusive 
growth, enterprise, and creating more and better-quality jobs supported by an 
employability plan.663 The employability plan, published in 2018 and updated since, 
prepares Wales for a radically different world of work.664 The approach is about 
developing skills for the future, supporting those furthest from the labour market, 
developing initiatives to tackle in-work poverty and supporting job progression.665
This approach was having some impact before COVID-19.666 In autumn 2019, progress 
was being reported on economic opportunity, employability and equality.667 Valleys 
Taskforce initiatives, like the Peer-to-Peer Entrepreneurs Network and better-targeted 
business support, suggest that tailored support has potential.668 Ongoing investment 
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in social enterprise infrastructure has also enabled dynamic growth. By 2020, 
2,000 social enterprises employing 55,000 people contributed over £3 billion to the 
Welsh economy.669
The Welsh Government’s Economic Contract is at the heart of its approach to providing 
business support, giving priority to businesses which commit to its core principles, 
including fair work, the Living Wage and promoting wellbeing. The Foundational 
Economy Fund Challenge fund piloted projects to support ‘fair work’ and local jobs.670
Place-based regeneration programmes trialled initiatives to solve poverty and promote 
economic growth.671 The ‘Transforming Towns’ programme and other regeneration 
initiatives have invested in towns, coastal communities and rural areas and are 
instrumental in supporting jobs close to home, especially in deprived areas.672 
The impact of COVID-19 on employment
An estimated 250,000 jobs in Wales – one in five – are in the sectors most impacted 
by measures to slow the spread of the virus, or where most businesses were forced 
to reduce trading or close altogether.
Post-COVID-19, Wales is likely to be more exposed than other parts of the UK to rising 
unemployment levels.673 An estimated 250,000 jobs in Wales – one in five – are in the 
sectors most impacted by measures to slow the spread of the virus, or where most 
businesses were forced to reduce trading or close altogether; if a quarter of those 
workers lost their job, it would mean that unemployment levels would surpass those 
seen under the last recession.674
Young people, women and those with the lowest qualification levels are most likely 
to lose their jobs as a result of the crisis, including those with lower qualifications in 
low-paid, low-skilled, ‘fragile’ employment, and those already facing labour market 
disadvantages, including disabled people, ethnic minorities and other minority 
groups.675, 676, 677
669 Wales Cooperative Centre, Transforming Wales through social enterprise: 10 year vision and action plan, 2020.
670 Welsh Government, The valleys taskforce 2016 to 2021: final report, 2021.
671 Welsh Government, Transforming Towns: support to improve towns, 2018.
672 Ibid.
673 Learning and Work Institute, Understanding the potential impact of coronavirus in Wales, 2020.
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675 Ibid.
676 Joseph Rowntree Foundation, Poverty in Wales 2020, 2020.
677 Equality and Human Rights Commission, Rebuilding a more equal and fairer Wales: focus on the unequal impact of the coronavirus pandemic, 
2020.
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By March 2021, the ‘COVID-19 Commitment’ had supported 22,000 individuals with 
careers advice and guidance through Working Wales. Community Employability 
Programmes had supported 9,000 people, with nearly 4,000 entering employment 
during the pandemic; 6,000 people applied for a Personal Learning Account, 2,000 
ReAct vocational training grants were awarded, and 1,300 Apprentices were recruited 
via employer incentives.678
Digital skills is one area where generally insufficient progress was brought into sharp 
focus during the pandemic.679, 680 Digital exclusion – problems of access, confidence, 
resources and capability – and data poverty proved major challenges, especially for 
low-income workers and job-seekers.681 The Welsh Government responded by topping 
up the UK offer with digital resources, and £500 additional payments for social care.682 
Additional investment in the Digital Communities Wales infrastructure included adapting 
Communities for Work and Communities for Work Plus services to provide people 
with digital access, resources and support to develop skills and keep learning and 
job-hunting.683
A decade on from the 2011 Digital Wales strategy, employers report that digital 
skills gaps are still holding back innovation, productivity and growth.684, 685 The 2021 
employability plan prioritises developing digital confidence and skills, to increase the 
employability and competitiveness of low-skilled, unskilled and young people.686, 687
678 Welsh Government, Written statement: Employability plan annual statement 2021, 2021. 
679 Learning and Work Institute, Disconnected? Exploring the digital skills gap, 2021.
680 Wales Cooperative Centre, From Inclusion to Resilience: An agenda for digital inclusion, 2021.
681 Nesta, Data poverty in Scotland and Wales, 2021.
682 Welsh Government, First Minister of Wales announces £500 extra payment for care staff, 2020.
683 Welsh Government, Digital Communities Wales: Digital confidence, health and well-being: Process evaluation and theory of change, 2021.
684 Welsh Government, Digital Wales: Delivery plan delivering a digital Wales, 2011.
685 Learning and Work Institute, Disconnected? Exploring the digital skills gap, 2021.
686 Welsh Government, Written Statement: Employability Plan Annual Statement 2021, 2021.
687 Wales Cooperative Centre, From Inclusion to Resilience: An agenda for digital inclusion, 2021.




Josie Eddy, 25, from Treorchy in the 
Rhondda Fawr valley area of Wales, 
was in her final year of school when 




After going through family difficulties, she had been arguing a lot with her parents and 
became involved in an emotionally abusive relationship.
“It was unplanned. I was in a rough part of my life at that time. I went into the 
wrong crowd and met someone that was not my normal type”
After making the brave decision to leave the relationship, Josie lived with her parents 
and received benefits. 
“I was pretty good at saving stuff, but I wanted to do stuff for my child myself. 
That’s why I was thinking, how am I going to go to work and pay for my child 
myself, not off everybody else?”
But looking for work as a single mum in Treorchy was difficult. 
“Not many jobs around in the valleys. They’re more in the cities, which would 
be Cardiff or Swansea, so there’s basically travel to work unless you’re lucky 
enough to have a job in say a Co-op or a little shop on the corner or in the 
high street.”
Josie also struggled with leaving her baby with others. 
“I felt bad for leaving him with someone else. I was scared other people would 
take him away.”
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A youth worker noticed that she was finding life challenging and referred her to the 
Prince’s Trust Explore programme, which helps 16-25-year olds re-engage in education, 
training or employment through confidence-building activities. 
“I had a three-day residential over the weekend. Three days without my son 
and sleeping without my son. That was the biggest accomplishment I’d ever 
done, and that made me realise I am Josie; not just a mother.”
The course also made Josie realise she wanted to be a youth worker, and now she 
is employed by the Youth Engagement Participation Service in Treorchy. In 2020, 
she won Volunteer of the Year and was also a finalist for Volunteer of the Year in 
England and Wales.
Juggling parenthood and work can be hard. 
With the youth work, it’s mainly nights. My mum works 
full-time and my dad works shifts, so they could look after 
my son for me while I go out in the night two or three times 
a week, but I’m finding it more hard to have day jobs as he’s 
in school now. I don’t drive, so I have to think about travel. 
Then having to get him from school, which is 3pm, which my 
mother and father can’t do. You do cope with it.
Despite all this, Josie is clear she loves her job. 
“Having my son and being finalists for these awards were the best 
achievements of my life.”
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Poverty and living standards
31% of children in Wales live in poverty – more than one in five in every  
local authority
Poverty in Wales remains stubbornly persistent.688 There has been limited progress in 
reducing child poverty in Wales for over a decade. The modest positive trends prior to 
2015 went into reverse in Wales before the pandemic, as predicted, because of UK 
government tax and welfare reforms.689, 690 The child poverty rate in Wales is higher than 
that seen in Scotland and Northern Ireland and about the same as seen in England 
(figure 5.7): 31% of children in Wales live in poverty – more than one in five in every 
local authority.691 In Wales, 71% of children living in poverty between 2017 and 2020 
lived in working households, and this figure has been steadily increasing in recent 
years.692 Wales, alongside London and the north of England, has the highest levels of 
in-work poverty compared to other areas of the UK.693 
Wales, alongside London and the north of England, has the highest levels of in-work 
poverty compared to other areas of the UK.
688 Wales Centre for Public Policy, Review of poverty in Wales, Coming in 2021.
689 Equalities and Human Rights Commission, Is Wales fairer 2018?, 2018.
690 Wales Institute of Social and Economic Research, Poverty in Wales: are we getting the full picture?, 2018.
691 Welsh Government, Households below average income, 2021.
692 Welsh Government, Children in relative income poverty by economic status of household, Accessed June 2021.
693 Institute for Public Policy Research, No longer managing, 2021.
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Figure 5.7: Percentage of children in poverty across the United Kingdom (after housing 
















































































































Source: Department for Work and Pensions, Households below average income for financial years 1995 to 2020, 2021
Note: This is based on a poverty line defined as 60% of the contemporary median after deducting housing costs
694 Welsh Government, Child poverty strategy for Wales, 2015.
695 BBC, No end to child poverty by 2020, Welsh Government says, Accessed June 2021.
696 Welsh Government, Child poverty: income maximisation action plan 2020 to 2021, 2021.
697 Ibid.
698 Joseph Rowntree Foundation, Briefing: Poverty in Wales, 2020.
699 Learning and Work Institute Understanding the potential impact of coronavirus in Wales, 2020.
700 Joseph Rowntree Foundation, Briefing: Poverty in Wales, 2020.
The focus of the 2015 Child Poverty Strategy and Action Plan, refreshed in 2020, has 
been to tackle worklessness, increase employability and skills, address inequalities, 
maximise income and alleviate the effects of welfare reform and aggressive fiscal 
consolidation.694, 695, 696 Family support initiatives have aimed to improve health, training 
and employment opportunities. 
In March 2020, the Welsh Government concluded its review of programmes to ensure 
they have maximum impact on child poverty in Wales and, as a result of this work, 
published the Child Poverty Income Maximisation Plan; however, this in many ways 
continues the approach taken since 2015.697 Given the risk of a significant spike in child 
poverty, a more radical approach is needed; it is vital that the Child Poverty Strategy 
is refreshed.
The number and proportion of people living in poverty is expected to have increased 
further due to the pandemic.698, 699 Higher poverty rates in poorer areas are anticipated. 
People working in certain low-paying sectors will be hit worse by job losses, pushing 
them and their children further into poverty.700 
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Without further investment, poverty, and child poverty in particular, look set to increase 
significantly. This will have adverse impacts on living standards and poverty rates in 
general, and especially on children’s life chances and prospects for social mobility. 
The Welsh Government’s tax-raising powers mean there is potential to invest in a 
more redistributive system to mitigate child poverty and enhance prospects for social 
mobility for lower socio-economic groups, ensuring investment in the life chances of 
future generations.
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Conclusion
Wales is a small nation faced with an unprecedented challenge, created by COVID-19. 
Its social and community infrastructure put it at a significant advantage when the 
pandemic struck.701 The Welsh Government responded flexibly, supporting economic 
resilience and targeting additional funds at those hardest hit. Yet COVID-19 also 
exposed how easily and swiftly limited progress could be undone, with adverse 
consequences for future generations. Continued investment in the early years, young 
people, and the most disadvantaged is vital as Wales builds back.
Political commitment to solving poverty and inequalities remains a crucial part of 
Wales’ focus, alongside community resilience, compassion and fairness.702 The newly 
elected Welsh Government is rightly prioritising national post-pandemic recovery and 
rebuilding, with a firm focus on the wellbeing of future generations. Learning lessons 
around governance and delivery, to close the gap between ambition and impact, will be 
critical.703, 704 The debate on spending and tax priorities in Wales is likely to rise up the 
agenda in the next five years. 
Wales will require unprecedented levels of UK Government investment to enhance the 
Welsh national offer, and it needs to ensure that it gets a fair share of resources from 
the UK Shared Prosperity Fund (UKSPF) that replaces EU funding in 2022. Political 
debate about how much control the Welsh Government has over the fund is likely 
to become pressing. There is concern that the UKSPF could recentralise power to 
Westminster, severely limiting and undermining the ability of Wales to shape its future.705 
As a minimum, Wales should have the leverage it had with EU funding.706
As Wales enters into a third decade of devolution, and emerges from the pandemic, the 
Senedd and the Welsh Government have a unique opportunity to use devolved powers 
to pursue a bold vision for change. The WFGA – combined with the socio-economic 
duty and Wales’ tax-raising powers – gives the Senedd and the Welsh Government 
the power to invest in measures which promote social mobility. It is vital that, following 
the pandemic, Wales uses these policy tools and its devolved leverage to tackle the 
profound obstacles to social mobility the nation faces.707
701 Education Policy Institute and Nuffield Foundation, Education policy responses across the UK to the pandemic, 2020. 
702 Equality and Human Rights Commission, Rebuilding a more equal and fairer Wales: focus on the unequal impact of the coronavirus pandemic, 
2020.
703 Wales Centre for Public Policy, WCPP evidence briefing papers, 2021.
704 Wales Centre for Public Policy, Building back better? Priorities for reconstruction after the coronavirus pandemic, 2021.
705 Minto, R. and Parken, A., The European Union and regional gender equality agendas: Wales in the shadow of Brexit, 2020.
706 Institute for Government, The Sewel convention, 2020.
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Annex A – Glossary
Absolute poverty This is one measure of poverty (see also Relative poverty). 
A household is in absolute poverty if its income is below 60% 
of the average (median) net household income as it was in 
2010/11. This threshold stays the same over time – it does not 
adjust for changes in average income.
Many experts, including us, prefer the relative poverty 
measure, because it shows the number of households 
significantly below today’s normal living standards. In 
contrast, the UK’s absolute poverty measure becomes 
increasingly out of date over time.
Absolute social mobility This is the idea that you have a good chance to do better than 
your parents, especially in terms of occupation and income. 
Absolute mobility rates look at the proportion of the 
population who are in different positions (occupational class 
or income) from their parents, and are usually given as a 
simple percentage. 
For example, a person experiences upward absolute income 
mobility if their income is greater than their parents’ income.
They experience upward absolute occupational mobility if 
their occupation class is higher than their parents’. Absolute 
social mobility increases if more and more people do better 
than their parents.
Advanced Higher exams Exams taken by students around 16-18 years of age after 
the completion of their main university entrance qualification 
in Scotland.
Apprenticeships A work-based training system, where apprentices earn 
a qualification after completing a blended mix of study 
and work.
Apprentices must complete 20% of their training off the job, 
be paid the apprenticeship minimum wage (£3.70/hr for those 
aged 19 and over) and pass an end point assessment.
Attainment Scotland Fund A targeted initiative focused on closing the attainment gap 
between the most and least advantaged children in Scotland.
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Attainment 8 Attainment 8, a measure used in England, gives a student’s 
average grade at Key Stage 4 (when pupils are generally 
aged 16) across eight subjects. The same subjects count 
towards Progress 8. The eight subjects fit into three groups:
English and maths. These are double-weighted, which means 
they count twice. 
Three further qualifications which count for the English 
Baccalaureate (EBacc). 
Three further qualifications from the ‘open group’ which is 
any remaining GCSEs and other approved academic, arts or 
vocational qualifications. It can include qualifications which 
count for the EBacc. 
A student’s Attainment 8 score is calculated by adding up their 
points for their eight subjects and dividing by 10. Students 
score zero for any unfilled slots.
Children and Young People 
(Scotland) Act 2014
This Act was passed by the Scottish Parliament on 19 
February 2014 and received Royal Assent on 27 March 2014. 
The legislation is a key part of the Scottish Government’s 
strategy for making Scotland the best place in the world for 
children to grow up and establishes a new legal framework 
within which services are to work together in support of 
children, young people and families.
Class pay gap The difference in average pay between people from different 
class backgrounds.
Convention of Scottish Local 
Authorities (COSLA)
COSLA is a councillor-led cross-party organisation which 
was established in 1975 to champion councils’ vital work to 
secure the resources and powers they need, focus on the 
challenges and opportunities they face, engage positively with 
governments and others on policy, funding and legislation.
Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme 
(CJRS)
A scheme offered by the UK Government to provide grants to 
employers to ensure that they can retain and continue to pay 
staff, despite the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic.
COVID-19 FE/HE Student Hardship 
Taskforce
The Scottish Government established this to assess the 
impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on student hardship and to 
determine if the mechanisms and measures currently in place 
are enough to mitigate against student hardship in further 
(FE) and higher education (HE).
Developing the Young Workforce 
(DYW)
The Scottish Government’s Youth Employment strategy to 
better prepare young people for the world of work.
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Digital exclusion Digital exclusion refers to the lack of internet access, digital 
devices or skills that prevents people from effectively 
engaging with digital services and environments.
Early years The period in a child’s life between birth and five years of age.
Early years foundation stage The early years foundation stage (EYFS) sets standards in 
England for the learning, development and care of a child 
from birth to 5 years old. All schools and Ofsted-registered 
early years providers must follow the EYFS, including 
childminders, preschools, nurseries and school reception 
classes. There are different early years standards in Scotland, 
Wales and Northern Ireland.
Economically inactive Individuals that are out of work and not looking for a job. 
Reasons for this include: sickness, looking after family, and 
being a student, amongst other reasons.
English Baccalaureate (EBacc) The English Baccalaureate (EBacc) is a school performance 
measure in England, derived from GCSE results. It uses the 
average score from GCSE grades in specified subjects: 
• English language and English literature
• Mathematics
• Either combined science or three of biology, chemistry, 
computer science, and physics
• Either a modern or an ancient foreign language
• Geography or history.
Fairer Scotland Action Plan Came out of the Fairer Scotland conversations in 2015 and 
consists of 50 actions to help tackle poverty, reduce inequality 
and build a fairer and more inclusive Scotland.
Fair Start Scotland A flexible employment support service in Scotland that helps 
to find the right jobs. It is a voluntary programme delivered in 
Glasgow and the Highlands and Islands which offers tailored 
support for up to 12 months.
Fair Work: action plan A document which sets out the strategic approach the 
Scottish Government is taking to help achieve the 2025 vision 
for Fair Work.
Foundation phase The statutory curriculum for all 3- to 7-year-olds in Wales.
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Furlough The word ‘furlough’ generally means temporary leave of 
absence from work. This can be due to economic conditions 
affecting one company, or matters affecting the whole country.
Furlough leave in 2020 temporarily provided employers who 
were severely affected by coronavirus with an option to keep 
employees on the payroll without them working at all. Under 
the flexible extensions to the furlough scheme (from July 2020 
onwards) employees could either cease working completely 
or work reduced hours. As the staff on furlough are kept on 
the payroll, this is different to being laid off without pay, being 
made redundant or becoming unemployed.
Further education Typically refers to classroom-based learning at Further 
Education (FE) colleges or providers. Students can start at 
age 14 or 16, depending on the college.
GCSE, General Certificate of 
Secondary Education
The GCSE is an academic qualification taken in England, 
Wales, and Northern Ireland, normally at the age of 16. 
State schools in Scotland use the Scottish Qualifications 
Certificate instead.
Higher Exams One of the national school-leaving certificate exams in the 
Scottish secondary education system and can be referred to 
as ‘Highers’.
Students can normally study four or five Highers, the Scottish 
curriculum allows for this to be sat over one to two years 
which can lead to university, further study, training or work.
Income mobility See Social mobility, Absolute social mobility and Relative 
social mobility.
Intermediate (occupations) See NS-SEC.
Key Stage 1 The two years of schooling in England and Wales described 
as Year 1 and 2, when pupils are aged between 5 and 8.
Key Stage 2 The four years of schooling in England and Wales described 
as Year 3, Year 4, Year 5 and Year 6, when pupils are aged 
between 7 and 11. Key Stage 2 SATs (standard admissions 
tests) are taken by pupils aged 11 at the end of Year 6, which 
is, usually, the final year in primary school.
Key Stage 3 The three years of schooling in England and Wales known as 
Year 7, Year 8 and Year 9, when pupils are aged between 11 
and 14.
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Key Stage 4 The two years of schooling in England known as Year 10 
and Year 11, when pupils are aged between 14 and 16. 
Most pupils take their final general certificate of secondary 
education (GCSE) exams at the end of Year 11.
Key Stage 5 The two years of schooling in England and Wales known 
as Year 12 and Year 13, when pupils are aged between 16 
and 18. Typical qualifications studied for during this time are 
A-levels and BTEC Level 3 courses. T Levels are expected to 
be the gold standard of new vocational courses offered at Key 
Stage 5 from 2020.
Lad o’pairts A Scottish term for a youth, particularly one from a humble 
background, who is considered talented or promising.
National minimum wage The minimum wage that an employer must pay its workforce. 
For those aged over 25, it is currently set at £8.91, an amount 
known as the “National Living Wage”. There are lower 
National Minimum Wages amounts for younger people. In this 
report, this is referred to as the minimum wage.
National Transition Training Fund The £25 million fund aims to tackle the rise in employment 
caused by COVID-19 by helping people to identify relevant 
employment and training opportunities in Scotland.
Nine Challenge Authorities The Scottish Government Attainment challenge focuses on 
these nine authorities: North Ayrshire, Dundee, Inverclyde, 
West Dunbartonshire, Clackmannanshire, North Lanarkshire, 
East Ayrshire and Renfrewshire. These are the nine local 
councils with the highest concentrations of deprivation in 
Scotland.
No detriment policy ‘No detriment’ is the principle that when there is significant 
and unavoidable disruption to studies, students are not 
disadvantaged by receiving grades that are lower than 
might otherwise be expected. The approach to applying ‘no 
detriment’ varies across institutions.
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NS-SEC, the National Statistics 
Socio-economic Classification
This is the best national measure to monitor occupational 
social mobility. We define an individual’s socio-economic 
background according to the occupation of their higher 
earning parent:
• Professional/managerial: NS-SEC 1 and 2 – managerial 
and professional. Examples include CEOs, senior police 
officers, doctors, journalists, barristers, solicitors, teachers 
and nurses.
• Intermediate: NS-SEC 3 and 4. Examples include: 
shopkeepers, paramedics, and police officers. 
• Working class: NS-SEC 5, 6, and 7 – routine and manual. 
Examples include receptionists, electricians, plumbers, 
butchers and van drivers.
Occupational mobility See Social mobility, Absolute social mobility and Relative 
social mobility. 
Ofsted (The Office for Standards 
in Education, Children’s Services 
and Skills)
The education and skills inspectorate, and both regulator and 
inspectorate of services which provide care for children and 
young people.
Poverty and Inequality Commission An advisory non-departmental public body established from 
1 July 2019, which provides independent advice and scrutiny 




Pupil Premium A sum of money given by the UK government to schools in 
England to improve the attainment of disadvantaged children.
Pupil Equity Funding Funds to help Scottish schools support children who 
experience barriers to learning and might not be getting 
the same chances in their education because their family is 
experiencing poverty and other financial difficulties.
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Relative poverty This is one measure of poverty (also see Absolute poverty). A 
household is in relative poverty if its income is below 60% of 
the average (median) net household income in the same year. 
In other words, the pound amount of the poverty line changes 
each year based on current average income in the country.
Many experts, including us, prefer the relative poverty 
measure, because it shows the number of households 
significantly below today’s normal living standards. In 
contrast, the UK’s absolute poverty measure becomes 
increasingly out of date over time.
We can look at relative poverty in two ways: before and after 
housing costs. We look at poverty after housing costs to see 
how much households have in disposable income. Ignoring 
the cost of housing means you only have half of the picture of 
financial pressures on struggling households. Since housing 
costs have spiralled over the past 25 years (increasing by 
almost half in real terms for private tenants), and because 
housing costs differ dramatically across the country, it makes 
a real difference to families’ disposable income.
Relative social mobility This is the idea that your parents’ position in society doesn’t 
determine your position in society, especially in terms of 
occupational class and income.
Relative mobility rates compare the chances that people from 
different backgrounds have of ending up with a particular 
occupational class or income. They are usually given as a 
ratio or a similar statistic (such as a slope in a regression 
model). For example, we note in this report that people from 
a professional background are 60% more likely to be in a 
professional job.
Relative occupational mobility is low if almost everyone ends 
up in the same occupational class as their parents. Relative 
income mobility is low if almost everyone ends up in a similar 
place in the income distribution as their parents – for example, 
if parents in the bottom decile of earnings have children that 
mostly end up in the bottom decile of earnings. 
While absolute and relative social mobility often go together, 
they are not the same concept. For example, if a society 
creates more professional jobs, absolute occupational mobility 
should improve. But if most of these professional jobs go to 
people from professional backgrounds, relative social mobility 
may remain static.
SATs A common term for tests taken at the end of Key Stage 1 and 
the end of Key Stage 2 in England.
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Secondary 3 Also known as S3, it is the third year of schooling in Scottish 
secondary schools and is roughly equivalent to Year 10 in 
England and Wales and Year 11 in Northern Ireland. Most 
pupils are 14 or 15 years old at the end of S3.
Scottish Framework for Fair Access This framework was designed to produce a step change in 
knowledge about which interventions designed to promote 
fairer access to higher education work best.
This framework has two pillars. Firstly, a toolkit to assess the 
effectiveness of existing interventions to promote fair access 
and secondly, the establishment of Scotland’s Community of 
Access and Participation Practitioners (SCAPP).
Scotland’s National Performance 
Framework (NPF)
This framework which pertains to Scotland provides a vision 
for national wellbeing across a range of economic, social and 
environmental factors. It aims to:
• Create a more successful country.
• Give opportunities to all people living in Scotland.
• Increase the wellbeing of people living in Scotland.
• Create sustainable and inclusive growth.
• Reduce inequalities and give equal importance to 
economic, environmental and social progress.
Social mobility This is the idea that where you start in life shouldn’t determine 
your future, and that you have a good chance to do better 
than your parents. To measure it, we look at what occupation 
or income your parents had and what occupation or income 





Tackling Child Poverty Delivery 
Plan
The plan is focused on reaffirming rights and entitlements and 
reflects the Scottish Government’s commitment to ‘inclusive 
growth’, aiming to provide a foundation of entitlements that 
tackles poverty and leaves no one behind.
Technical education The academic and vocational education of students for jobs 
that usually include an applied element.
The Fairer Scotland Duty This is an interim guidance for public bodies which came 
into force from April 2018. It places a legal responsibility on 
specific public bodies in Scotland to actively consider how 
they can reduce inequalities of outcome caused by socio-
economic disadvantage when making strategic decisions.
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The Fair Work Convention (April 
2015)
This convention which acts as an independent advisory body 
to Scottish ministers, came into force in April 2015.
The convention’s vision is that, by 2015, people in Scotland 
will have a world-leading working life where fair work drives 
success, wellbeing and prosperity for individuals, businesses, 
organisation and society.
The Scotland Act 1998 An Act of the Parliament of the United Kingdom which 
legislated for the establishment of a devolved Scottish 
Parliament with tax varying powers and made provision for a 
Scottish Government of ministers.
The Scotland Act 2016 This is an Act of the Parliament of the United Kingdom which 
sets out amendments to the Scotland Act 1998 and devolves 
further powers to Scotland.
The Scottish Attainment Challenge The First Minister of Scotland launched the Scottish 
Attainment Challenge in February 2015 to bring a greater 
sense of urgency to tackling inequity, which is at the heart 
of the Scottish Government’s agenda. It aims to raise the 
attainment of children and young people in deprived areas, 
to close the equity gap, foster improvements in educational 
outcomes and ensure that everyone is encouraged to be the 
best they can be.
The Scottish Government’s 
devolved employment support 
service
Provides intensive and individualised employability support to 
people facing challenges in accessing work across Scotland.
The Young Person’s Guarantee Offers young people in Scotland a connection to the following 
opportunities:
• An apprenticeship.
• Fair employment including work experience.
• Participating in a formal volunteering programme.
• Training.
• Going to university or college.
UCAS The Universities and Colleges Admissions Service – a non-
profit organisation which conducts the application process for 
UK universities.
(UKSPF) UK Shared Prosperity 
Fund
A new fund to replace the structural funding which the UK 
received as a member of the European Union. The UK 
government has stated that the purpose of the fund is to 
tackle inequalities between communities.
Working class occupations See NS-SEC.
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Annex B – Methodology
This report uses socio-economic background questions within the UK Labour Force 
Survey (LFS) to provide comprehensive analysis of social mobility from 2014 to 2020. 
The LFS represents the largest survey of employment in the United Kingdom, with a 
sample of around 70,000 to 90,000 each quarter.
The survey has a rolling panel design over five waves, with one fifth entering the 
survey and one fifth leaving at each wave. The July to September wave has been used 
in each year for this analysis, as this has questions on socio-economic background, 
asking about the survey respondents’ parents in childhood. It asks about the household 
composition, the main wage earner (including if no parent was earning) and the 
occupation of the main wage earner when the respondent was 14. This has been 
included in each July-September wave since 2014, meaning that there is now seven 
years’ worth of data. However, where we’ve marked it in the report, we have had to pool 
data across multiple years to achieve sufficient sample sizes.
A quarterly main LFS dataset typically contains around 75,000 individuals. However, 
during the COVID-19 pandemic, from July to December 2020, the wave 1 LFS sample 
size was doubled in order to improve achieved sample sizes while response rates 
were impacted by the pause in face-to-face data collection. The change in the mode 
of collection also impacted on the weighting used in the survey and full details can 
be found in the ONS methodology1. Unweighted sample sizes for each of the charts 
included in the report are in the tables below.
The analysis of this report replicates and updates the analysis from our 2018 Statutory 
report for the UK and its constituent countries and therefore the main sample for this 
report is those aged 25-60 (175,387 respondents). The sample is expanded to cover 
16-64 year olds when looking at measures of economic activity (as this does not require 
a measure of own occupation). This increases the sample size to 229,810.
Sampling weights are used throughout the analysis. Income-related analysis in the 
report has been drawn from smaller samples, due to income not being captured in 
all waves of the survey. Income analysis also does not include individuals that are 
self-employed, as the LFS does not include earnings data for these individuals. Any 
figures that are shown on an annualised basis have been calculated by multiplying 
gross weekly earnings by the relevant multiplier. Earnings are only included for those 
classified as working full-time and where hourly wages are greater than zero, but less 
than £100 per hour. Income-related analysis makes use of the relevant income-related 
sampling weights, which differ from the standard weights. 
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Socio-economic background has largely been derived using occupational class in this 
report, the measure that sociologists traditionally favour. This is based on an individual’s 
National Statistic Socio-Economic Classification (NS-SEC), a measure which combines 
occupation with the degree of autonomy of the role and size of the employer. Mobility is 
calculated by looking at how a person’s NS-SEC compared to that of their main income-
earning parent.
The seven groups of NS-SEC have been simplified into three distinct groups:
Class title NS-SEC code
Professional and managerial 
occupations.
We call people whose 
parents were in this category 
‘advantaged’, ‘privileged’, 




Examples include CEOs, senior police 
officers, doctors, journalists, barristers, 
solicitors, teachers and nurses 
Intermediate occupations NS-SEC 3
NS-SEC 4
Examples include shopkeepers, paramedics, 
small business owners and police officers
Routine and manual occupations.
We call people whose parents 
were in this category ‘working 





Examples include receptionists, electricians, 
plumbers, butchers and van drivers
This matches the classification system proposed by ONS and used in the 2018-19 State 
of the Nation report. However, it differs slightly from the approach used in the academic 
literature, which treats NS-SEC 5 as part of the ‘Intermediate’ group.  This accounts for 
about 6-7% of individuals each year.
The Labour Force Survey already includes the NS-SEC classification for individuals’ 
own occupation. This report focuses on the occupation recorded at the same time 
as parental backgrounds (the July-September wave). Individuals who are studying 
full-time according to the NS-SEC classification or have a missing classification and are 
permanently retired are excluded from the analysis. Individuals who are not working for 
other reasons are included and treated as ‘Not working’.
To measure intergenerational occupational mobility, origin class has been created using 
information on the respondent’s main earning parent’s occupation when the respondent 
was 14. In particular, this report uses a simplified-method to compute NS-SEC based on 
the three-digit Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) code (SMSOC103), which is 
the most detailed variable included in the End User Licence version of the data.
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Individuals are excluded from the analysis where parental occupation is missing, 
uncertain or where parent(s) were not working. This applies to about 5% of cases. This 
matches the approach in the 2018-19 State of the Nation Report. This group is also 
often excluded or treated entirely separately in the academic literature given uncertainty 
about where they should be included in any occupational hierarchy.
Figure B1 below shows the share of individuals where parental background is missing 
or workless in different jobs. As can be seen, a relatively high share are in working 
class jobs (34% in 2020) which is slightly above the share of those from working 
class backgrounds in working class jobs (31% in 2020). A relatively low share are 
in professional jobs (about 30%), a lower share than from all other backgrounds. 
Around 15-20% of this group have a missing occupation or are out of work 
themselves over time. 
Figure B1: Proportion of people in the UK aged 25-60 with missing, unknown or 
workless backgrounds in different occupations.































Source: SMC Analysis of Labour Force Survey (ONS)
This work contains statistical data from ONS which is Crown Copyright. The use of the 
ONS statistical data in this work does not imply the endorsement of the ONS in relation 
to the interpretation or analysis of the statistical data. This work uses research datasets 
which may not exactly reproduce National Statistics aggregates.
Unweighted sample sizes for each of the charts included in the report are in the 
tables below.
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Appendix Table B1: Proportion of people aged 25-60 from different socio-economic 










2014 16.5% (15.8%, 
17.2%)
11,609 26.8% (25.8%, 
27.8%)
7,673 35.6% (34.8%, 
36.4%)
13,446
2015 17.1% (16.3%, 
17.8%)
9,587 27.7% (26.6%, 
28.8%)
6,179 34.9% (34.0%, 
35.8%)
10,771
2016 16.5% (15.7%, 
17.3%)
9,163 28.6% (27.4%, 
29.8%)
5,555 34.6% (33.7%, 
35.5%)
9,692
2017 16.3% (15.6%, 
17.0%)
9,644 26.9% (25.7%, 
28.0%)
5,721 35.1% (34.1%, 
36.0%)
9,980
2018 15.6% (14.9%, 
16.4%)
8,837 27.0% (25.8%, 
28.2%)
5,119 34.4% (33.4%, 
35.4%)
9,038
2019 15.7% (15.0%, 
16.5%)
9,451 26.1% (24.9%, 
27.3%)
5,492 32.3% (31.3%, 
33.3%)
9,002
2020 14.3% (13.5%, 
15.1%)
8,106 23.3% (22.0%, 
24.5%)




2014 16.4% (15.7%, 
17.2%)
10,003 26.1% (25.0%, 
27.2%)
6,277 34.9% (34.0%, 
35.8%)
11,084
2015 16.9% (16.1%, 
17.7%)
8,271 27.0% (25.8%, 
28.2%)
5,082 34.5% (33.6%, 
35.5%)
8,762
2016 16.0% (15.2%, 
16.8%)
7,870 28.4% (27.0%, 
29.7%)
4,473 33.7% (32.7%, 
34.8%)
7,761
2017 15.5% (14.7%, 
16.3%)
8,289 27.0% (25.8%, 
28.3%)
4,629 34.4% (33.3%, 
35.4%)
8,094
2018 14.8% (14.0%, 
15.6%)
7,467 26.3% (24.9%, 
27.6%)
4,113 33.7% (32.6%, 
34.8%)
7,208
2019 15.4% (14.6%, 
16.3%)
7,730 25.8% (24.5%, 
27.1%)
4,168 31.4% (30.3%, 
32.5%)
6,773
2020 13.8% (13.0%, 
14.6%)
6,804 23.6% (22.1%, 
25.0%)
3,367 30.1% (28.9%, 
31.3%)
5,583










2014 15.0% (11.9%, 
18.2%)
488 25.2% (20.8%, 
29.6%)
373 39.8% (36.0%, 
43.5%)
649
2015 18.3% (12.9%, 
23.8%)
377 33.6% (28.1%, 
39.0%)
291 39.2% (35.2%, 
43.2%)
573
2016 22.2% (16.4%, 
28.1%)
319 33.6% (27.8%, 
39.5%)
242 37.6% (33.4%, 
41.8%)
513
2017 20.6% (15.3%, 
25.9%)
342 34.2% (28.9%, 
39.5%)
268 33.5% (29.3%, 
37.8%)
482
2018 21.1% (15.4%, 
26.8%)
399 37.5% (31.7%, 
43.2%)
243 36.9% (32.7%, 
41.0%)
521
2019 14.9% (8.9%, 
20.8%)
368 39.5% (33.6%, 
45.4%)
215 36.8% (32.5%, 
41.1%)
478
2020 19.7% (14.4%, 
25.0%)
326 45.8% (40.5%, 
51.1%)




2014 17.4% (15.0%, 
19.8%)
924 32.3% (28.8%, 
35.8%)
685 39.2% (36.5%, 
41.8%)
1,306
2015 17.8% (15.1%, 
20.6%)
747 29.3% (25.3%, 
33.3%)
493 35.5% (32.5%, 
38.5%)
1,004
2016 18.1% (15.2%, 
21.0%)
693 29.5% (25.2%, 
33.8%)
441 39.5% (36.3%, 
42.7%)
892
2017 22.8% (19.8%, 
25.8%)
733 28.5% (24.3%, 
32.7%)
452 40.0% (36.8%, 
43.2%)
900
2018 21.1% (18.1%, 
24.2%)
672 30.9% (26.3%, 
35.5%)
391 37.7% (34.4%, 
41.1%)
806
2019 19.7% (16.8%, 
22.5%)
728 29.3% (24.9%, 
33.8%)
400 37.3% (33.9%, 
40.6%)
810
2020 17.0% (13.9%, 
20.0%)
587 23.2% (18.7%, 
27.8%)
332 35.0% (31.1%, 
38.9%)
566










2014 22.3% (16.4%, 
28.2%)
194 30.7% (25.8%, 
35.7%)
338 37.1% (32.4%, 
41.8%)
407
2015 19.7% (14.0%, 
25.3%)
192 31.7% (26.6%, 
36.9%)
313 35.3% (30.8%, 
39.8%)
432
2016 23.9% (18.9%, 
28.9%)
281 29.2% (24.8%, 
33.7%)
399 36.7% (32.5%, 
40.8%)
526
2017 18.8% (14.2%, 
23.4%)
280 21.1% (16.9%, 
25.2%)
372 40.6% (36.3%, 
44.9%)
504
2018 17.3% (13.0%, 
21.6%)
299 32.0% (27.2%, 
36.7%)
372 38.9% (34.7%, 
43.2%)
503
2019 15.5% (12.6%, 
18.3%)
625 25.8% (22.6%, 
29.0%)
709 33.5% (30.5%, 
36.5%)
941
2020 16.0% (12.3%, 
19.6%)
389 23.5% (19.3%, 
27.6%)
397 32.7% (28.6%, 
36.7%)
516
Note: 95% confidence intervals are shown in parentheses and sample sizes are unweighted. 
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Appendix Table B2: Proportion of people aged 25-60 from different socio-economic 


















































































































































































































































Note: 95% confidence intervals are shown in parentheses and sample sizes are unweighted. 
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Appendix Table B3: Unemployment rate for 16-64 year olds by socio-economic 









2014 4.8% (4.5%, 5.1%) 15,524 5.7% (-0.4%, 
6.1%)
10,002 6.6% (6.3%, 6.9%) 17,608
2015 4.5% (4.2%, 4.8%) 12,679 5.1% (-0.4%, 
5.5%)
8,035 5.9% (5.5%, 6.2%) 14,110
2016 4.2% (3.9%, 4.6%) 12,112 4.3% (4.6%, 4.7%) 7,240 5.5% (5.2%, 5.9%) 12,520
2017 3.9% (3.5%, 4.2%) 12,727 4.0% (4.0%, 4.4%) 7,371 4.8% (4.5%, 5.2%) 12,928
2018 3.9% (3.6%, 4.3%) 11,684 3.7% (3.6%, 4.1%) 6,652 4.8% (4.4%, 5.1%) 11,898
2019 3.8% (3.4%, 4.1%) 12,350 4.0% (3.5%, 4.4%) 7,013 4.2% (3.9%, 4.5%) 11,617
2020 5.7% (5.3%, 6.1%) 10,966 4.6% (3.6%, 5.0%) 5,614 4.9% (4.5%, 5.3%) 9,160
England (3yr moving average)
2014 n/a 13,306 n/a 8,192 n/a 14,535
2015 n/a 24,167 n/a 14,776 n/a 26,022
2016 3.6% (3.3%, 3.9%) 34,550 3.9% (3.4%, 4.4%) 20,593 4.6% (4.2%, 5.0%) 36,035
2017 3.3% (3.1%, 3.5%) 32,132 3.5% (3.2%, 3.8%) 18,359 4.1% (3.8%, 4.4%) 31,940
2018 3.3% (3.1%, 3.5%) 31,108 3.3% (3.0%, 3.6%) 17,112 4.0% (3.8%, 4.2%) 29,942
2019 3.2% (3.0%, 3.4%) 30,760 3.2% (2.9%, 3.5%) 16,580 3.6% (3.4%, 3.8%) 28,679
2020 3.7% (3.5%, 3.9%) 29,002 3.5% (3.2%, 3.8%) 15,034 3.7% (3.5%, 3.9%) 25,488
Wales (3yr moving average)
2014 n/a 684 n/a 482 n/a 867
2015 n/a 1,187 n/a 865 n/a 1,615
2016 6.3% (5.2%, 7.4%) 1,622 6.2% (5.0%, 7.4%) 1,181 7.2% (6.3%, 8.1%) 2,270
2017 5.7% (4.6%, 6.8%) 1,416 4.7% (3.6%, 5.8%) 1,051 6.6% (5.6%, 7.6%) 2,038
2018 5.0% (4.0%, 6.0%) 1,438 4.0% (2.9%, 5.1%) 995 5.3% (4.4%, 6.2%) 1,960
2019 3.8% (2.9%, 4.7%) 1,501 4.3% (3.1%, 5.5%) 962 4.7% (3.9%, 5.5%) 1,923
2020 4.8% (3.8%, 5.8%) 1,478 4.3% (3.1%, 5.5%) 881 4.7% (3.8%, 5.6%) 1,768






N Working Class 
Background
N
Scotland (3yr moving average)
2014 n/a 1,254 n/a 883 n/a 1,673
2015 n/a 2,284 n/a 1,533 n/a 2,993
2016 5.3% (4.6%, 6.0%) 3,200 5.2% (4.3%, 6.1%) 2,106 6.6% (5.9%, 7.3%) 4,151
2017 5.1% (4.4%, 5.8%) 2,919 5.3% (4.4%, 6.2%) 1,804 6.0% (5.3%, 6.7%) 3,666
2018 4.2% (3.5%, 4.9%) 2,816 3.8% (3.0%, 4.6%) 1,664 4.7% (4.1%, 5.3%) 3,435
2019 3.9% (3.3%, 4.5%) 2,893 3.8% (2.9%, 4.7%) 1,625 4.3% (3.7%, 4.9%) 3,307
2020 4.5% (3.8%, 5.2%) 2,742 3.4% (2.6%, 4.2%) 1,471 3.8% (3.2%, 4.4%) 2,874
Northern Ireland (3yr moving average)
2014 n/a 280 n/a 445 n/a 1,673
2015 n/a 565 n/a 863 n/a 2,993
2016 4.2% (3.1%, 5.3%) 943 6.3% (5.2%, 7.4%) 1,397 6.0% (5.1%, 6.9%) 4,151
2017 4.0% (3.0%, 5.0%) 1,051 5.6% (4.6%, 6.6%) 1,432 4.0% (3.3%, 4.7%) 3,666
2018 3.3% (2.4%, 4.2%) 1,161 3.6% (2.7%, 4.5%) 1,492 5.0% (4.2%, 5.8%) 3,435
2019 3.1% (2.4%, 3.8%) 1,607 2.4% (1.8%, 3.0%) 1,869 4.5% (3.8%, 5.2%) 3,307
2020 3.3% (2.6%, 4.0%) 1,778 2.5% (1.9%, 3.1%) 1,893 4.8% (4.1%, 5.5%) 2,874
Note: 95% confidence intervals are shown in parentheses and sample sizes are unweighted. Figures for England, Northern Ireland, 
Scotland and Wales individually are 3 year moving averages up to and including the year given (i.e. 2016 represents the average for 
2014-2016). 
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Appendix Table B4: Change in the share of individuals in paid work between 
September 2019 and September 2020 by own occupation and socio-economic 
background, unweighted sample sizes and 95% confidence intervals.
















(N 2020, N 2019) (10,886, 12,203) (5,025, 5,519) (1,586, 1,901) (1,087, 1,468)








(N 2020, N 2019) (5,564, 6,951) (2,028, 2,235) (1,021, 1,377) (940, 1,417)








(N 2020, N 2019) (9,084, 11,496) (2,768, 3,113) (1,587, 2,049) (2,064, 2,882)
Note: 95% confidence intervals are shown in parentheses and sample sizes are unweighted. 
Appendix Table B5: Median earnings in 2019 by occupational background and own 
















































Note: 95% confidence intervals are shown in parentheses using the bootstrap method with 500 repetitions. Sample sizes are 
unweighted. 
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Appendix Table B6: Proportion of men and women aged 25-60 from different socio-









2014 61.1% (59.8%, 62.4%) 5,350 33.8% (32.6%, 35.0%) 6,319
2015 59.2% (57.7%, 60.6%) 4,492 33.8% (32.5%, 35.1%) 5,031
2016 62.4% (61.0%, 63.8%) 4,383 35.1% (33.7%, 36.5%) 4,541
2017 60.5% (59.1%, 62.0%) 4,516 34.8% (33.4%, 36.1%) 4,710
2018 61.8% (60.3%, 63.2%) 4,146 35.4% (34.0%, 36.9%) 4,239
2019 64.0% (62.5%, 65.4%) 4,452 37.0% (35.6%, 38.5%) 4,323
2020 65.1% (63.6%, 66.6%) 3,762 39.9% (38.3%, 41.6%) 3,340
In Working Class Jobs
2014 17.7% (16.7%, 18.7%) 5,350 39.2% (38.0%, 40.4%) 6,319
2015 19.3% (18.2%, 20.5%) 4,492 38.4% (37.1%, 39.8%) 5,031
2016 18.0% (16.8%, 19.1%) 4,383 38.1% (36.7%, 39.5%) 4,541
2017 17.9% (16.8%, 19.0%) 4,516 39.5% (38.1%, 40.9%) 4,710
2018 16.9% (15.8%, 18.1%) 4,146 37.9% (36.4%, 39.3%) 4,239
2019 16.3% (15.3%, 17.4%) 4,452 36.2% (34.8%, 37.6%) 4,323
2020 15.2% (14.1%, 16.4%) 3,762 34.3% (32.7%, 35.9%) 3,340









2014 54.7% (53.5%, 56.0%) 6,259 30.3% (29.2%, 31.3%) 7,127
2015 53.0% (51.6%, 54.4%) 5,095 30.7% (29.5%, 31.9%) 5,740
2016 54.0% (52.6%, 55.5%) 4,780 31.7% (30.5%, 33.0%) 5,151
2017 54.8% (53.4%, 56.1%) 5,128 32.2% (30.9%, 33.4%) 5,270
2018 54.8% (53.4%, 56.2%) 4,691 34.1% (32.7%, 35.4%) 4,799
2019 55.5% (54.1%, 56.9%) 4,999 34.7% (33.3%, 36.1%) 4,679
2020 58.1% (56.6%, 59.6%) 4,344 36.2% (34.6%, 37.7%) 3,687
In Working Class Jobs
2014 15.4% (14.5%, 16.3%) 6,259 32.0% (30.9%, 33.1%) 7,127
2015 14.9% (13.9%, 15.9%) 5,095 31.6% (30.4%, 32.8%) 5,740
2016 15.0% (14.0%, 16.0%) 4,780 31.2% (29.9%, 32.5%) 5,151
2017 14.8% (13.8%, 15.7%) 5,128 30.7% (29.4%, 31.9%) 5,270
2018 14.3% (13.3%, 15.3%) 4,691 31.1% (29.7%, 32.4%) 4,799
2019 15.1% (14.2%, 16.1%) 4,999 28.3% (27.0%, 29.6%) 4,679
2020 13.4% (12.4%, 14.4%) 4,344 27.7% (26.3%, 29.2%) 3,687
Note: 95% confidence intervals are shown in parentheses and sample sizes are unweighted. 
Alternative Appendix Table B6: Proportion of men and women aged 25-60 from 
different socio-economic backgrounds in different occupations, unweighted sample 


















































Note: 95% confidence intervals are shown in parentheses. Sample sizes are unweighted. 
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Appendix Table B7: Change in the share of individuals in paid work between 
September 2019 and September 2020 by age group, gender and socio-economic 
background, unweighted sample sizes and 95% confidence intervals.
Men
All Age 16-24 Age 25-34 Age 35-49 Age 50-64










(N 2020, N 
2019)
(5,138, 5,788) (902, 967) (889, 1,181) (1,624, 1,894) (1,723, 1,746)











(N 2020, N 
2019)













(N 2020, N 
2019)
(4,342, 5,543) (433, 626) (525, 894) (1,239, 1,678) (2,145, 2,345)
Women












(N 2020, N 












(N 2020, N 













(N 2020, N 
2019) (4,742, 5,953) (382, 639) (647, 994) (1,365, 1,894) (2,348, 2,426)
Note: 95% confidence intervals are shown in parentheses and sample sizes are unweighted. 
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Appendix Table B8: Proportion of individuals with and without disabilities aged 25-60 
from different socio-economic backgrounds in different occupations, unweighted sample 
























































Note: 95% confidence intervals are shown in parentheses. Sample sizes are unweighted. 
Appendix Table B9: Percentage of people from different backgrounds in professional 
occupations by ethnicity (2014-20), sample sizes and 95% confidence intervals.
Professional  
Background
N Working Class 
Background
N
White 59.7% (59.3%, 60.1%) 58,290 34.1% (33.7%, 34.5%) 62,475
Chinese 64.8% (60.4%, 69.1%) 460 47.6% (41.4%, 53.9%) 247
Indian 62.1% (60.0%, 64.2%) 2,039 44.5% (41.9%, 47.1%) 1,444
Mixed Ethnicity 61.0% (57.5%, 64.5%) 743 39.6% (35.3%, 43.9%) 505
Black Caribbean 49.8% (44.6%, 55.0%) 353 34.3% (31.0%, 37.6%) 786
Other Ethnicity 49.7% (46.9%, 52.6%) 1,173 29.6% (26.5%, 32.8%) 798
Other Asian 48.8% (45.4%, 52.2%) 844 30.2% (26.2%, 34.2%) 506
Black African 44.3% (41.5%, 47.1%) 1,200 32.4% (28.6%, 36.1%) 599
Pakistani 36.4% (33.3%, 39.5%) 912 25.4% (22.9%, 27.9%) 1,151
Bangladeshi 33.2% (28.2%, 38.2%) 342 24.2% (20.1%, 28.3%) 417
Note: 95% confidence intervals are shown in parentheses using the bootstrap method with 500 repetitions. Sample sizes are 
unweighted. 
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Appendix Table B10: Change in the share of 16-24 year olds in different forms of 
economic activity between September 2019 and September 2020 by socio-economic 
background, unweighted sample sizes and 95% confidence intervals.
Paid 
Employment

















(N 2020, N 
2019)












(N 2020, N 
2019)














(N 2020, N 
2019)
(815, 1,265) (826, 1,291) (826, 1,291) (826, 1,291) (826, 1,291)
Note: 95% confidence intervals are shown in parentheses and sample sizes are unweighted. 
Additional methodological notes from charts in the main body of the text
Figure 2.7: Child income poverty rates (after housing costs) UK, England and by English 
regions – 1996/97-1998/99 to 2017/18-2019/20 (three-year moving averages).
• Figures are for the United Kingdom from 2002-03 to 2004-05 onwards. Earlier years 
are for Great Britain only.
• This report and tables use grossing factors based on 2011 Census data, so caution 
should be exercised when making comparisons with reports prior to 2012-13.
• The all children figures here are three-year averages and are therefore not directly 
comparable with the totals in the main tables.
• For the 2019-20 statistics, a minor methodological revision has been made to 
capture all income from child maintenance. This results in more income from child 
maintenance being included, in turn slightly increasing some household incomes 
and so tending to slightly reduce low income rates for families with children. The 
full back series (back to 1994-95) has been revised so that comparisons over time 
are on a consistent basis across the full time series. This also means that figures 
for 1994-95 to 2018-19 in this year’s publication (2019-20 statistics) may be slightly 
different to the equivalent figures in previous publications. Please refer to HBAI 
Quality & Methodology Report for more information.
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Annex C – National Benchmarks
In 2021, the Social Mobility Commission produced national benchmarks setting out 
what percentages of each of the socio-economic background categories (professional, 
intermediate and lower socio-economic background) are found in the working population 
(age 16+) and in different sectors.
These are aimed at employers, who can use them to see how their own diversity and 
inclusion of people from different socio-economic backgrounds compares with the 
national and sector socio-economic background benchmarks. These benchmarks can 
also be used to monitor social mobility trends over time.
The national benchmarks are not included in the main analysis of the report due to 
definitional differences. These include:
• At the time of producing the analysis for the report, only the three-digit SOC code 
(Standard Occupation Classification) version of the LFS was available. However, 
the Social Mobility Commission has more recently undertaken analysis to produce 
the national benchmarks using the four-digit SOC code. A review has found that 
using the four-digit codes provides additional detail and allows for a more accurate 
allocation of jobs to socio-economic profession.
• The analysis in the majority of this report is for those aged 25-60 to replicate our 
analysis for the 2018 State of the Nation report for the UK and its constituent 
countries. In comparison, the national benchmarks are for all those aged 16+.704
• In this report, individuals are excluded from the analysis where parental occupation 
is missing or uncertain, or where parent(s) were not working. This applies to 
about 5% of cases. This matches the approach in the 2018-19 State of the Nation 
report. Further information on this group can be found in Annex A. In our national 
benchmarks ‘those who have never worked’ when reporting parental background 
are included in the definition of ‘working class’, to target employer behaviour to 
address this subset of disadvantage. 
• 2019 data is used in the national benchmarks due to the uncertainty of the 2020 
data as a result of the pandemic and recognising that trends seen in 2020 may 
not continue.
Due to these differences, direct comparisons between the analysis in this report and the 
national benchmarks cannot be made at this time. However, the national benchmarks 
for each of the countries are included below for completeness.
Of those aged 16+ in the workforce in the UK, 37% came from professional 
backgrounds. This is a similar picture for England and Scotland. Northern Ireland and 
Wales have a smaller proportion of their workforce from professional backgrounds.
704  Social Mobility Commission, Simplifying how employers measure socio-economic background: An accompanying report to new guidance, 2021.
Social Mobility Commission | State of the nation 2021 | 221
Technical Annex
Figure C.1: National benchmark for the UK – socio-economic background of the overall 




Source: Office for National Statistics licensed under the Open Government Licence v.3.0
Note (applicable to all charts below): The National Statistics Socio-economic Classification (NS-SEC) distribution was identified 
by mapping the four-digit standard occupation classification (SOC) category (or occupation group) of the main wage earner when 
the survey respondent was 14 to NS-SEC. See annex B in this guidance for further information.
Figure C.2: National benchmark for England – socio-economic background of the 




Source: Office for National Statistics licensed under the Open Government Licence v.3.0
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Figure C.3: National benchmark for Northern Ireland – socio-economic background of 





Source: Office for National Statistics licensed under the Open Government Licence v.3.0 
Figure C.4: National benchmark for Scotland – socio-economic background of the 





Source: Office for National Statistics licensed under the Open Government Licence v.3.0
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Figure C.5: National benchmark for Wales – socio-economic background of the overall 
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